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Abstract
The manufacturing strategy literature is reviewed and it is found to centre on content
and process models. However, a number of other issues are present in the literature
whose relationship to the central process and content models is less clear. These
include the trade-off, focus, flexibility, and generic manufacturing strategies. It is
noted that the manufacturing strategy literature does not fully address product
customisation. The literature relating to the interface between marketing and
manufacturing is found to concentrate either on the identification of conflict areas, or
on strategic reconciliation between the functions. Writers in this field do give greater
emphasis to product customisation.
A case-study method is adopted for the research and the design involves four firms
in varying industries. The firms manufacture fork-lift trucks, microswitches, telephone
switching systems and diaries, respectively. The case-studies comprise quantitative and
qualitative data, and each case chapter includes case-specific analysis.
The analysis of all the cases finds that customisation has a very important effect on
-manufacturing performance. The firms have inconsistencies within their manufacturing
strategies, but these are found to rest not only on the firms' manufacturing products
with different volume requirements in the same plant, but also on the fact of some of
the products being custom-designed. The interface between marketing and
manufacturing is found to be more complex and variable than the literature would
suggest. The role that customised products play in relationships with customers also
varies, although this is inconsistently recognised by the firms.
Based on the case-data, a model of product customisation is proposed. This
incorporates customisation, flexibility, product architecture, the manufacturing strategy
trade-off and the competitive criteria.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank lots of people who helped with the research:
John Coopey for suggesting it
John Dalrymple for believing in it and making it possible
All the staff at all the firms who helped with their time and assistance - I
learned a lot from you
More generally, thanks to colleagues and friends at the University of Stirling,
Manchester School of Management and Manchester Metropolitan University, not least
for providing me with the opportunity to earn a living - Dr. John Dalrymple,
Professor Bob Hollier and Professor Richard Thorpe. Thanks also to June Hall for
making my teaching timetable conducive to writing.
Finally, thanks to many friends and loved ones who have made life enjoyable during
the period of the research and writing, notably: my mother; John Tavendale for early
encouragement; John Harrison for wonderful friendship and use of the A-Marlcworthy
section of his OED; John Bowers for hills and beers; and Jill, for her love and
amazing ability to cut through the crap.
This is dedicated to the memory of my father, Frederick Arthur Spring.
Declaration
I, Martin Spring, declare that I am the sole author of this work. None of the material
has been included in another thesis. .
Martin Spring
Contents in Brief
Chapter 1 - Introduction
	 2
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 	 6
Chapter 3 - Research Design	 133
Chapter 4 - Case: Hyster-Yale Materials Handling
	 168
Chapter 5 - Case: Honeywell Control Systems Limited 	 252
Chapter 6 - Case: Philips BCS	 335
Chapter 7 - Case: Letts	 427
Chapter 8 - Cross-Case Analysis: Strategy Content and Customisation 474
Chapter 9 - Conclusions, Speculations and Recommendations for Further
Work	 569
Appendix - Data-collection Instrument
References
Contents
Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Subject and Motivation for Research 	 2
1.2 Outline of the Thesis	 2
Chapter 2 - Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
,	6
2.2 Strategy	 7
2.2.1 Corporate Strategy	 8
2.2.2 Business Strategy 	 13
2.2.3 Functional Strategies 	 20
2.2.4 Strategy Process	 22
2.2.5 Conclusion	 30
2.3 Manufacturing Strategy 	 31
2.3.1 Manufacturing Strategy Content
	 33
2.3.1.1 Competitive Criteria 	 33
2.3.1.2 Decision Areas 	 42
2.3.2 Manufacturing Strategy Process
	 45
2.3.3 The Trade-Off 	 52
2.3.4 'Best Practice'/'World Class Manufacturing'
	 55
2.3.5 Consistency or 'Fit'
	 56
2.3.6 Focus	 60
2.3.7 Level of Manufacturing Strategy
	 63
2.3.8 Flexibility	 67
2.3.9 Generic Manufacturing Strategies
	 75
2.3.10 Do Formal Manufacturing Strategies Improve Performance?
	
76
2.3.11 Conclusions on Manufacturing Strategy
	 78
	
2.4 Manufacturing and Marketing	 80
2.4.1 Conflict Areas	 80
2.4.2 Strategic Reconciliation	 85
2.4.3 Other Research	 97
2.4.4 The Product and Related Issues 	 101
2.4.4.1 The Product 	 102
2.4.4.2 Product Range 	 103
2.4.4.3 Product-Range Breadth 	 108
2.4.4.4 Product Customisation
	 113
2.4.4.5 Mass Customisation and Product Family
	
Management	 117
2.4.4.6 The Product Life-Cycle 	 120
2.5 Implications for the Present Research
	 125
2.5.1 Major Issues From The Literature
	 125
2.5.1.1 Scope	 125
2.5.1.2 The Product and the Product-Range
	 126
2.5.1.3 Strategy Process
	 127
2.5.1.4 Marketing and Manufacturing
	
127
2.5.1.5 A Theory of Manufacturing Strategy for Industrial
Markets?	 128
2.5.1.6 Product Customisation
	 129
2.5.2 Research Questions 	 130
Chapter 3 - Research Design
3.1 Introduction	 133
3.2 Extensive and Intensive Approaches
	 133
3.3 Assessment of Research Quality
	 135
3.4 Discussion of Generic Approaches 	 138
3.5 The Method for This Research 	 142
3.5.1 External Validity: Cross-sectional Considerations 	 147
3.5.1.2 Case Selection	 148
3.5.1.3 Case Definition 	 151
3.5.1.4 Practicalities	 153
3.5.1.5 Cases Selected	 155
3.5.1.6 Summary of Cross-Sectional Issues 	 156
3.5.2 External Validity: Longitudinal Considerations
	
157
3.5.2.1 Learning New Skills, Learning New Theory 	 158
3.5.2.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis 	 161
3.5.3 The Data-Collection Instrument 	 166
/
Chapter 4 - Case: Hyster-Yale Materials Handling
4.1 Introduction	 168
4.1.1 Company Background and History	 168
4.1.2 Irvine Manufacturing Facility 	 169
4.1.3 Context of the Study	 170
4.1.4 Research Process	 171
4.2 Strategy Statements	 172
4.2.1 Hyster-Yale Europe Mission	 172
4.2.2 Worldwide Assembly Strategy 	 173
4.2.3 Marketing Communications 	 175
4.2.4 Development of Irvine Plant Role 	 175
4.3 Hyster Operations at Irvine	 177
4.3.1 Organisation	 177
4.3.2 Products	 180
4.3.3 Manufacturing Facilities and Processes 	 182
4.3.4 Ordering, Specification and Planning - Standard Procedure 	 185
4.3.5 Ordering, Specification and Planning - SPED
	
187
4.3.6 The Shop Floor Reality	 192
4.4 Quantifying the SPED Problem	 194
4.4.1 Overall Measures 	 194
4.4.2 Trends	 195
4.4.3 Series-to-Series Variation	 197
4.5 Competitive Position 	 201
4.5.1 The Challenger Range 	 202
4.5.2 Technical Lead and Custom Design 	 203
4.5.3 Customer Service	 205
4.5.4 Price	 206
4.5.5 Delivery	 206
4.5.6 Dealers	 207
4.6 Performance Measurement	 210
4.6.1 Delivery Performance 	 210
4.6.2 Cost and Costing Systems	 213
4.7 Customisation and Variety	 219
4.7.1 Attitudes to SPED	 219
4.7.2 The 'SPED Price List'	 221
4.7.3 SPED Option Usage	 221
4.7.4 Dealer Modifications	 224
4.7.5 'Evolving' SPED	 224
4.8 Contract Chronologies	 227
4.8.1 An Order for Five Trucks for a UK Public Sector
Organisation	 227
4.8.1.1 Chronology Outline	 227
4.8.1.2 Commentary and Background	 229
4.8.2 Three Trucks for an African Customer	 231
4.8.3 Six Trucks for a Northern European Customer	 231
4.8.4 General Comments	 232
4.9 Case Analysis	 234
4.9.1 What To Do About SPED?	 234
4.9.2 Marketing and Manufacturing	 234
4.9.3 Custom-built and Custom-designed Products 	 236
4.9.4 Inter-Series Comparisons' .	240
4.9.5 Technical and Business Decisions 	 241
4.9.6 The Cost of SPED, The Value of SPED	 245
Chapter 5 - Case: Honeywell Control Systems Limited
5.1 Introduction	 252
5.1.1 Company Background	 252
5.1.2 The Newhouse Site	 254
5.1.3 An Outline of Control Components Products	 257
5.1.4 Context of the Study	 258
5.1.5 Research Process 	 259
5.2 Strategy Statements 	 261
5.2.1 Control Components Strategy 	 261
5.2.2 Marketing Communications
	
264
5.3 The AOM Market	 268
5.4 Honeywell Operations - AOM Products 	 272
5.4.1 Organisation Overview	 272
5.4.2 Sales	 274
5.4.3 Marketing and Design	 275
4.3.1 Bringing AOM Products to Market - Design and Product
Management Interaction	 275
4.3.2 A.O.M. Sales Projects 	 277
5.4.3.3 The Role of the Product Manager 	 281
5.4.4 Manufacturing and Procurement	 285
5.4.4.1 Organisation and Overview 	 285
5.4.4.2 EN Parts Sourcing	 287
5.4.4.2 Newhouse Manufacturing Processes 	 288
5.4.5 Delivery Performance	 293
5.5.5 Products	 294
5.5.1 The Three Product Groups: Volumes, Variety and
Revenue	 294
5.5.2 Product-Range Structure and Reporting 	 298
5.5.3 AOM Product Variety 	 300
5.5.4 Customisation	 301
5.6 Contract Chronologies 	 305
5.6.1 Two Customised ENs for a North European Sales Affiliate 	 306
5.6.2 Contract 2 - An SP for Customised ENs for a UK Sales
Affiliate	 308
5.6.3 Contract 3 - An SP for Two Customised Control Panels for
a UK Sales Affiliate	 311
5.7 Case Analysis	 314
5.7.1 Explicit Business Strategy	 314
5.7.2 International Organisation Issues 	 317
5.7.3 Manufacturing Strategy and the Implications of Low
Volumes	 319
5.7.4 Marketing - Manufacturing 	 321
5.7.5 Product-Range and Customisation	 322
5.7.6 Sales Project Decisions 	 324
5.7.7 Design Cycle and Material Cycle 	 327
5.7.8 Summary of Honeywell Case Analysis 	 330
Chapter 6 - Case: Philips BCS
6.1 Introduction	 335
6.1.1 Company Background 	 336
6.1.2 An Outline of Products and Markets
	
338
6.1.3 Context of the Research	 339
6.2 Industry Context
	
341
6.2.1 Technology Context 	 341
6.2.2 Market Context
	
342
6.2.3 Small Switch Markets	 343
6.2.3.1 Channel Overview	 343
6.2.3.2 Market Characteristics
	 344/
6.2.4 Implications for BCS
	
348
6.3 Strategy Statements 	 350
6.3.1 Marketing Strategy	 350
6.3.2 Manufacturing and Procurement Strategy 	 354
6.4 Development, Marketing and Sales	 361
6.4.1 Development	 361
4.1.1 The Development Process	 363
4.1.2 Design Review	 367
6.4.1.3 Scale of Development Projects 	 369
6.4.2 Product Marketing 	 371
6.4.3 Sales and Logistics	 372
6.5 Manufacturing and Procurement
	 374
6.5.1 Manufacturing Organisation 	 374
6.5.2 Manufacturing: Some Product and Process Technology Issues
	 376
6.5.3 The Manufacturing Processes	 379
6.5.4 Procurement	 384
6.6 The Product-Range and Customisation	 390
6.6.1 The Product-Range - A Clear View	 390
6.6.2 The Product Range: Volumes, Variety and Revenues	 392
6.6.3 Sopho-S	 395
6.6.3.1 The Plan for Sopho S	 396
6.6.3.2 Product Variety within the Sopho-S Range 	 398
6.6.3.3 Sopho-S One-and-a-Half	 400
6.6.3.4 Internationalisation 	 406
6.6.4 Customisation 	 410
6.6.5 Shopfloor Effects of Product Variety	 412
6.7 Case Analysis	 416
6.7.1 Basis for Strategy 	 416
6.7.2 Interfunctional Relationships 	 418
6.7.3 Competitive Criteria 'Drift' 	 419
6.7.4 Technology	 420
6.7.5 Internationalisation	 421
6.7.6 Product Variety and Customisation	 421
Chapter 7 - Case: Letts
7.1 Introduction	 427
7.1.1 Context of the Study 	 427
7.2 The Diary Business - Markets and Issues 	 430
7.3 Strategy	 435
7.3.1 Explicit Strategy Statements
	
435
7.3.2 Marketing Communications
	
436
7.3.3 Competitive Positioning 	 436
7.3.4 Manufacturing Strategy	 439
7.5 Organisation and Interfunctional Issues 	 447
7.5.1 Organisation	 447
7.5.2 Interfunctional Relationships	 448
7.5.3 Technical Coordination 	 452
7.6 Operations	 454
7.6.1 Design	 454
7.6.2 Diary Manufacture 	 ,	 457
7.7 Product Range	 460
7.7.1 Volume, Variety and Seasonality	 461
7.8 After Restructuring
	
	 462
/
7.9 Case Analysis	 468
Chapter 8 - Cross-Case Analysis: Strategy Content and Customisation
8.1 Introduction to Analysis 	 474
8.2 Overview: The Firms, Their Plants, Their Problems	 475
8.3 Corporate Strategy	 477
8.4 Business Strategy and Competitive Position 	 478
8.5 Manufacturing Strategy	 480
8.5.1. Content of Documented, Explicit Strategies 	 480
8.5.1.1 Competitive Criteria
	
482
8.5.1.2 Decision Areas 	 483
8.5.2 Manufacturing Strategy Content Implicit in Current Activities 	 486
8.5.3 Consistency, Focus and Level of Aggregation 	 490
8.5.4 Comment on Customisation in the Manufacturing Strategies 	 499
8.5.5 Summary on Manufacturing Strategy	 500
8.6 A General Model of Product Customisation 	 502
8.7 Aspects of Product Customisation 	 503
8.7.1 Demand-Side Issues	 503
8.7.1.1 Problem-Definition and Solution-Realisation
	 505
8.7.1.2 What is Customisation? 	 508
8.7.2 Supply-Side Aspects 	 512
8.7.2.1 Custom-Design, Custom-Build 	 513
8.7.2.2 Options: Essential Features and 'Optional Extras'	 516
8.7.2.3 Product Architecture	 518
8.7.3 Patterns of Customisation	 520
8.7.3.1 Problem-Solving and Transfer: Timing and Repetition 520
8.7.3.2 Role of Customisation	 523
8.7.4 The Role of Service in Customisation 	 528
8.8 Customisation and Flexibility	 533
8.9 Customisation and the Trade-Off
	 537
8.10 A General Model of Product Customisation Revisited
	 540
8.11 Customisation and the Marketing-Manufacturing Interface 	 542
8.11.1 Functional Roles, Interfaces and Geography for the Finns
	 542
8.11.1.1 Hyster-Yale	 544
8.11.1.2 Honeywell	 546
8.11.1.3 Philips BCS
	 547
8.11.1.4 Letts	 549
8.11.2 Can Marketing and Manufacturing Co-Exist?
	 550
8.11.3 The Field-Plant Interface	 551
8.11.4 Major Accounts	 554
8.11.5 The Effects of Customisation on the Marketing-Manufacturing
Interface	 556
8.11.6 Staff Backgrounds and Degree of Specialisation 	 558
8.12 Operations Strategy and Customisation
	 560
8.12.1 Some Shortcomings of the Manufacturing Strategy Literature 560
8.12.1.1 Omission of Service Component 	 560
8.121.2	 Neglect of Design Engineering Activities as Central to
Operations	 561
8.12.1.3 Over-Emphasis of Pure Markets	 563
8.11.1.4	 Lack of Precision in Including Customisation,
Flexibility and the Trade-Off
	
563
8.122 An Operations Strategy Process
	 563
Chapter 9 Conclusions, Speculations and Recommendations for Further Work
9.1 Introduction	 569
9.2 The Research Questions Revisited 	 569
9.3 Generalisability	 572
9.4 Research Method
	 573
9.5 Tracking Past and Present Influences on Strategy 	 574
9.5.1 Hyster-Yale	 575
9.5.2 Honeywell	 578
9.5.3 Philips BCS	 580
9.5.4 Letts	 581
9.5.5 Cross-Case Analysis of Influences
	
583
9.6 Focusing Service and Manufacturing Strategies: Transaction Costs 	 585
9.7 Manufacturing Strategy and Industrial Markets	 588
9.8 Manufacturing Strategy and Core Competences 	 591
9.9 The Future of Customisation	 591
9.10 Suggestions for Further Work
	
592
9.10.1 Testing and Refining the General Model
	
592
9.10.2 The Service Aspects of Manufacturing 	 593
9.10.3 The Marketing Manufacturing Interface 	 594
9.10.4 Boundary-Spanning Roles 	 594
9.10.5 Operations Strategy in Industrial Markets
	
595
9.10.6 Operations Strategy and Core Competences
	
596
9.10.7 Emergent Strategy Processes
	
596
9.10.8 Operations and Geography
	
597
9.10.9 Mass Customisation 	 i	 598
9.10.10 The Trade-Off • 	 599
/
Appendix - Data-collection Instrument
References
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Subject and Motivation for Research
This research concerns product customisation. The initial motivation for the research
was personal experience of working in the manufacturing functions of firms where
marketing personnel appeared all too ready to say to customers 'Yes, we can do
that 	 ', to accept customers' orders for unusual products, and to leave the
manufacturing function to live with the consequences.
This appeared to represent an instance of manufacturing not being aligned to other
parts of the organisation, notably marketing, in terms of its priorities. This raised
questions about the strategic role of manufacturing and, consequently, the
manufacturing strategy literature forms the main theoretical foundation for the work.
However, although centred in the operations management field, the research takes an
interdisciplinary stance, examining the interface between marketing and manufacturing
in attempting to understand the research problem.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2 is the literature review. It starts with a brief review of corporate strategy
concepts, as corporate strategy tends to be associated with, amongst other things, the
scope of a business (i.e. what a business in fact does - what it may or may not be able
to do well). It then reviews competitive strategy, before moving on to one of the two
main areas reviewed - manufacturing strategy. This section concentrates in particular
2
on those aspects of the manufacturing strategy literature having potential bearing on
the product customisation issue. The other major part of the review addresses the
marketing-manufacturing interface and the role and significance of product policy in
that interface. Drawing all these together with recent interdisciplinary work, the final
section of the review identifies important issues to be examined.
Chapter 3 discusses the research method to be adopted. Alternative resarch designs
are reviewed, both in general terms and as they relate to the specific research
question. The conclusion of this is that a case-study method is appropriate, and the
issues of case selection, data collection and data-analysis are discussed. An Appendix
contains the details of the data-collection instrument used.
The next four chapters, Chapters 4 to 7, each comprise a relatively self-contained,
single-firm case-study. Each of these chapters contains some brief analysis devoted
to the individual case. For reasons explained elsewhere, the last of these case-studies
is rather briefer than the other three.
Chapter 8 contains the cross-case analysis, developing some of the single-case
analyses from the preceding four chapters, and relating them more systematically to
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. It examines manufacturing strategy and product
customisation issues in the firms and develops a novel model of the product
customisation process which incorporates the concepts of product architecture, process
flexibility, the competitive criteria and the trade-off. The model is then used a a basis
for developing operations strategy prescription.
3
The final chapter, Chapter 9, revisits the research questions, briefly comments on the
wider applicability of the findings of the research, and discusses the method adopted.
It then explores, in a rather more speculative way than Chapter 8, some of the other
implications of the work. Finally, it makes a number of recommendations for further
research, both to build directly onto the fmdings of this work, and to explore new
avenues suggested by some of the cases.
4
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Manufacturing strategy is the focus of the literature review and, indeed, of the whole
thesis. However, the literature review begins by reviewing some more general
concepts from the business literature, of what strategy is and how it is formed. This
serves a dual purpose. First of all, it provides some of the basic language that is
useful in discussing the more specific issue of manufacturing strategy. Secondly, the
business literature's concern with scope and competitive emphasis is one that informs
later discussions of the scope and competitive emphasis of manufacturing. This first
section then, discusses corporate strategy, business (or competitive) strategy and then
functional strategies.
The next main section of the review concerns manufacturing strategy. It presents a
short general review of the manufacturing strategy process and content literature, but
concentrates its attention on a number of themes emerging from the literature that
seem particularly contentious or related to product customisation, the product-range
and the marketing-manufacturing interface. One aim here is to identify the extent to
which the manufacturing strategy literature explicitly or implicitly addresses these
issues.
The interdisciplinary nature of the research is developed in the next section of the
review, which concerns the marketing-manufacturing interface. A number of areas are
reviewed, some dealing with the interface per se, others with subjects that link the
two functions. This section includes discussions of the notion of the product, product-
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range, product customisation and the product life-cycle.
The review concludes by drawing together the substantive elements of these three
main bodies of literature to formulate the scope and objectives of the present research.
2.2 Strategy
There are many conceptions of what strategy is. Many writers avoid definitions of the
term, preferring to identify typical characteristics of strategic decisions (Mintzberg,
1987; Johnson and Scholes, 1993:5-10). Manufacturing strategy is the main subject
of this review and so this introduction to strategy in general is intended to provide a
framework for discussion and, in particular, a way of locating functional strategies,
of which manufacturing strategy is one type. This does not imply that the view of
strategy adopted is seen as exhaustive. Hofer and Schendel (1978: 27-29) described
three levels of strategy:
Corporate strategy: 	 What set of businesses should we be in?
Business strategy: 	 How to compete in a particular industry or
product/market segment
Functional area strategy:	 Maximising resource productivity.
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Progressing downward through the hierarchy, the emphasis shifts on a number of
dimensions, as shown in Table 2.1
Table 2.1 Emphases of Corporate, Business and Functional Strategies
Selected Issues Corporate Business Rnctional
Distinctive
Competence
Competitive
Advantage
Scope
Emphasis
Comparison
Emphasis
Nature
+
+
v. Industries
4-14
portfolio/
diversification
4-14
++•
v. competitors
-14
product/market
segment
matches
-144
++
v. products
+
product/market
revenue,
product forms
and brands
Note: Emphasis: + = occasionally important; ++ = important; +++ = very important
(Adapted from Hofer and Schendel, (1978: 28))
2.2.1 Corporate Strategy
Defining the business was seen by Hofer and Schendel (1978) as a matter of
identifying the product/market segments in which to operate. Ansoff's approach to
identifying the firm drew on a number of other factors:
'Some firms are identified by the characteristics of their product-
line 	 Others are described by the technology which underlies the
product line 	 Firms are also described in terms of their markets.
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Here it is useful to make a distinction between customer and mission.
A mission is an existing product need; a customer is the actual buyer
of the product....' (Ansoff, 1965: 106)
Further on, Ansoff defines possible growth vectors in a two-dimensional matrix
(Ansoff, 1965: 108-109), using the two dimensions of product and mission: the
mission in turn can be defined in terms of its product characteristics, technology, or
similarity of needs (Ansoff, 1965: 107). There appears to be some inconsistency in
these dimensions: based on these definitions, the two are by no means orthogonal.
When Ansoff addresses the more advanced stage of building portfolios of activities,
he simply refers to 'product-market scope' (Ansoff, 1965: 172) and it is his two-
dimensional diversification matrix that has endured (e.g. Johnson and Scholes, 1993:
222).
Abell (1980: 169-173) found two dimensions inadequate and, based on a number of
case-studies in industrial goods firms, identified three dimensions by which to define
the scope of a business: customer groups, customer functions and technologies
(usually product rather than process technologies, although this is not explicitly
stated).
A more recent development from this is by Mc Tavish (1995) who adds to Abell's
three dimensions the fourth dimension, albeit a less convincingly orthogonal one, of
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stage in the value chain' (Porter, 1985: 33-61), which is effectively the degree of
vertical integration. Abell is not unaware of such considerations, making it clear that
his work is not about vertical integration but '..questions of how a business should be
defined at the stage at which it sells its final product' (Abell, 1980: 6). Ansoff also
considered this aspect, from the more macroscopic perspective of whether to diversify
by acquisition or internal growth (Ansoff, 1965: 196-198).
Porter (1985: 233) reverts to something similar to Ansoff's two dimensions, adopting
those of product varieties and buyers:
'An industry is a market in which similar or closely related products
are sold to buyers...'
Kay (1993: 128) considers that the question 'What business are we in?' is a badly
formulated one because the word 'business' conflates the separate ideas of market,
industry and strategic group. He cites examples of firms in oil exploration redefining
their business as 'energy supply' and finding that managing coal mines is very
different from managing oil exploration: there is an energy supply market, but not an
energy supply industry or, at least, the difference between the two ideas was what
caused many of these diversifications to be unsuccessful (Kay, 1993: 129). Kay re-
formulates the question and in so doing combines both perspectives:
'Mc Tavish actually mis-appropriates Porter's terminology, as the value-chain consists, by
Porter's definition (Porter, 1985: 33-35) of the activities that the firm is involved in and the value-
system is the aggregate of the value-chains of all the firms in the sequence. Thus the issue is to
determine which stages in the value-system should constitute the firm's value-chain.
10
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'The question "What is our core business?" should be redefined as
'What markets are those which best enable us to translate our
distinctive capability into competitive advantage?" (Kay, 1993: 132)
Even the use of the word 'core' itself suggests a looking inward, by implication at that
which cannot be dispensed with. This was to some extent a product of its times:
Ansoff was primarily concerned with diversification (Ansoff, 1965: 127-138); Abell
wrote at the beginning of a period of corporate retrenchment after years of
diversification into unrelated activities, particularly in large companies. Although
Abell did not use the term 'core' business, his work is identified by Kay (Kay, 1993:
143) as seminal in the drive for reversion to core business subsequently popularised
by Peters and Waterman (1982: 292-305) as 'sticking to the knitting'. Kay's definition
links the emphasis on scope of corporate strategy with the emphasis on competitive
advantage of business strategy (to adopt the terms proposed by Hofer and Schendel).
It also introduces the ideas of distinctive capability and competitive advantage. Kay
does not seek to define orthogonal, exhaustive variables by which to 'define the
business', but identifies product and geographical factors as the essence of defining
most markets.
Along similar lines, Thorelli (1986) suggests that a firm's mission may be defined in
terms of its domain, and the objectives to be achieved within that domain. The domain
is defined in terms of: product, clientele, functions performed, territory and time.
This adds space and time to other dimensions used by the authors already reviewed.
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Table 2.2 'Defining the Business' - Five Versions
Author	 DimensicxiBases
	
Emphasis
Ansoff
	
Mission	 Diversification and growth into new
(1965)	 Customer	 businesses - external orientation
Abell
(1980)
Porter
(1985)
Kay
(1993)
Thorelli
(1986)
Customer groups
Customer functions
Technologies
Product varieties
Buyers
Products &
Geography define
markets
Product
aientele served
Functions
Territory
Time
Understanding Mat the 'core
business' is: external orientation
Defining terms for analysis of
competition: external orientation
Market definition: external orientation
based on distinctive competence
(internal)
'Domain' defined to identify potential
network members
These definitions involve various combinations of inward- and outward-looking
elements. Abell (1980: 11-12) summarises these two approaches as resource-based and
programme-based (where, in the latter, programmes are defined 'conventionally in
terms of products offered and markets served') and is quite explicit about addressing
solely the latter in his work. His concern is with developing the three- as opposed to
two-dimensional basis for defining the programme. Table 2.2 summarises the
dimensions used by these writers to 'define the business'.
It is apparent from Table 2.2 that the overwhelming emphasis is an external one.
This, in part, is because corporate strategy as a concept or technique grew out of the
need for multi-divisional corporations to manage, from the centre, increasingly large,
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complex and diverse activities. An important development of the 1970s was the use
of the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Growth-Share matrix in the planning of a
portfolio of businesses. Interpretations vary as to the application of the technique:
most see it as a corporate strategy tool for managing, from the centre, a portfolio of
businesses (Henderson, 1979; Hofer and Schendel, 1978: 28; Kay, 1993: 344-345;
McKiernan, 1992: 1-3); some adopt it for managing products, which may or may not
be congruent with Strategic Business Units (Day, 1977; Wind, 1982: 119-121). The
BCG matrix and other similar devices concentrate on balancing the propensities for
cash-utilisation and cash-generation of various products/businesses and needed clear
definitions of markets for the analysis of market shares, growth rates and projected
revenue streams.
Having examined some approaches to defining businesses, the review now summarises
some prominent theories as to how, once defined, these businesses compete. This is
the second level of the Hofer and Schendel hierarchy - business or competitive
strategy.
2.2.2 Business Strategy
According to Hofer and Schendel, business strategy is concerned with how each
strategic business unit competes in its particular industry or product/market segment
(Hofer and Schendel, 1978: 28). A good deal of the strategic management literature
is devoted to this subject, so this section will review a few key authors in the area,
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as well as identifying concepts that may be useful to the more specific concerns of this
research. Two basic issues will be touched upon: first, what a business' competitive
advantage is; and, secondly, what the source of this competitive advantage is. The
former is rather outward-looking, the latter more inwardly-directed. These issues are
both present in Kay's defining question (above) and show that the clean distinction
between scope as a concern of corporate strategy and competitive advantage as a
concern of business strategy, implied by the hierarchies of Hofer and Schendel and
other writers, is not always helpful.
Whilst the work of Ansoff, Abell and others provides a number of sets of dimensions
by which the current and potential scope of activities may simply be described, they
also, in varying degrees, provide rationales for determining the most appropriate
scope for the business, given its goals, objectives and circumstances. This aspect of
the corporate strategy literature potentially provides a macroscopic context for the
more detailed product scope decisions that this research addresses.
Kay's concept of 'distinctive capability' is essentially the 'distinctive competence' of
Selznick (1957: 42-56) and used by other authors since (e.g. Hofer and Schendel
(1978: 25) use the term as an alternative to 'resource deployments'). Selznick's
conception of competence is associated with patterns of organisational behaviour: 'we
look beyond the formal aspects to examine the commitments that have been accepted
in the course of adaptation to internal and external pressures' (Selznick, 1957: 42).
Although his concern was principally with public bodies and Government agencies,
he applies the concept to industrial firms (note that the term 'distinctive capabilities'
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has been adopted here):
'The assessment of industrial firms also requires a study of distinctive
capabilities and limitations. For example, a commitment to quality of
product may be an important determinant of organizational character
or institutionalization.
The first boats made by Gar Wood were high quality crcO, made of
the finest materials by master boat builders. Later, the company
decided to mass-produce a comparatively low-cost speed-boat for wide
distribution It developed that the entire organization found itself
unable to cope with the effort to shift commitments. Workmen and shop
supervisors alike continued to be preoccupied with high cost quality
craftsmanship. Members of the selling staff too, could not shift the
emphasis from 'snob appeal' to price appeal. The quality commitment
was so strong that an entirely new division - operating in a separate
plant hundreds of miles away and therefore recruiting from a different
labor market - had to be created to do the job successfully'. (Selznick,
1957: 53-54)
Selznick's emphasis is on the difficulty of changing the distinctive competence, and
less on the competitive advantage or disadvantage it affords (perhaps not surprisingly
given the concern with public agencies; the index of his book does not contain the
word 'competition'). Nonetheless, Selznick (1957: 50) comments that '[al somewhat
more general competence may develop, as when we say that a firm is good at
marketing but less successful in production'. Ansoff (1965: 97-100) developed this
further and drew up a checklist, by functional areas, by which 'competitive and
competence profiles' might be developed. From this, the firm could identify its
15
'strengths and weaknesses relative to the present product-market posture' (Ansoff,
1965: 100). (Incidentally, Ansoff also suggests that comparisons be made, where
possible, with firms in other industries altogether - benchmarldng is nothing new.)
Christensen, Andrews and Bower (1978: 130) emphasised that distinctive competence
was more than what an organisation could do, it was the set of things it did
particularly well, relative to its competitors. Hofer and Schendel soft-pedal this
aspect, simply equating distinctive competence with 'the level and patterns of the
organisation's past and present resource and skill deployments that will help it achieve
its goals and objectives' (Hofer and Schendel, 1978: 25). Snow and Hrebniak (1980)
categorise distinctive competences solely along functional lines e.g. production,
applied engineering.
Day and Wensley (1988) note how the subsequent work on distinctive competences
'add[s] little other than longer lists of factors to consider'. They combine these so-
called 'competitor-centred' approaches with customer-focused methods in a structured
approach to assessing strategic advantage. In so doing, they make in some detail the
connection between distinctive competence and competitive advantage that is outlined
by Kay in his definition of core business (Kay, 1993: 132). Kay's emphasis is on the
use of an understanding of the sources of competitive advantage to help determine
which markets to compete in. Day and Wensley take the market definition issue as
read and develop understanding of how most appropriately to measure performance
and adjust strategies to best effect.
Porter (1985: 11) states that there are only two basic types of competitive advantage:
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1low cost and differentiation. Other writers similarly summarise competitive advantage
as essentially cost or non-cost (e.g. Day and Wensley, 1988; Pettigrew, Whipp and
Rosenfeld, 1989). Porter (1980: 34-46) combines cost and differentiation with the
scope of activities to arrive at three generic strategies, previously detailed but not
explicitly derived from the types of advantage. These generic strategies are
(definitions summarised from Porter, 1985: 12-15):
Low cost 'a firm sets out to become the low-cost producer in the
industry.. .a low-cost producer must find and exploit all sources
of cost advantage. Low-cost producers typically sell a standard,
or no-frills product and place considerable emphasis on reaping
scale or absolute cost advantages from all sources... If a firm
can achieve and sustain overall cost leadership, then it will be
an above-average performer in its industry provided it can
command prices at or near the industry average.'
Differentiation 'a firm seeks to be unique in its industry along some
dimensions that are widely valued by buyers.. .It is rewarded
for its uniqueness with a premium price.'
Focus '[t]he focuser selects a segment or group of segments in the
industry and tailors its strategy to serving them to the exclusion
of others.. [c]ost focus exploits differences in cost behaviour in
some segments, while differentiation focus exploits the special
needs of buyers in certain segments'.
These are shown in Figure 2.1.
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Firms in any industries who adopt none of these strategies will, according to Porter,
perform less well than those who adopt one. He characterises those adopting none as
'stuck in the middle'. Porter is inconsistent in his expounding of this categorisation
(Cronshaw et al, 1994): it varies from a prescription to a descriptive classificatory
scheme; it is unclear whether firms (taking the prescriptive view for now) should
adopt only one or at least one of the strategies; it is also unclear as to whether the
scheme refers to the strategic orientation of the whole firm or simply to product
positioning (i.e. a firm could have a number of products, each with different generic
strategies). The empirical support for Porter is contradictory and there are examples
of firms successfully 'stuck in the middle' or adopting both low cost and
differentiation strategies (Murray, 1988; C.Hill, 1988; Cronshaw et al, 1994). As
taxonomical scheme, it is fundamentally flawed (Chrisman, Hofer and Boulton, 1988).
Nonetheless, the generic strategies have been widely adopted and, for example, taken
more or less unquestioningly as the starting-point for many manufacturing strategy
theorists (Kotha and Orne, 1989; Samson, 1991: 18; Schroeder, 1993: 33).
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Recent developments in strategy research have challenged a number of tenets of both
corporate and business strategy. The core competence literature, popularised in its
present form by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), takes considerably farther the move
away from the largely outward-facing concern with products and markets and towards
a resource-based view of the firm (VVernerfelt, 1984). Also, as Rumelt (1994) notes,
it builds on the well-established but essentially static view of distinctive competence
in which capabilities are givens, with which an environmental fit must be made by the
strategist. Rather than 'givens' to be exploited as well as possible through competition
between products in markets, competencies are increasingly being seen as the true
locus of competition, with products 'but the momentary expression of a corporation's
core competencies'; Prahalad and Hamel (1990) characterise product-to-product
competition as the last 100 yard sprint of a marathon. Rather than acting as some kind
of conceptual plumber, fitting the distinctive competences to the environment, the
strategist proactively selects, builds, deploys and protects core competences (Hamel,
1994). Competition over competences is not about the sort of optimisation of
resource-allocation characterised by, say, the BCG Matrix but about 'a search for new
ways to challenge traditional competitive logics' (De Leo, 1994). The core
competence idea is an appealing re-statement and development of some of the ideas
of the resource-based view of the firm. As elaborated by Hamel and Prahalad (1994:
5-9), it also represents an exhortation not to destroy potential sources of long-term
competitive advantage in misguided attempts to improve short-term financial
performance by restructuring and outsourcing.
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2.2.3 Functional Strategies
The third of Hofer and Schendel's levels of strategy is the one to which most
consideration will be given, in that the central body of literature to be reviewed is that
of manufacturing and operations strategy. This section will briefly consider some
general issues relating to functional strategies per se: the manufacturing strategy
literature will be reviewed in detail in section 2.3.
Hofer and Schendel provide a convenient stepping-off point (although they do not
devote any of their book to a detailed consideration of functional strategies). They
comment as follows in relation to functional strategies: the 'principal focus of strategy
is on the maximisation of resource productivity ' ; the characteristics and scope of
strategy components are 'product/market development and product forms and brands';
competitive advantage is 'vs specific products'; that manufacturing system design,
product-line policies and market development policies are included in business
strategy rather than functional strategy. (Hofer and Schendel, 1978: 28).
Consideration of functional strategies per se causes some questioning of what
constitutes 'strategy' anyway. Mockler (1995: 3-5) notes that the discipline previously
known as strategic planning, which centred on strategy formulation across the whole
enterprise, has become more and more concerned with implementation and less the
exclusive preserve of planners at the centre of corporations. As the focus 'shifted to
managing strategically at any level of management where enterprise-wide strategies
are implemented' (Mockler, 1995: 4) the discipline became known as strategic
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management. Mockler suggests that the shift is one to 'integrative enterprise
management, that is, management at any level within the overall context of overall
enterprise....strategies' . Pettigrew, Whipp and Rosenfeld (1989) regard the term
'strategic' as simply referring to magnitude and the presence of second-order effects.
Here is not the place to consider all the defulitions of 'strategy' that have ever been
made. What Mockler points to though, is that either the meaning of the term has
changed, or there are more activities that are 'strategic', or both. Successive
functionally-based disciplines have taken on the mantle: marketing (e.g. Day and
Wensley, 1983) manufacturing (Skinner, 1969), Human Resource Management (e.g.
Storey, 1991), research and development (e.g. Loveridge and Pitt, 1990). Not only,
as Mockler sees it, have managers within these functions 'managed strategically', but
the explicit strategy-formulation process previously only the concern of central
planners has become part of functional management. Functions, departments and even
smaller subdivisions of organisations have strategies that are written down or
otherwise explicitly-defined, and internally-generated rather than handed down to them
from central planners.
Because there is no longer the single strategic 'architect' (Christensen, Andrews and
Bower, 1978:19-21), or a plan that is centrally and, presumably, consistently written
(Ansoff, 1965), it is increasingly necessary to understand the relationship between
functional strategies and business strategies and between various functional strategies.
As such, there has developed a growing concern that there should be consistency or
'fit' (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984) between different levels of strategy and
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between the strategies of the various functions. Business strategy has, for many years,
been concerned with contingency theories of matching internal resources with external
opportunities and threats in the business environment. In particular, contingency
theorists have concentrated on identifying the organisational structure most appropriate
to environmental conditions or to other business characteristics (Burns and Stalker,
1961; Chandler, 1962; Woodward, 1965 and, slightly more recently, Donaldson,
1987).
Although the functional strategies of manufacturing and marketing will be discussed
in some detail later, it is important at this stage to raise the more general question of
what the nature of a functional strategy is. Should functional strategies be developed
to fit, in the way contingency theorists (e.g. Donaldson, 1985a) discuss, with the
competitive strategy? Or should the emphasis be on the consistency between the
various functional strategies? Certainly, the shift toward strategic management
identified by Mockler implies an increase in managerial agency or choice (Child,
1972) at lower levels in organisations.
2.2.4 Strategy Process
The review so far has concentrated on the content of strategy i.e. what the issues that
concern strategists are and, to some extent, what arguments there are for adopting
particular courses of action. The other major concern of the business strategy
literature is the process by which strategy - corporate, business or functional - is
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formulated. This section briefly reviews the predominant views on this subject.
Christensen et al (1978: 131) outline a sparse model of the strategy process. This
consists of:
evaluation of opportunities and threats
appraisal of internal strengths and weaknesses
- creation of strategy
- consideration of stakeholder values and responsibilities
- evaluation and choice of strategy
implementation
Mintzberg (1990) extracts the following 'premises' of this so-called Design School
model (and the term 'Design School' will be adopted in what follows):
- strategy formulation is a controlled, conscious process of thought
it is the responsibility of the head of the organisation - The Strategist
- it is best represented by a simple and informal model
an organisation's strategy should be unique
a strategy should emerge from the formulation process fully developed
- it should be simple enough to state in a sentence or two
it must then be implemented.
Insofar as he speaks of 'the strategic problem' which is to be 'solved', Ansoff (1965:
100) also represents strategy formulation as a rational, controlled and conscious
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process. However, he differs very markedly from the Design School in the way that
he attempts to 'programme' the formulation process by an elaborate decision process
flowchart. There is next to no consideration of implementation of the strategy. The
various analytical steps proposed by Ansoff depend on the availability of a great deal
of detailed, accurate information about, amongst other things, the future. This will be
termed the 'planning' approach.
Whittington (1993) categorises strategies according to the extent to which the
formulation process is deliberate, and upon the presence of objectives other than
profit-maximisation. It is the former of these that has become the most heavily-
debated aspect of the strategy process. Mintzberg (1994) is the most thorough and
devastating critique of the strategic planning approach, but it has been subject to
questioning for much longer (Mintzberg, 1978; 1979; Quinn, 1980, Mintzberg and
Waters 1985; Hayes, 1985; Mintzberg et al, 1990; Mintzberg, 1990). Mintzberg's key
criticisms of the planning approach are:
Predetermination the environment is assumed to be predictable, strategy
formulation can be programmed to happen, and
strategies can be implemented on an acquiescent
organisation;
Detachment	 it is held that strategy formulation is best carried out by
people without day-to-day involvement in the business;
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Formalisation it is held that the strategy formulation process can be
institutionalised and programmed: that 'systems can do
it'.
The ultimate criticism by Mintzberg is his so-called Grand Fallacy of planning:
'Because analysis is not synthesis, planning is not strategy formation.'
(Mintzberg, 1994: 321)
Pettigrew (1985, 1989) is also critical, but emphasises internal politics, the past and
present context of strategic change, and organisational culture. Kay (1993: 357) sees
Pettigrew 's view as nihilistic - that organisations are what they are and that all we can
do is describe, not prescribe. This seems somewhat unfair: Pettigrew avoids simplistic
conclusions, but by no means dismisses managerial agency.
The deliberate-emergent continuum of Mintzberg and Waters (1985) is perhaps the
best summary of many of these aspects of the strategy process. A strategy has been
defined as 'a pattern in a stream of decisions' (Mintzberg, 1978) and subsequently as
a pattern in a stream of actions (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Based on these
patterns, strategy types have been identified on a continuum from pure deliberate to
pure emergent. Deliberate strategies require that (a) the organisation has precise
intentions, (b) these intentions are common to all the actors and (c) the intentions
are realised exactly as planned. Emergent strategies exhibit a pattern with some
consistency - otherwise they would not be strategies by Mintzberg and Waters'
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definition - without intention. The authors acknowledge that neither of these pure
forms are likely to exist and thus propose a number of strategy types on the
continuum between them. Their view is that there is much value in the strategies
tending toward the emergent end of the continuum, that only by taking actions to see
what works can viable strategies be identified. They emphasise that:
'emergent strategy does not have to mean that management is out of
control, only - in some cases at least - it is... .willing to learn. Such
behaviour is especially important when an environment is too unstable
or complex to comprehend, or too imposing to defy
	 [management
can] respond to an evolving reality rather than having to focus on a
stable fantasy... Our view is that strategy formation walks on two feet,
one deliberate, one emergent.'
Hayes (1985) characterises this as reversing the 'ends-ways-means' sequence and, in
a similar conclusion to that of Mintzberg and Waters, suggests that a combination of
the two - bottom-up and top-down - is appropriate. In terms of prescription, this
amounts to a need to develop low-level expertise - expertise at low levels in the
organisation in problem-solving skill and the like (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 341-
343).
Johnson (1988) notes that, although it views strategy formation as a process of
learning by trying, rather than of rational design followed by implementation, Quinn's
logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1980) still makes some claim to being 'logical'.
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Johnson's empirical work has demonstrated that managers will go to considerable
lengths to ignore evidence from their business environment that does not fit their
'paradigm' of their organisation or industry. This may mean that, although some
incremental change is effected, it is inadequate because a large proportion of the data
is screened out and 'strategic drift' takes place (see Figure 2.2). Johnson even goes
so far as to suggest that the paradigm-contradicting data may provoke management to
reinforce the paradigm, making radical change even less likely. Miller and Friesen
(1980) found that organisations exhibit long periods dominated by 'momentum', where
continuity is the rule and merely incremental change take place, alternating with
occasional periods of 'revolution', where many trends and norms are reversed within
a short time. These may come about due to the type of 'drift' that Johnson identifies,
or to major external changes.
Time
Figure 2.2 'Illogical Incrementalism' and Strategic Drift (from Johnson, 1988)
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All the foregoing work assumes that, in some form or another, albeit that they may
be inappropriate or emergent, strategies are present. One further possibility is
proposed by Inkpen and Choudhury (1995). This is the concept of strategic absence.
If, as Mintzberg and Waters (1985) _suggest, strategy is a pattern in a stream of
actions, it seems perfectly conceivable that there may be no pattern at all and hence
no strategy. According to Inkpen and Choudhury, this can be due to failure i.e. a
strategy would be desirable but none exists, due to a period of transition, or be seen
as a virtue. One notable way in which strategic absence is considered potentially
virtuous is that it does not build the kind of restrictive paradigm that Johnson (1988)
describes; this is close to Mintzberg's suggestion that too much strategic consistency
can leave a firm exceedingly inflexible.
A recently-evolved alternative view of strategy process and content is the network
concept. This developed from empirical work, mostly carried out in Europe, on
business-to-business marketing. The network view of marketing and innovation is
more fully-developed (e.g. Hakansson (ed), 1982; Ford, 1980, 1984; Hákansson,
1987; Biemans, 1992), but its extension into business strategy is not well established.
However, it does offer some potentially useful alternative concepts, particularly for
industrial markets. In its sharpest contrast to much of the business strategy literature
(e.g. Christensen et al, 1978; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980), the network
view does not conceive of an organisation as one of a relatively large number of
passive entities reacting to the contingencies of an uncontrollable business
environment. Organisations, particularly in concentrated business markets (Blois,
1980a), are often among a few principal actors who are involved in various
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relationships of a continuous nature, rather than in a succession of many discrete
transactions in an external 'market'. As such, the identity is created in its interactions
with its major counterparts and ' [a]n organisation's performance is therefore largely
dependent on whom it interacts with' (Hdkansson and Snehota, 1989). As such,
network-oriented marketing strategy is much more concerned with analysing
individual customers or portfolios of customers (e.g. Campbell and Cunningham,
1983) than in aggregated 'sales' of 'products' in 'markets'.
The network view also questions the sharp divide that much strategy theory makes
between the organisation and its environment. Rather than having distinctive
competences inside the boundary between organisation and environment, which it uses
to compete in markets outside the boundary, the firm on the network view has
relationships - by definition spanning that boundary - that constitute a valuable
resource in themselves. Linking with some of the ideas of the resource-based view of
the firm, Hakansson and Snehota (1989) stress that it is largely within such
relationships that important assets such as knowledge, abilities and reputation are
created. The concept of strategy then, becomes less one of 'fit' with the environment
at any one time, and more one of the process of relating to other actors over time.
This is held to be most effectively managed by 'framing the context' in which
relationships evolve, 'rather than by designing (planning) a future pattern of activities'
(Häkansson and Snehota, 1989).
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2.2.5 Conclusion
This brief review of some key ideas in the strategy literature has identified a number
of concerns for the present research. First of all, it has been possible to contextualise
functional strategies in general, and manufacturing strategy in particular. This
provides a background for the discussion to come in following sections. However, this
is not unproblematic, as there are large overlaps between corporate, business and
functional strategies as to the domain of decision-making about scope, distinctive
competence and the competitive advantage to be sought. The shift from strategic
planning to strategic management observed by Mockler (1995) also complicates this.
The review has also identified a number of approaches to defining the business,
including outward-looking ones based on products and markets, inward-looking ones
based on resources, core competences and distinctive competences and, furthermore,
the network view which concentrates on the very relationships that link these two.
Finally, the review has outlined some of the more widely-known theories of the
processes by which strategies are formed. Much of this can apply to functional
strategies as well as to business-level strategies, and so provides background for the
process aspects of manufacturing strategy which is included in the following section.
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2.3 Manufacturing Strategy
Selznick's 1957 vignette of the Gar Wood boat company (Selznick, 1957: 53-54,
quoted above), although used to illustrate 'distinctive competence', will have a
familiar ring to anyone who has some knowledge of the manufacturing strategy
literature. However, although it was clear to Selznick (and probably to many more
before him) that it was difficult for a manufacturing organisation to be good at
everything, it is Wickham Skinner who is credited with identifying manufacturing
strategy as a separate area for study.
In the context of a 1960's USA manufacturing industry dominated by large
corporations who had been struggling with the 'productivity problem', Skinner's
(1969) views that manufacturing firms (a) could and should have objectives other than
productivity and low costs; (b) should make explicit choices about their objectives and
design their manufacturing systems accordingly; and (c) should give a prominent
strategic role to the manufacturing executive in developing strategy, were something
new. Skinner set out his vision of 'a kind of "top-down" manufacturing' in which
manufacturing policies were derived from the company's competitive strategy and
summed up in terms of the 'manufacturing task' - productivity or service, quality or
ROI (Return on Investment) for example. Central to Skinner's visions were a
formalised planning procedure, very similar to Ansoff's corporate strategy model
(Ansoff, 1965: 202-203), and the concept of the trade-off. This fundamental idea is
that, in various decisions required in the design of a manufacturing system, there is
always a trade-off between one capability and another. For example, production
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equipment can be general-purpose, flexible, but with high variable costs, hence
suitable for high-variety production where price is not a priority, or it can be special-
purpose, with low unit-costs but limited flexibility, hence suitable for high-volume
production where price is a priority. The key point is that, in Skinner's view, in
choosing the production equipment 'you can't have it both ways': production
equipment cannot provide, say, both high flexibility and low unit costs. The same
argument was applied to other decision areas such as planning and control systems
and organisation structure. These themes were reiterated and extended in Skinner
(1974), where the concept of the focused factory was introduced. Focus, just like the
trade-off, has been an important theme in the manufacturing strategy literature, and
this review will return to consider both in some depth.
Skinner's 1969 article considered manufacturing strategy content - the manufacturing
task and decision areas - and the manufacturing strategy process. These issues have
dominated subsequent work in the field, and the review will continue by briefly
presenting notable contributions to the literature under these headings. This will
provide a backdrop for the following sequence of more narrowly-focused sections.
These will consider several issues of a more over-arching nature, taking in both
process and content, as well as a few strands in the literature of a more specific nature
that relate particularly to the present research.
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2.3.1 Manufacturing Strategy Content
The content of manufacturing strategy is typically considered in two parts. First, there
is what Skinner called the 'manufacturing task', and what has subsequently been
redefined as competitive criteria (Wheelwright, 1978), competitive priorities (Leong
et al, 1989), competitive-edge criteria (New, 1992), operations objectives (Wild,
1980: 55-71; Schroeder, 1984; Slack, 1991), content variables (Adam and Swamidass,
1986), order-winning criteria (Hill, 1985; 1993) and manufacturing objectives
(Schroeder, Anderson and Cleveland, 1986; Mills et al, 1995). The term competitive
criteria will be adopted here. The other part of the content of manufacturing strategy,
which has more consistently maintained the term used by Skinner, is the range of
decision areas. These two, competitive criteria and decision areas, will be considered
in turn.
2.3.1.1 Competitive Criteria
Skinner did not consistently specify an exhaustive set of variables that defined the
manufacturing task. They were: "lowest total cost' ....time and customer satisfaction'
(Skinner, 1969: 140) (which are almost exactly those of Wild's elegant scheme (Wild,
1980: 60)); 'costs, deliveries, lead times, quality levels and reliability' (Skinner, 1969:
144); 'cost, quality, lead times, reliability, changing schedules, new product
introduction, or low investment' (Skinner, 1974: 115), to give a few examples. Other
writers have attempted to be more categorical and parsimonious, and a summary of
the various schemes are presented in Table 2.3. This tabulation of competitive criteria
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shows some general trends over the years of theory development. Notable amongst
these are:
- delivery speed has only intermittently been included
- some of the criteria have been elaborated considerably e.g. flexibility
and quality
- there has been a broadening from steady-state concerns to
progressively take in more dynamic issues i.e. innovation
- service aspects have been added latterly.
Figure 2.3 attempts to capture the broad thrust of this development.
Skinner's
various
combinations
(1969, 1974)
Figure 2.3 The Competitive Criteria: Evolution
34
45
•
	4?;t	 a) 0
▪
 -(Doom a)?:73"
o. t '5 c.) . 	 0
O c° 'rr) cS
< - Cf1 C.) 0 2
w
0
I
a)
Cl)
C
0
';',
co
>
0
C
C
:4)::.
ST)
R
C)
U-
>.C.)CCD
047.
'ILL
4-,
	
0- CU	 7 0-CC)
..E >
	
47.,	 0 0'-0
	
C 2 co	 CL ,-
.0) a)	 >	 O.
	
0 -0 0	 CO	 'V
a) CD CC)
• 
° C
0 ° .EC Z CD
C
V
.
-0	 17	 0
C	 C	 c	 4=,
co	 co	 >-	 co	 CON
4-, 	 -,	 -0	 At	 I 4-,	 4-7 •• cl)
c) 0	 0 0 c a) =	 c.) co E QC) 0
n E a)	 m E as E :0	 CD=00 DEC)
alF 1:3 02 2 tA
 -E: (1 2°cJ)"0 0	 13 0
	
C	 X 2 g
25 0
	
2 TDCL > CC	 0- >	 >) M	 CC CL O. 0 0- > O.
15
i,"	 ."	 >5	
4-,
t 3 a) a ?".
W V-a	 a) -0 CT) -0	 03000 017
> C)	 > a)
CL	
a)	 a 1.-. .5 0 .>0
= o 	 a, L-> 0	 co ,- c 7) E.CD	 a) a	 CD 1:).	 co	 a) 0 U)	 0 U) Ôø	 <- CI) C.) 0 0
ql.
co
C
o' .
>••	 4	
co
?-..	
>.
'
.	
co
4-,	.1•,	 Z.,.	
__. •Cisi c	 >.
.4-,	 >•.4-,
7'- 	 =	 =	 =	 ,- C1)
.Cr'..:CO co 	 To 	 To
a	 a	 a	 a	 a	 "c Ea) ° a	 a
0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 ii-J '5 	 Ci	 0
4, a)	 4.,	 4-,	 a)	 4-,	 4,
cn	 c)	 Cl)	 (I) 0 	 0	 0O ',7.	 0	 0	 • 	 0	 0
0 0- 0 0 0-	 0	 0
0
8
.04-,7
<
Although it is not suggested that the successive writers have built neatly on one
another's schemes, it is fair to say that attention has shifted toward the dynamic and
service aspects as indicated. The inconsistency with which delivery speed has been
included is puzzling; it was one of Skinner's various criteria and there seems little
reason to suspect that it has not always been of prime concern to manufacturing
management. Wheelwright's scheme (1978) included speed of delivery under the
'quality' heading. The broadenings in emphasis though, do reflect a change in the
perceptions of manufacturing management and academics alike as to the scope of their
discipline. Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark (1988) are perhaps the most notable
examples of this, and Wheelwright and Clark have subsequently shifted their focus
to product development as their main research concern (Wheelwright and Sasser,
1989; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992a, 1992b). Chase and Garvin's inclusion of the
service component in manufacturing strategy content has been one aspect of the
attempt to develop a genuine concept of operations strategy, rather than simply
substituting the word 'operations' in place of 'manufacturing' in theory that has been
developed from an empirical base firmly planted in manufacturing. The observation
made by Anderson et al (1989) that service operations strategy 'is virgin territory -
almost nothing has been done' remains true.
Noticeable in some of the schemes is the apparent willingness to add factors in a fairly
ad hoc manner - Hill adds 'colour range' (Hi11,1985: 41); and 'customer relations'
(Hi11,1990: Appendices C1-C3); Fitzsimmons et al (1991) add Garvin's (1987) eight
dimensions of quality; Chase (1990) adds various service aspects. Whilst these may
be relevant factors to the complete competitive offering of some firms, it appears that
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1the rationale for identifying the factors in these schemes has been forgotten. Based on
Skinner's original concept, the reason for identifying these criteria is that they are
supposed to conflict with one another and, as such, the list needs to be confined to
those for which there are reasonable grounds to suspect that such a conflict exists.
Another distinctive development is in the work of Hill. He emphasises in particular
the link between manufacturing and marketing and proposes the concept of order-
winning and order-qualifying criteria (Hill, 1985:45-52) as essential to making this
link. A close reading of the development of these concepts indicates that they started
out as a convenient way of communicating the idea of competitive criteria (Hill, 1990:
72). Hill's earlier version of the framework had 'performance criteria to compete'
instead of order-winners (Hill, 1981). But the order-winner has ended up as an
appropriation of buyer behaviour theory (Berry, Hill and Klompmaker, 1995). Along
the way, the useful presentational device became built into ever more detailed and
prescriptive audit methods and tools (e.g. Berry, Bozarth, Hill and Klompmaker,
1991) without, it is contended, adequate recognition of the implications. This process
is reminiscent of the corruption of the Boston Consulting Group Growth-Share Matrix
from 'purely a presentational device' to 'the much used (abused?) device so commonly
found in marketing and strategy textbooks' (McKieman, 1992: 7-9). It also has
parallels with the elaboration, by Ansoff (1965), of the Andrew 'Design School'
strategy formulation model (Christensen et al, 1978).
Elaboration of the original Hill concept runs considerable risks. First, if order-winners
are indeed different to competitive criteria, they are different by virtue of encroaching
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on marketing 'territory': they describe an area of decision-making and performance
mediated not only by manufacturing but also by marketing. Secondly, the emphasis
on the order implies that what we are interested in is merely an aggregation of many
atomistic purchase decisions, taken out of the context of the relationships with the
customers making the purchase. Whilst this may be the only realistic approach to
consumer buyer behaviour (at least prior to the advent of scanner-data (Cooper,
1991)), it also forms the foundation of much of the literature in industrial buyer-
behaviour. Two empirical studies which tested the Robinson, Faris and Wind (1964)
Buying Process Model have implicit in their research design that Lk useful unit of
analysis is the individual purchase decision (Ghingold, 1986; Anderson et al, 1987).
There is, however, a growing body of evidence that, in industrial marketing (and,
recently, even consumer marketing), buying behaviour is more usefully considered
not in terms of isolated decisions made by passive buyers, but as part of a
relationship. The interaction approach sees both seller and buyer active in the
relationship, and sees any particular 'decision' as influenced by, and influencing of,
the relationship between the organisations. 'The marketer's and buyer's task in this
case may have more to do with maintaining these relationships than with making a
straightforward sale or purchase' (IMP Group, 1982).
On the interaction view, a relationship consists of a series of episodes over time.
There are four types of episode - product/service, financial, information and social
(IMP Group, 1982). These might be seen as a stream of events as in Figure 2.4.
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Product/service	 •	 •
Financial	 •	 •
Information	 • •	 •	 • •	 •	 •
Social	 •	 •	 •
Time
Figure 2.4 A Graphical Representation of Episodes in a Buyer-Supplier Relationship
How each episode is handled depends on aspects of the episode itself - how complex
it is for example - but will also depend on the history of the relationship (Gadde and
Hákansson, 1993: 60-61). By implication, it will also depend on what the expectations
are of future episodes. Episodes can strengthen or weaken a relationship, particularly
in the way they affect the degree of trust between parties. As business transactions are
carried out in an atmosphere of greater or lesser uncertainty, of one sort or another
(Ford, 1980; Hákansson, Johansson and Wootz, 1976; Gadde and Hikansson, 1993:
71), the level of trust is important in determining how episodes are handled, in that
a high level of trust can greatly mitigate potentially problematic uncertainty. Trust is
seen as an important factor in determining the power of any firm in a relationship or,
indeed, in a supply network. It is based on 'reputation and, more importantly, on past
performance' (Thorelli, 1986).
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Whilst these 'softer' aspects of buyer behaviour are not completely lost on the
traditional business marketing literature, there are tendencies (a) to relegate them to
secondary considerations (e.g. Hutt and Speh, 1992: 83-84) and (b) to separate them
from the 'rational' criteria such as price and delivery. As Thorelli (1986) suggests,
however, trust (for example) is to a great extent founded on past performance on such
quantifiable criteria as delivery and quality. The reliable delivery to a customer of one
product on one occasion, if the interaction view is accepted, will not only satisfy thon
on that occasion,in respect of that product, but also modify the relationship. Such an
episode might improve trust and reduce the perceived risk involved in placing future
orders. When the time comes to place those future orders, for the same or other
products, decision-making will be based in part on trust and perceived risk and will
hence be influenced by previous manufacturing performance. This may outweigh the
immediate 'rational' criteria (e.g. this is precisely the basis for awarding 'the order'
in so-called black-box design projects as advocated as part of a lean supply
relationship (Womack et al, 1990: 138-168)). Hill's approach invites the abstraction
of the criteria from the potentially very important context of the relationship. The
implicit assumption is that current performance specific to the product to be purchased
is all that matters, hence ignoring the transfer of experience on the part of the
purchaser both over time and between products.
In the detailed strategy-formulation process advocated (Hill, 1993: 44-52), order-
winning and order-qualifying criteria for individual products considered to be
representative of particular product-market segments are allocated relative importance
in terms of weightings out of a total of 100. Wheelwright (1978) advocated something
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similar but, importantly, in Hill's approach this is to be done based on past production
and sales data giving, for example, volumes and leadtimes requested by individual
customers for individual orders. (Again, this is adopted in the process described by
Platts and Gregory, 1990.) This contrasts with the competitive criteria approach,
which does not descend into the detailed consideration of individual products,
individual orders, and individual customers. In this literature, manufacturing strategies
are usually determined at Strategic Business Unit level (e.g. Leong et al, 1990).
Many of the competitive criteria approaches (i.e. those other than Hill's) are very
sketchy about the process by which the criteria are determined. Indeed, a
dissatisfaction with the general nature of much of the writing in strategic management
is at the heart of Hill's approach, for example in this thinly-veiled swipe at Michael
Porter:
' ...researchers, writers and advisors have proffered generic statements
concerning corporate strategy formulation with expressions such as
"low cost", "differentiation" and "critical success factors" ' (Hill, 1993:
60)
Whilst this may be a valid criticism, it does not necessarily follow that Hill's
approach, particularly in the way it has become operationalised, is any better. In
conclusion, the term 'order-winner' is accepted as perhaps a more readily-grasped
construct for interviewing purposes but, for the reasons set out here, it is considered
dangerous to collect data on weightings out of 100 or to adopt any similar procedures.
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2.3.1.2 Decision Areas
Just as Skinner was less than categorical about the 'defmitive' list of competitive
criteria, so he also only claimed to identify 'some' important decision areas (Skinner,
1969). Nonetheless, he did stress the need to consider both structural and
infrastnictural issues (Skinner, 1971). As with competitive criteria, many writers have
developed their own lists of decision areas and these are summarised in the Table 2.4.
Because there is not the same implicit requirement for orthogonality or parsimony as
with the competitive criteria, there is less controversy over the decision areas. The
areas are defined so as to ensure that all aspects of the operation are explicitly
considered, and to enable assessment of consistency between various aspects of the
manufacturing system. Many writers have adopted the structure/infrastructure split -
again a Skinner concept (Skinner, 1971).
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 31) note that the infrastructural decisions are often
considered more tactical in nature, but contend that 'their cumulative impact can be
just as difficult and costly to change (if not more so)' than the structural decisions.
Berry and Hill (1991) stress the need for manufacturing planning and control systems
appropriate to the priorities of the plant. Neely et al (1994) examine the consistency
of performance measurement and competitive criteria and fmd that there may be
considerable use of surrogate measures, although there are relationships between
competitive criteria and the measures adopted.
Although there is broad agreement in many areas, there are one or two deviations.
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Perhaps the most notable, in view of the concerns of this research, is that Fine and
Hax (1985) include 'scope and new products'. Although other writers e.g. Hayes et
al (1988), Platts and Gregory (1990) include new product development in their
decision areas, their emphasis is on the organisation and procedures by which new
product development is carried out. Fine and Hax, although they also include the new
product development process in this sense, are alone in giving manufacturing
management a role in determining product-range policy:
'Scope and New Products: The degree of difficulty of the
manufacturing management task is strongly influenced by the range of
products and processes.. .In well-run organisations, manufacturing
management has significant input in decisions about product scope and
new products. Firms with rapid and frequent product introductions or
broad product lines must develop flexible, responsive, efficient
manufacturing organizations. Its (sic) product designers must
understand what demands product design will place on manufacturing,
and design, marketing and manufacturing must be in close
communication.' (Fine and Hax, 1985)
Although Fine and Hax do not draw attention to this difference in their framework,
it is quite distinctive in that it gives manufacturing management a role in product
policy. The purpose of manufacturing strategy is not just to design a manufacturing
structure and infrastructure that can cope with the products that marketing determine
that they should manufacture and develop, but also to proactively influence what
products are included in the product-range. This is a quietly radical step.
43
E
a)
ti:
a
a
1 2;----Tr
2
= 0.)
tr..
1L
co
2
0"
F
a)
>
I
2.3.2 Manufacturing Strategy Process
Skinner is clear that what he is advocating is 'top-down' manufacturing. His model
for manufacturing strategy formulation is very much in the planning mould of Ansoff
(1965: 202-203); it is similarly heavy on analysis and light on strategy formation and
issues of implementation. After several pages of his classic article (Skinner, 1969)
relating to analysis, one paragraph mentions strategy formation, noting that:
'Management must decide what it is going to make and what it will
buy; how many plants to have and how big they should be, and where
to place them; what processes and equipment to buy; what the key
elements are which need to be controlled and how they can be
controlled; and what kind of management organisation would be most
appropriate.'
And even less is given over to implementation:
'Next come the steps of working out programs of implementation,
controls, performance measures, and review procedures'.
Skinner also represents his process in the same form as Ansoff s, i.e a decision flow-
chart.
Although the hard-systems flowchart - at least of the minutely-detailed type employed
by Ansoff and Skinner - is less fashionable now than it was in the late 1960's and
1970's, the strategy formulation process advocated in much of the literature contains
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similar elements. As in the strategy formulation model of Hofer and Schendel (1978),
the process begins by definition of the Corporate Strategy and the Competitive
Strategy for the SBU, (Skinner, 1969; Wheelwright, 1978 ; Hayes and Wheelwright,
1984: 28-29; Fine and Hax, 1985; Leong et al, 1989; Tunalv, 1990; Marucheck,
Pannesi and Anderson, 1990; New, 1992; Garvin,1993; Stonebraker and Leong,
1994: 35). From these the functional strategies, of which the manufacturing strategy
is one, are derived. Dissenting voices here are few. Hill (1981, 1985, 1993, 1995)
maintains the centrality of the marketing strategy and links it upward to corporate (not
competitive) strategy and 'downward' to manufacturing strategy. Pronchno and Corréa
(1995) advocate the use of a pilot project to drive a 'middle-down-top-down'
approach, but the process set out is entirely deliberate.
Platts and Gregory (1990) present a more balanced consideration of the extent to
which the strategy formation process is a deliberate one of design or planning as
opposed to an emergent one, noting the views of Mintzberg, Quinn and others, but
in the end devoting most of their article to the design of a classic formal planning-
style audit tool. Most of the models referred to here involve some form of iteration,
indicating that the manufacturing strategy is not simply 'handed-down' to the
manufacturing function once the competitive or business strategy is decided, but that
the two are developed with regard to one another.
The next stage in the process is, almost invariably among the authors cited, to
determine the competitive criteria necessary for manufacturing to support the business
or competitive strategy. From these are determined the appropriate decisions in the
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various decision areas. The exact means by which this is achieved is, in many
instances, less comprehensively spelled out than other aspects of the strategy process.
Certain stages of the process are assisted by tools and frameworks, many of which are
embodiments of the trade-off principle (the product-process matrix, Hayes and
Wheelwright, 1979a; product profiling, Hill, 1985; the manufacturing strategy audit
workbook, Platts and Gregory, 1990 are three examples). Perhaps this is a reflection
of Mintzberg's concerns - 'planning's grandest assumption of all' - as to how
synthesis can result from analysis (Mintzberg, 1994: 223). Garvin (1993) notes that
the consensus view of the manufacturing strategy process fails to carry projects down
to the lowest levels of the organisation and 'focuses more on the broad direction and
the content of manufacturing policy and far less on detailed programs and the process
of selecting initiatives' (emphasis added). Gunn (1987: 74-87) proposes a classical
planning approach which follows the Design School steps and sets out how to break
down the plan into ever-smaller parts of a five-year programme. Although Gunn's
method includes 'obtaining commitment' as one of its stages (after formulating the
plan), it is still essentially top-down. It also seems to imply that all manufacturing
strategy programmes consist of local variations on the three 'tools': Computer-
Integrated Manufacturing, Total Quality Control and Just-in-Time. Apparently, these
are all that are required to become World Class, regardless of industry or competitive
strategy.
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) are at pains to stress, on a number of occasions, a
Mintzbergian concept of strategy:
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'It cannot be overemphasised that it is the pattern of decisions actually
made, and the degree to which that pattern supports the business
strategy, that constitutes a function's strategy, not what is said or
written in annual reports or planning documents.*'
'* Some writers and managers distinguish between an 'enunciated' (or
planned) strategy and an 'implemented' strategy. We do not make that
distinction because it suggests that developing a strategy then
implementing it are somehow separable. As will become apparent in
subsequent chapters, we think the development of a manufacturing
strategy is an interactive process involving planning and execution at
various levels and in a variety of areas. In the end, it is the pattern of
decisions actually pursued that determines the firm's manufacturing
capabilities'. (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 30, italics in original)
However, those who would write management books find it difficult to resist defining
staged processes e.g. in one of the 'subsequent chapters' on capacity and facilities
planning:
Capacity and Facilities Planning Projects: Eight-Step Procedure
1. Audit and evaluate existing capacity and facilities
2. Forecast capacity/facilities requirements
3. Defme alternatives for meeting requirements
4. Perform fmancial analyses of each alternative
5. Assess qualitative issues for each alternative
6. Select the alternative to be pursued
7. Implement the chosen alternative
8. Audit and review actual results
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 126)
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Here are the classic Design School stages: audit, forecast, define alternatives,
evaluate, choose, then implement. Roth, Giffi and Seal (1992: 43) are similarly
confused:
'The [written] strategy.. .must be a blueprint for action: a pattern of
decisions to be executed over time' (emphasis added).
The use of the future tense here shows that, even though they use the phrases of
Mintzberg, Roth et al are still planners at heart.
Mills, Platts and Gregory (1995) provide an integrative, contingency-based framework
which attempts to capture manufacturing strategy content and process, the qualities
of the process outcome as well as the internal and external contexts. In the event, the
process at the heart of their framework reverts to a three-stage one of audit,
formulation and implementation. Despite considerable discussion of various strategy
processes, and suggestions that various strategy 'modes' such as the 'entrepreneurial'
mode (Mintzberg, 1978) may be supportive at certain stages in formation, it is
essentially a Design School process overall. Mills et al note the lack of tools to
support anything other than a major or 'big bang' strategic review; they also
comment that 'in no case yet seen has the audit stage included a systematic means of
looking at past manufacturing strategy'. They summarise the strategy mode (based on
Mintzberg, 1978) they see as appropriate to each stage of the process:
Audit	 Formulation	 Implementation
Planning	Entrepreneurial	 Planning
Adaptive	 Adaptive
Grass Roots
49
The framework still has little by way of an answer as to how analysis can lead to
synthesis - i.e. where strategies come from. The section supposedly on formulation
is largely devoted to how to assess strategies once they are formulated. As Mills et
al (1995) note:
'No techniques.. have., been found in the strategy literature in general
that assist strategy development as part of the normal management
process.'
Kinnie, Staughton and Davies (1992) carried out longitudinal case studies in a number
of firms implementing changes in manufacturing strategy. This type of work is
unusual because so much of the manufacturing strategy literature concentrates on
content and process modelling. Kinnie et al found that firms successful in achieving
the aims of their change programmes adopted a proactive approach during
implementation and understood and made provision for the wider implications of the
change. However, the work is disappointing in a number of ways and does not, in the
final analysis, give any new insights not available from the change management
literature (e.g. Burnes, 1992). The projects chosen by Kinnie et al were all
technology-based, with five out of the seven projects (the five deemed 'failures') being
information-technology-based production planning and control systems - OPT
(Optimised Production Technology) or MRP (Materials Requirements Planning).
Furthermore, the research examined the change process adopted given the decision
to effect the particular change i.e. no connection is made between strategy formation
and implementation. The potentially interesting question of what the problems are with
a change in manufacturing strategy in the classical Skinnerian sense of, say, shifting
50
from cost to delivery speed emphasis is not posed. There is, though, a distinct
question to be addressed here, particularly as this shift is at the heart of the 'new'
manufacturing strategy of, for example, Hayes and Pisano (1994).
In summary, the manufacturing strategy process literature concentrates heavily on
strategy formulation and, although concessions are made to bottom-up initiatives (or
at least to the potential for strategy to be modified after consultation), has little to say
about truly emergent strategies. It is sketchy in its translation of broad strategic
directions into concrete action and very, very vague about implementation - many are
the articles and books with only the last five or ten percent devoted to
'implementation'. If strategy formation, as Mintzberg and Waters (1985) suggest,
walks on two feet, manufacturing strategy formation appears to be limited to hopping
or, at best, limping.
This short review of the manufacturing strategy process literature concludes the
general overview of manufacturing content and process. The remaining sections will
discuss a number of themes running through and around this basic literature. These
are included either because they are the areas of most contention and/or because they
relate particularly to the present research.
51
2.3.3 The Trade-Off
One of the most contentious aspects of manufacturing strategy theory is the trade-off,
arguably the 'Big Idea' of Skinner's early work and certainly the foundation of much
that was to follow (e.g. Wheelwright, 1978; Hayes and Schmenner, 1978; Hayes and
Wheelwright, 1979a; Hill, 1981, 1985). It is the basis for the product-process matrix,
the whole of Hill's framework, and of much of the 'focus' literature (see 2.3.6
below).
Wheelwright (1981) called the trade-off into question. This article articulated what
was becoming apparent to Western manufacturers - that the trade-off was not a
universal law. Japanese manufacturers were able to produce high quality products at
low cost: contrary to the trade-off theory that these objectives are mutually
conflicting, the high (conformance) quality helped cost-reduction through elimination
of scrap, rework, inspection and over-scheduling. Indeed, the article contained much
of the argument of Ferdows and De Meyer (1990) and Bolwijn and Kumpe (1990) -
that the objectives of flexibility, dependability and cost built cumulatively on a
foundation of quality, not as an alternative to it. Schonberger popularised the idea of
World Class Manufacturing which, amongst other things, dismissed the trade-off
theory completely (1986: 203-204). He derides the idea that firms should find their
'distinctive competency' and holds that World Class Manufacturers are good in all the
areas of quality, cost, response-time and flexibility. However, a close reading of his
evidence by New (1992) results in apparent vindication of the trade-off view, albeit
in modified form. Wild (1980: 69) 'speculates' that the key trade-offs are in the time-
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related dimensions as they interact with particular capacity management strategies -
a fast delivery can only be guaranteed by having spare capacity or large inventories.
The conclusion of New is that certain trade-offs still exist; Slack (1991: 11) introduces
the time element again, holding that, whilst trade-offs certainly exist in the short-term,
in the longer term they can be reduced or eliminated. Indeed, that is increasingly seen
as a key part of manufacturing strategy (Slack, 1991: 12; Corbett and Van
Wassenhove, 1993; Hayes and Pisano, 1994).
As well as the trade-off in general being subject to criticism, particular pairs of
objectives have been scrutinised. Cost and quality have already been mentioned. Cost
and variety is another pair to have been examined. From a process technology
starting-point, Goldhar and various co-workers have been among those pointing out
the implications of microprocessor-controlled process technology for manufacturing
strategy in general and the variety-cost relationship specifically. Goldhar and Jelinek
(1983a) capture this with the idea of economies of scope, indicating that production
that combines high variety and low volume need not carry a cost penalty if the
potential of computer-controlled process technology is exploited. This is one aspect
of manufacturing flexibility (see 2.3.8 below) and will be revisited in the section on
customisation.
With a less purely technological emphasis, the emerging literature on mass
customisation further questions the trade-off between variety and cost. There is
relatively little empirical work in the field so far, and the literature consists of a very
few cases in a limited range of clothing and consumer durables markets. Mass
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customisation takes in the possibilities of process technology and allies it to marketing
(Kotler, 1989, was an early advocate) and organisational developments (Pine, 1993;
Boynton, 1994). Again, this will be assessed further in the section devoted to product
customisation (section 2.4.4.5)
The debate about the manufacturing strategy trade-off recalls a very similar debate in
the business strategy literature. Voss (1992: xi) suggests that Porter (1980) stole his
generic strategies concept from the manufacturing strategy theorists; whether this is
true or not, the parallels are strong. Murray (1988) suggests that the low cost and
differentiation strategies are in conflict only under certain circumstances; C.Hill
(1988) also maintains that both are possible together. A closer reading of Porter e.g.
by Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1994), as already indicated, shows that Porter himself
is by no means consistent in the way the theory is applied and interpreted. However,
if we take Porter at his most categorical and prescriptive i.e. as advising firms to
pursue one objective and one only and not to be 'stuck in the middle' (Cronshaw et
al, 1994), there is an inconsistency between this and the classic manufacturing strategy
trade-off. The latter doesn't appear to recommend adopting an extreme position, just
that as performance in one area is improved, performance somewhere else will suffer
- will be traded off. This continuity, rather than discontinuity, is at the heart of such
tools as the product-process matrix of Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a) and profile
analysis of Hill (1985: 89-95)
Despite these reservations, inconsistencies and non-isomorphisms - as well as the
existence of a number of other generic strategy schemes (see section 2.2) - a number
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of manufacturing strategy theorists take Porter's generic strategies unquestioningly as
the starting-point for their particular versions of the basic manufacturing strategy
model (Samson, 1991: 18; Stonebraker and Leong, 1994: 38).
2.3.4 'Best Practice'/'World Class Manufacturing'
As discussed above, the trade-off is seen by, for example, Schonberger (1986) as a
fallacious and dangerous concept. This is an example of what Professor Nigel Slack
has called the 'fundamentalist wing' view. The role of the 'best practice' techniques
such as Total Quality Management, Just-in-Time and Lean Manufacturing in relation
to Skinnerian manufacturing strategy is a contentious issue. The fundamentalist view -
the view of Schonberger, and of Womack et al, perhaps - is that any firm in any
industry must forget the trade-off and adopt best practice techniques such as those
mentioned here. Gunn (1987) sees any manufacturing strategy programme as a
judicious blend of HT, CIM and TQC. The only issue to debate is how fast to
implement and what the implementation priorities are.
Other, almost exclusively UK-based writers see the issue differently. First, as
discussed, New (1992) detects gross inconsistencies in the Schonberger argument
anyway. The broad thrust of a number of writers (Slack, 1991: 17-19; Berry and Hill,
1992; Voss, 1995; Mills et al 1995) is that these techniques should not be seen as
panaceas, and a number of contingency theories are proposed. For example, in
relation to production planning and control systems, Slack (1991: 180-181) suggests
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that choice of system depends upon a number of factors such as volume/variety,
leadtime variation and the level of control; Berry and Hill (1992) do much the same
within a framework of marketing and manufacturing factors. Voss (1995) notes that
'best practices' may depend on industry (although this appears to be a surrogate for
the types of factors that Slack, Berry and Hill identify). Mills et al (1995) suggest that
such 'off-the-peg' improvement programmes may be particularly appropriate to firms
who are relatively poorly developed and at Stage 1 or 2 of the Wheelwright and
Hayes (1985) Four-Stage model, but are neither pervasive enough nor distinctive
enough to lead to sustainable competitive advantage that can be developed without
external advice. Fittingly enough, this is also the conclusion of Skinner (1995) who
sees such techniques merely as pad of the means of avoiding competitive
disadvantage, not the way to achieve competitive advantage.
2.3.5 Consistency or 'Fit'
A recurring theme in the manufacturing strategy literature is the requirement for
consistency within and between strategies. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984:33)
identified four types of consistency:
1. Manufacturing Strategy - business strategy
2. Manufacturing Strategy- other functional strategies
3. Among decision categories
4. Manufacturing Strategy - business environment
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or, diagrammatically, as in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 Aspects of Consistency in Manufacturing Strategy
The majority of the work in the field addresses the first and third of these. Skinner
(1974) stressed the third (arguably this consistency is the essence of focus). Some
authors have emphasised the second, particularly the manufacturing-marketing link
(e.g. Hill, 1993). The last of these has been almost completely neglected. Slack
(1991: 185-186) adds the significantly different issue of consistency over time,
particularly noting the common phenomenon of loss of credibility when successive
initiatives give the appearance of all too frequently-changing priorities. (If the
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) definition of strategy as a pattern in a stream of actions
is accepted, then Slack's call for consistency over time is tautological - if there
weren't consistency over time, then there would be no strategy.) This is a particularly..
.,..
interesting point when compared with the view of Hayes and Pisano (1994) that die
'new' manufacturing strategy is precisely about developing the ability to change from
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one emphasis to another.
Of particular note in the research relating to the business strategy - manufacturing
strategy link is the extent to which manufacturing strategy is seen as following from
and supporting the business strategy as opposed to, at least to some extent, changing
it. Although many writers emphasise the iterative nature of their strategy formulation
process models (e.g. Manicheck et al 1990, Hill, 1993), the emphasis is still on
manufacturing strategy being derived from the competitive strategy, sometimes
expressed in terms of one of Porter's generic strategies (Porter, 1980), sometimes in
other terms. Wheelwright and Hayes (1985) took this further with their four-stage
model, in which the Stage Four organisation has a manufacturing function which
moves beyond merely being consistent with the business strategy and takes on a
significant and pre-emptive role in providing competitive advantage. As such,
Anderson et al (1989) ask what seems the wrong question in their summary of the
literature on this: 'Should operations' capabilities be adjusted to achieve corporate
objectives, or should corporate objectives be confined to what operations is capable
of doing?'. To some extent, this sums up the binary view, but the choice of the word
'confmed' is perhaps unfortunate - in the Stage 4 company, the word 'extended'
would be more appropriate.
In a somewhat idiosyncratic development, at least in terminology, a series of articles
have developed the notion of 'production competence' (Cleveland, Schroeder and
Anderson, 1989; Vickery, 1991; Vickery, Droge and Markland, 1993). In the terms
of these authors, production competence is 'the degree to which manufacturing
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performance supports the strategic objectives of the firm' (Vickery et al, 1993). The
original work by Cleveland et al was deeply flawed methodologically (Vickery (1991)
contains a critique) but, even in its rather more carefully-designed form, such an
approach requires that the data-collection instrument, a questionnaire in this case,
identifies a profile of important competitive variables for the business, a weighting of
the importance of the manufacturing contribution to each, and a precise measure of
manufacturing performance in each area. This small strand of research though, (a)
demonstrates the concern with the linkage between business and manufacturing
strategy and (b) needs to be discussed insofar as it raises another usage of the word
competence. Vickery et al are keen to emphasise the difference between 'production
competence' and 'distinctive manufacturing competence'. A manufacturing firm may
have a distinctive competence in some area, but it may not be particularly relevant to
its business strategy. Distinctive competence is assessed relative to competitors or
potential competitors; production competence is concerned with achieved performance
against the 'current set of competitive priorities' (Vickery, 1991). Vickery attempts
to extract the effect this 'production competence' has on business performance but
arrives at the conclusion that a combination of a mixed low-cost and differentiation
strategy (the options are Porter's cost, differentiation or both) combined with low
competence gives the worst business results. This seems far from surprising and does
not show whether this is inevitable (as it would be if Porter's 'don't get stuck in the
middle' is 'true'.)
Swamidass and Newell (1987) are rare in examining the connection between
environmental uncertainty and manufacturing strategy process and content. Their first
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conclusion is that more flexible firms perform better in an uncertain environment;
their second, perhaps more interesting, conclusion is that there was a tendency for
manufacturing management to be less involved in strategy formulation in uncertain
environments, but that there was more involvement in the more successful firms.
Although the research method adopted was relatively extensive, the data were mostly
collected via interview rather than postal questionnaire. As such, the results can be
seen as providing some confirmation of Skinner's call for a greater strategic role for
the manufacturing manager (Skinner, 1969). The results also suggest that
manufacturing strategy is contingent on the organisation's environment, at least insofar
as manufacturing strategy can be assessed by asking questions of the senior
management about manufacturing flexibility issues, which was the surrogate measure
adopted.
2.3.6 Focus
In many ways, the concept of focus is indistinguishable from manufacturing strategy,
particularly as Skinner (1969) first articulated it. Skinner (1974) introduced the term
focus to refer to:
'a factory that focuses on a narrow product mix for a particular market
niche will outperform the conventional plant, which attempts a broader
mission'.
Hill draws our attention to Skinner's own elaboration of the focus concept:
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'learning to focus each plant on a limited, concise, manageable set of
products, technologies, volumes and markets' (Skinner, 1974)
and
'learning to structure basic manufacturing policies and supporting
services [the structure/infrastructure split] so that they focus on one
explicit manufacturing task instead of on many inconsistent,
conflicting, implicit tasks' (Skinner, 1974)
and interprets this as not necessarily advocating a small number of products, merely
products that have a small range of manufacturing tasks (Hill, 1993: 157-158).
Focus embraces many of the issues of manufacturing strategy - it requires that a clear
choice be made about the competitive criteria for a particular operation, and that a
consistent set of decisions be made in support of that strategic choice. This is based
on the conventional view of the trade-off. Perhaps the distinctive characteristic of
focus, especially in the context in which it was first proposed, is the extent to which
it reinforces the idea that economies of scale and absorbing overhead by filling
production capacity with any product that anyone would buy were not the only ways
to compete. On the contrary, the focus position is that it is acceptable to break up the
unfocused but fully-utilised large plant into smaller, less-well-utilised but more
manageable factories within factories. Conceptually, focus is indistinguishable from
a manufacturing strategy that has a high degree of consistency. Bozarth (1993) has
summarised various other authors' work on focus as relating to consistency (a) within
manufacturing; (b) between manufacturing and business strategy. If these are indeed
the broad thrusts of the focus literature, then it does not offer anything in addition to
the prescriptions of, for example, Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 33) for consistency
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in manufacturing strategy. The distinctive feature of focus that emerges from Hill
(1995: 193-197) is that it gives more weight to the advantages of smaller, more easily
managed units that concentrate on a narrower range of tasks and therefore challenges
economies of scale as the only rationale for designing manufacturing systems. This
is a natural implication of Skinner's challenging the idea that competition need only
be on the basis of cost. The other recurring theme in the rather limited focus literature
is the longitudinal phenomenon that Hill and Duke-Woolley (1983) termed 'focus
regression', that is, the tendency for gradual proliferation in the product range and
hence loss of focus. Other writers also discuss focus in this context (Hayes and
Wheelwright, 1979b; Stonebraker and Leong, 1994: 204-205).
Various sets of dimensions on which plants may be focused have been proposed. Most
often these are summarised as product and process focus (Hayes and Schmenner,
1978; Hill, 1995: 201). Berry, Bozarth, Hill and Klompmaker (1991) use statistical
techniques to create groups of products based on order-winning criteria.
However, despite the conceptual appeal of focus, there is no empirical evidence to
indicate improved performance of focused plants, insofar as focus is an idea distinct
from consistent manufacturing strategy. Probably the aspect of the focus literature
most relevant to the present research is the recognition of the effect on manufacturing
of product proliferation.
62
1
2.3.7 Level of Manufacturing Strategy
Most of the models reviewed have the manufacturing strategy as a functional strategy
subordinate to the competitive strategy of a strategic business unit (e.g. Fine and Hax,
1985; Leong et al 1989; Schroeder and Lahr, 1990; Garvin, 1993). The focus
literature discussed above concentrates on the plant level, and this is the position of
New (1992), who states clearly:
'Manufacturing strategy is primarily about what a single plant is
capable of doing successfully - a 'corporate' manufacturing strategy
would cover only those items which would be common across all
plants (not very much generally).' (New, 1992: 24, italics in original)
In fact, it is not altogether clear what the relationship is between focus and
manufacturing strategy. Do plants adopt a manufacturing strategy of focusing sub-sets
of their operations on different objectives or manufacturing tasks? Or does each
focused unit have its own manufacturing strategy? Furthermore, even within the
common conception of the plant, what of the multi-plant SBU (Strategic Business
Unit)? Hayes and Schmenner (1978) address this to some extent, characterising the
basic design of the 'total manufacturing system' as a balance between the single plant
where the plant management task is difficult but the central coordination role is trivial
and the opposite, where there are many very focused plants, making plant
management easy but SBU coordination difficult. Advocating the latter, they suggest
that:
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'[the central manufacturing staff] must somehow maintain the total
organisation's sense of priorities and manufacturing mission, even
though individual units [plants] may have quite different tasks and
focuses.'
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 33-37) discuss the concept of a corporate
manufacturing strategy. They hold that certain elements of each business strategy may
be common through the whole firm, even though each business strategy is different.
The type of issue that may be common are described as 'policies and guidelines' and
these are noticeably different from business strategies. They indicate that, in each of
the decision areas, there may be greater or lesser degrees in common between
business units, but the emphasis is very much on bases for decision-making such as
rules for capital investment appraisal, rather than on issues directly linked to the usual
content of competitive strategies. However, later on, they discuss the differences
between Hewlett-Packard and Texas Instruments, using their product-process matrix
concept (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979a) and distinguish between the two
corporations (each with many SBUs) on the basis of their competitive strategies and
the way their manufacturing strategies support these competitive positions across the
company (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 225, 259). This seems to indicate that there
is more to corporate manufacturing strategy than rules on how to write investment
proposals and the like. That is borne out by the extended discussion of facilities
strategy, in which 'facilities strategy should be regarded as a proactive element of the
overall manufacturing strategy, rather than a reactive one' (Hayes and Wheelwright,
1984: 109) and which also includes discussions of the facilities life-cycle concept
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(Schmenner, 1983) and of the plant charter (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 100-101),
which contains many elements of a manufacturing strategy plus some specific
quantifiable objectives such as units costs and capacity utilisation. In this context,
focus is identified as a concept that can be applied to any level: industry, multiple
plants, one plant over time, or to plants-within-plants (Hayes and Wheelwright
1984: 80). Having said all that, however, Hayes and Wheelwright still set out by
positioning the manufacturing strategy alongside the other functional strategies as
clearly subordinate to the Business Unit strategy, in exactly the way that Hofer and
Schendel (1978: 28) do. Samson (1991: 102-103) notes that focus 'can be applied
across virtually any aspect of the firm'.
Insofar as, for him, developing a manufacturing strategy begins by identifying the
relevant order-winners of particular market segments, Hill operationalises the
manufacturing strategy process at that level. Whilst advocating the plant-within-a-plant
approach to focusing within facilities (Hill, 1993: 156-182), Hill's discussion does not
explicitly consider facilities decisions in the way that, for example, Hayes and
Wheelwright do, at all. The concrete specificity of plants, locations and capacities is
absent: the abstract idea of providing manufacturing systems matched, via order-
winners, to markets is all-pervasive. Indeed, Hill's framework (Hill, 1995: 39) moves
straight from corporate objectives to marketing strategy without the business or
competitive strategy that intervenes in many other models. As such, it is unclear at
what level manufacturing strategy is to be defined. Hill being more reluctant than
some other writers (e.g. Schroeder and Lahr, 1990) to be prescriptive about written
manufacturing strategy documents, perhaps the real point of Hill's work is to think
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strategically about manufacturing at all levels.
While manufacturing strategy is seen in the Skinnerian way as making the right trade-
off choice to suit a particular market, it is possible to align a plant, say, with a
particular segment. However, as this idea of manufacturing strategy is being
challenged by the core competence or resource-based view (De Leo, 1994; Hayes and
Pisano, 1994) an aside by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 35) might have increasing
weight:
'A company may decide that it will need a certain manufacturing
capability in the future, even though none of its business units has an
immediate need for it. Therefore it may choose to develop an in-house
capability in that technology so it will be available when needed.'
In the original source, this referred purely to R&D policy and to essentially
technological capabilities. If the view of the core competence theorists is adopted, and
competition is significantly about these competences and less about products, then the
implication of this is that strategy is less about plants or even plants-within-plants, and
more about the competences underlying and linking together all or many of the
current production facilities. This may mean that the very point of strategy is not the
content or process at any or all hierarchical levels, but about the architecture that links
activities at various levels together.
Recent work by Wathen (1995) attempts to address this question and, to some extent,
66
concludes that businesses, even with multiple facilities, producing all their products
using one process type (small batch, large batch, continuous) perform better. The
work is of dubious merit however, as it is based on the PIMS database, which is very
unsubtle in its assessment of what constitutes, for example, a large batch. His research
instrument would also seem to interpret the focus concept in exactly the wrong way.
Skinner's original concept was that different process types should be adopted to serve
different needs within the one business; Wathen defines focused operations as those
adopting largely the same process type throughout the business, with no apparent
assessment as to the process type's appropriateness in terms of market characteristics.
In summary then, the literature is rarely clear about what a 'manufacturing strategy'
applies to. Many of the models operationalise it at SBU level; many of the concepts
seem most readily applicable to the plant level; more recent views tend to indicate that
the truly strategic is pervasive, across businesses and between levels in the hierarchy
of strategies.
2.3.8 Flexibility
Flexibility is routinely included in the lists of competitive criteria compiled by
manufacturing strategy writers (Wheelwright, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright 1984;
Leong et al 1989; Adam and Swamidass, 1989; Slack, 1991: 7-9; Swink and Way,
1995) and has attracted considerable attention as a separate issue within the literature
(Slack, 1983, 1987; Easton and Rothschild, 1987; Hill and Chambers, 1991;
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Chambers, 1992; Gerwin, 1987; De Meyer, Nakane, Miller and Ferdows, 1989).
However, it is contended here that its inclusion as a competitive criterion alongside
the others typically adopted is potentially problematic. Certainly, flexibility is
extremely complicated and multi-faceted.
Wheelwright (1978) included flexibility as one of his four criteria, taking it to refer
to changes in the 'product and the volume'. Other writers have subsequently identified
several other types of flexibility. Slack (1983) developed an early framework for
considering flexibility based to a large extent on the operations management policy
work of Wild (1980). The customer service variables of Wild - forerunners of the
competitive criteria - were adapted slightly and could be represented as in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6 Flexibility as a Second-Order Performance Objective
\
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Thus the objectives were conceptualised as first-order dimensions of customer service,
and reliability and flexibility were second-order qualifications of the primary
performance objectives. As Slack notes 'flexibility is the same class of objective as
reliability; it is both a condition to be applied to other objectives and an inherent
characteristic of the manufacturing system itself. ' (Slack, 1983: 5). Thus there are five
types of flexibility: New Product, Product Mix, Quality, Volume and Delivery. To
this elegant conception of flexibility, Slack adds the 'dimensions of flexibility': range,
cost and time. Range is the difference between the minimum and maximum value of
the dimension over which the system can 'flex'; the ease with which the flexing can
be carried out is measured in terms of time and/or money. Thus, for example, product
mix flexibility of a machine-tool might involve the assessment of the largest and
smallest diameter it could hold (range) and of how long it takes, and how much it
costs, to change the machine over from one product to the next. Following empirical
testing of the flexibility framework, it was modified to eliminate quality flexibility as,
although theoretically logical it was not, in practice, a relevant flexibility type. Thus
the types were Product, Mix,Volume and Delivery, and the hierarchical distinction
between them and the first-order manufacturing performance objectives was
maintained.
To reiterate, Slack comments that Ifilexibility is different from other operations
objectives. The extent to which a system meets all its other objectives is necessarily
demonstrated by its operating behaviour; its flexibility, however, can remain a
measure of potential behaviour'. Slack introduces the notion of 'adaptability' to refer
to the softer, usually managerial and organisational issues that determine the extent
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to which the potential flexibility, which is determined by the harder aspects, such as
process technology and layout, is achieved in practice. Upton (1994) proposes
dimensions of flexibility that, to some extent, reflect similar concerns: operational
(day-to-day), tactical (quarterly) or strategic (one-way, every few years).
Slack himself has subsequently fallen into line with other manufacturing strategy
writers and treats flexibility as just another performance objective (Slack, 1991: 7-10).
Other manufacturing strategy sources treating flexibility in this way include
Wheelwright (1978); Hayes and Wheelwright, (1984: 40), Fine and Hax (1985);
Leong et al (1989); Adam and Swamidass (1989) (who include it within their 'core'
objectives whilst demoting delivery to the next level in the hierarchy); Tunalv (1992)
and Garvin (1993). A number of alternative lists of flexibility types have been
proposed but these do not differ substantively from Slack's.
As already noted, the actual flexibility achieved may fall far short of the potential.
Goldhar and Jelinek (1983) and, in particular, Jaikumar (1986) demonstrate clearly
the extent to which the flexibility potentially offered by computer-based manufacturing
technologies is not achieved in practice due to organisational and managerial factors.
Hill and Chambers (1991) make the point strongly that firms are often not clear about
the type or extent of flexibility they require in their particular competitive situation,
and invest in Flexible Manufacturing Systems as an act of faith, seeing 'flexibility' as
a panacea. The refinement of the flexibility construct in the literature certainly makes
available a fairly sophisticated array of ways of analysing flexibility. This seems at
variance with the seemingly less useful way of treating flexibility as a performance
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objective. Slack's original conception of it as a means to the end of providing
particular levels of performance in terms of other dimensions - product, quality,
speed, cost - still appears more insightful. Flexibility may be a reason for developing
a relationship with a supplier, but at the level of individual orders, it is a product of
a particular quality at a particular time that the customer buys. Flexibility of one sort
or another may make it possible for the manufacturer to provide this product, but it
is the product that is bought, not the flexibility of the manufacturing system.
Easton and Rothschild (1987) consider production flexibility in terms of its
relationship with marketing strategy and, as such, offer a number of insights useful
to the present research. They adopt Slack's range/response dimensions of flexibility
(although using slightly different terms) and, using an analysis based on economics,
determine that there are discontinuities in the cost/benefit relationship; that is,
flexibility over some ranges in some dimensions add nothing to the competitive
advantage of the producer, yet a possibly smaller range of flexibility in another
dimension may add very significantly to competitive advantage. This is essentially a
static analysis but makes the case, from an entirely novel perspective, for a very
discriminating and case-specific understanding of flexibility (product flexibility in
Slack's typology). This 'translation problem' (Easton and Rothschild, 1987: 308), of
flexibility's being seen in process terms by manufacturing and in product terms by
marketing, adds to the importance of this concept for examination of the
marketing/manufacturing interface.
The article also touches on the issue of customisation. Again emphasising the
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discontinuous nature of many of the relationships, Easton and Rothschild note that,
as variety is added:
' ..a watershed in the marketing process is achieved. This occurs when
the product changes from one which is producer-specified to one which
is customer-specified. In practice this dimension is more likely to
resemble a continuum than a dichotomy. At the boundary, products
made to order from a series of producer-specified options (e.g. motor
vehicles) come close to offering customer specification. Similarly,
there occur situations where the production of 'specials' which are
clustered, in product space around a set of standard products provides
localised customer specification. As the proportion of specials
increases, so the firm moves towards the customer-specification end of
the spectrum. In doing so, it opens up opportunities to tie in customers
by establishing stable, long-term relationships, which create local
barriers to entry (Hakansson, 1982). It achieves this at the cost of
establishing a wholly different marketing system, and one in which the
management of relationships rather than the manipulation of the
product mix is the key skill... .An acceptable marketing strategy
requires the matching of the potential of the production process with
customer requirements.'
This extended quotation is one of the most carefully-considered comments on the
nature of product customisation offered in the literature. It appears somewhat
inconsistent in that it on the one hand sees the degree of customisation as a
continuum, yet identifies a 'watershed' and then a point at which a 'wholly different
marketing system' is required, neither of which suggest a gradual transition.
Easton and Rothschild go on to reflect on the 'response' dimension. The possibilities
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of microprocessor-based production technology notwithstanding, increased variety will
still result in some additional production costs in most cases. This is arguable but,
interestingly, they also note that the predictability and measurability of costs will be
reduced, recalling the 'Reliability' column of Figure 2.6. The increased flexibility
may also have implications for marketing communications strategy. As customer-
specified products increase, so the efficacy of brand-based communication is reduced
and 'image-making may have to become concentrated somewhere between the brand
and corporate level.' Also noted are the needs for closer liaison with design and
production and for the different selling skills demanded by selling capabilities rather
than products.
The work of Upton (1994) is brought to mind in Easton and Rothschild's use of the
term 'adaptability' in contrast to 'flexibility'. Adaptability is 'long-term, discontinuous
and resource-expensive'; this appears the same as Upton's 'strategic flexibility'.
Easton and Rothschild make the point that flexibility may inhibit adaptation - an
ability to 'muddle through' makes it possible to put off fundamental change. This is
a different use of these terms than Slack's (1983). To Slack, adaptability and
flexibility did not differ in terms of the time-period to which they applied, but
adaptability determined the extent to which the flexibility latent in the technology was
actually exploited. Sanchez (1995) distinguishes between resource flexibility, which
is analogous to flexibility in Slack's terms and is assessed in terms of range and
response, and coordination flexibility, which relates to the way in which a firm
redefines, reconfigures and redeploys the totality of resources. Sanchez holds that the
latter enables firms to pursue alternative product strategies.
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Sources	 Type cl Uncertainty 	 Strategic Otjective
	 Flexilility
Dimension
Marketing	 Market acceptance of
kinds of products
Length of product life
cydes
Specific product
characteristics
Aggregate production
demand
Diverse product line 	 IVix
Product innovation
	 Changeover
Responsiveness to	 Modification
customers'
specifications
Market share	 Volume
Manufacturing
	 Machine downtime	 Customer's due dates Rerouting
Characteristics of 	 Product quality	 Material
materials
(adapted from Germ, 1993)
As far as the present research is concerned, it is notable that many of the types of
flexibility identified depend on product-range issues (Sanchez, 1995). Gerwin (1987)
extends the basic typology of flexibilities to include product mix, modification,
sequencing, and changeover flexibilities. Subsequently (Gerwin, 1993) he relates types
of flexibility to the sources of uncertainty giving rise to a need for them. Furthermore,
he identifies some of these sources as marketing issues and some as manufacturing.
These relationships are summarised in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Strategic Flexibility Types
The conclusion of this review is that flexibility is best considered as a means rather
than an end in itself. In this sense it appears no different to capacity (one of the
decision areas) and, although perhaps more systemic in nature, is a property rather
than an objective of a manufacturing system.
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2.3.9 Generic Manufacturing Strategies
A number of researchers have attempted to identify generic manufacturing strategies,
either empirically (Stobaugh and Telesio, 1983;; Sweeney, 1991; Miller and Roth,
1994) or by theoretical extension of other frameworks e.g. the Porter taxonomy
(2.2.2) (Kotha and Ome, 1989). Sweeney suggests that the process of determining
which manufacturing capabilities are required based on the competitive positioning of
the business is in need of simplification and that it may be facilitated by identifying
generic strategies, which could then be adapted to the specific instance. On this very
issue, Skinner comments:
'In my own and others' defence we have not been prescriptive because
it is more art than science and there are 999 variables and 998
equations, so to speak. This is true and reasonable, but I would suggest
that we could be a lot more helpful to managers and that we need to
be. Until MCS ['manufacturing in the corporate strategy'] can provide
more links between tasks, objectives and specific manufacturing
policies, only bright students in a well-led case-method classroom will
do the synthesis needed and MCS will continue to miss its potential.
This is the greatest research, writing and consulting need and
opportunity in the field.' (Skinner, 1992: 22)
Stobaugh and Telesio and, to a lesser extent, Miller and Roth adopt essentially a
trade-off view. Their position appears to be that different firms may adopt different
bases for competition and, as such, require different approaches to manufacturing.
Kotha and Ome also adopt this position, although their work is entirely theoretical.
The aim of identifying generic strategies in these cases then, appears to be to 'bundle
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up' a set of consistent policies in various decision areas and so simplify the strategy-
formation task.
Sweeney's analysis identifies generic groupings but allies them to the Four-Stage
model of Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 396), thereby implying that some generic
strategies are better than others. The purpose of Sweeney's process is to provide a
path for every firm to the 'innovator' strategy where 'the nucleus of the innovator
strategy is just-in-time production'. There is a clear divergence here from the
contingency-theory basis of, for example, Berry and Hill (1992), who specifically
warn against such 'panaceas'.
2.3.10 Do Formal Manufacturing Strategies Improve Performance?
The business strategy literature has long considered the issue of whether formalised
planning processes actually improve firms' performance. Mintzberg (1994: 91-158)
provides one summary of this and, perhaps not surprisingly, finds the evidence
inconclusive. He reports evidence that planning plays a useful role in some respects,
but also evidence that planning can hinder creativity by over-formalisation.
Although the manufacturing strategy literature has advocated various strategy
formation techniques and processes, there is very little evidence as to whether these
processes are beneficial to performance. Tunalv (1992) found, from a questionnaire
survey of Swedish firms, that 'units with a manufacturing strategy were
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significantly. .more successful in their financial performance'. Having a
'manufacturing strategy' was defined as having formulated manufacturing objectives,
aligned with the competitive means (such as cost, quality etc) and with a time horizon
longer than a year. A written strategy was not necessary, although there was strong
correlation between the two. This type of study though, as the authors partly concede,
cannot address causality, and the point Mintzberg (1994:94) makes about business
strategy applies here too: do formal strategies make for success, or is it just that
successful companies can afford to pay people to write strategies?
Other process modellers are vague or fail to substantiate their claims. Hill (1993: 37)
claims that his approach has 'been researched and tested successfully in many
industries and businesses of different sizes' but there is no empirical evidence to
support this. Others concentrate on the process rather than the outcome: ' [o]f
particular importance was the managers' reaction to the process... If for no other
reason, methodologies such as this are a valuable subject for academic study ' (Slack,
1994); 'It is difficult to measure objectively whether the approach has been successful
and therefore we have relied on subjective assessments from the managements within
the firms..' (Plans and Gregory, 1990). Quinn (1978) likened strategic planning
processes to ritual rain-dances, in that they have no effect on what follows but those
that dance believe they do; furthermore, he suggests, the prescription of academics
appears to be directed at improving the dancing, not the weather.
Because of the practical impossibility of controlling for other factors, perhaps views
such as those of Slack and of Plans and Gregory above are the most honest.
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Identifying the success or otherwise of processes which are, by definition, supposed
to have long-term and pervasive effects is likely to be best studied using a
combination of techniques.
2.3.11 Conclusions on Manufacturing Strategy
This section of the review has set out some of the key issues in manufacturing
strategy. At the heart of most manufacturing strategy models are the competitive
criteria and decision areas. The strategy process models in the literature have not, for
the most part, moved on much from early business strategy process models. There is
some evidence that it is possible to pursue multiple objectives successfully: some
would argue that it is essential to do so. Although a hierarchy of strategies rather like
that of Hofer and Schendel (1978: 28) is often used to situate manufacturing strategy,
the literature is very inconsistent on the level at which a manufacturing strategy is best
defined.
Underlying many of the concepts reviewed - focus, flexibility and generic
manufacturing strategies - is the original trade-off concept. Assumptions one way or
the other about this basic concept determine just about everything else in the
literature. While aspects of the original idea have been qualified - by Skinner (1992)
himself amongst others - the current conclusion is well summed up by Skinner: 'What
about trade-offs? They are just as real as ever but they are alive and dynamic'
(Skinner, 1992: 20).
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With reference to the present research, it is notable that hardly any manufacturing
strategy models mention customisation or product-range explicitly. The product-range
underlies a number of concepts in the field, notable focus and aspects of flexibility.
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2.4 Manufacturing and Marketing
The manufacturing-marketing interface is of great importance to the present research.
To a large extent, product policy is the domain of marketing and, if we are to
consider how manufacturing strategy concepts may be used to inform product
customisation and product variety decisions, then we need to know something of the
relationship between the two functions in more general terms. In particular, it will
also be useful to identify the extent to which customisation and product variety issues
figure in general discussions of the relationship between the functions.
2.4.1 Conflict Areas
A number of writers have discussed the interface between marketing and
manufacturing (Shapiro, 1977, 1979; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979a, 1979b; Hill,
1980,1985; Blois, 1980a, 1980b, 1983; Lim and Reid 1992; Crittenden, Gardiner and
Stamm, 1993; Konijnendijk, 1993). One approach to describing the problem has been
to identify areas of conflict between the two functions. Two such taxonomies are
summarised in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, along with summaries of the authors' prescriptions
for improvement.
Of course, these are caricatures of the situation. St John (1991) reports a less stark
picture in one industry. Whilst marketing and manufacturing functions agree on the
general characteristics of objectives (e.g. reliable due dates or developing a 'full'
product-line), the disagreement arises over specific actions or strategies to achieve
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Table 2.6 Shapiro's Marketing-Manufacturing Conflict Areas
Marketing Issue Manufacturing
'Wiy don't we have enough
capacity'?"
"Vkib need faster response. Our
lead times are ridiculous."
'OAly don't we ever have the
right merchandise in inventory?'
"Wiy can't we have reasonable
quality at reasonable cost'?"
"Our customers demand
variety."
"Our costs are so high that we
are not corrpetitive in the
marketplace"
"New products are our life-
blood"
"Reid service costs are too
high."
Capacity planning
and long term
sales forecasting
•
Production
scheduling and
short-term sales
forecasting
Delivery and
physical distribution
Quality assurance
Breadth of product
line
Cost control
New Product
introduction
Adjunct services
(spares and
repairs)
"I/Viy didn't %he have accurate
sales forecasts?'
"1/1b need realistic customer
commitments and sales
forecasts that don't change like
the wind direction."
'Wiy can't we keep everything
in inventory?'
'INly must we always offer
products that are too hard to
manufacture and offer lithe
customer utility'?"
'The product line is too broad -
all vte get are short,
uneconomical runs."
"lAt can't provide fast delivery,
broad variety, rapid response
to change and high quality at
low cost."
"Unnecessary design changes
are prohibitively expensive"
"Products are being used in
ways for Mich they weren't
designed."
Managing the conflict
	
Strengthening the
- Make the trade-offs explicit	 - Segment market in line with manufacturing strengths
- Make performance measures	 - Develop an explicit manufacturing task
more consistent	 - Modular design
- Mxed career paths and
organisational development
(Adapted from Shapiro (1977))
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Table 2. 7 Crittenden, Gardiner and Stamm's Marketing-Manufacturing Conflict Areas
Marketing Issue Manufacturing
Many and complex models
Customer specifications
Product changes
immediately - high risk
Constant change
Accept all orders
Immediate: large inventory
High standards
Managing Diversity
Few and simple models
"Stock" products
Planned, only necessary
changes: low risk
Infle>dble
Critically evaluate "fit" of
orders
As soon as possible: no
inventory
Reasonable control
Product line length/breadth
Product Customisation
Product line changes
Managing Conformity
Product scheduling
Capacity/facility planning
Managing Dependability
Delivery
Quality control
Group
Prescription
Organisational design
Communication
Evaluation systems
Models
decision support systems (preferred)
on Qitt nden, Gardiner and amm
these objectives. Furthermore, although disagreement over these type of actions was
a consistent pattern, there was no consistency in which actions were favoured by
which function. Rather, the results were firm-specific. Having said that, and with the
present research in mind, the one area where marketing and manufacturing managers
consistently disagreed in the same way from firm to firm was over the elimination of
low-profit product variants; furthermore, in the part of the analysis that attempted to
relate level of disagreement with firms' use of formal strategic planning, this was by
far the area of disagreement most mitigated by strategic planning. These are
interesting findings but, of course, despite unusually thorough testing of validity and
high response-rates for such a questionnaire-based study, the data collected were only
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expressions of intention and attitude: no evidence as to actions was collected. Thus,
although espousing a Mintzbergian view of strategy as pattern in a stream of
decisions, this is not what St John eventually addresses. (And anyway, Mintzberg and
Waters (1985) adjust their definition to 'pattern in a stream of actions', distancing
themselves further from the study of mere expressed intentions and plans.)
Studying the supposed gulf between sales (rather than marketing) and manufacturing
in another single-industry study, Clare and Sandford (1984) found that the two
functions tended to blame each other for communications breakdowns, but also found
that, whereas respondents from both functions reported much the same personal values
of themselves, they 'create artificial distances' between themselves and their opposite
numbers by a process of functional stereotyping.
Hill (1981), like St John, attributes the problem not so much to inevitably
diametrically opposed priorities of the two functions, but to the precedence given to
marketing in development of strategy, and the lack of debate between the functions.
This in turn he attributes to the traditionally reactive role of manufacturing
management, the lack of language, as compared to the marketing and finance fields,
and the typically late involvement of manufacturing management in the formal strategy
process. So whereas Shapiro and Crittenden et al identify the symptoms at operational
level, Hill attempts to diagnose the cause which, as he sees it, lies in manufacturing's
role in the strategy process, a view partly confirmed by Swamidass and Newell
(1987). A recent article (Berry, Hill and Klompmaker, 1995) indicates that Hill still
perceives that the same problems exist, although in the successive editions of his
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textbook (at least those available in the UK) his target has shifted from marketing to
corporate strategy (Hill, 1985: 32-58; 1993: 25-58; 1995: 23-59).
Crittenden et al (1993) are disappointing in prescription. They identify four
mechanisms by which interfunctional conflict generally can be reduced: organisational
design, communication, evaluation systems and models. Rather too abruptly, these are
dismissed in favour of group decision support systems which apparently 'hold much
promise'. Notable is the emphasis on coping with the mismatch in objectives and
aspirations of the two functions, rather than bringing them closer in line. St John
(1991) is more optimistic, arguing based on her results that agreement can be
influenced by formal strategic processes. She acknowledges, however, agreement
implies nothing about firm performance. Clare and Sandford (1984) propose training
and communication enhancement initiatives, rather than any fundamental strategic
alignment.
Shapiro (1977) suggests a number of improvements, strongly related to the
manufacturing strategy ideas of Skinner (1969, 1974). He divides these into ways of
'managing the conflict' and of 'strengthening the functions'. The short-term conflict-
management approaches include making explicit the trade-offs that exist between
marketing and manufacturing requirements (i.e. not eliminating the trade-off but
making it explicit in the way that Hill's 'debate' is intended to); making the functions'
performance measurements more consistent; and using organisational development
approaches such as mixed career paths to develop all-rounders that have experience
of both functions' perspectives. Shapiro's point about performance measures is a
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recurrent theme in his work, in particular his emphasis on pursuing profitable business
(Shapiro, 1979, 1988) rather than any business. Hill (1985: 36-37) adopts this.
Shapiro's longer-term approaches are also of interest:
'Marketers should build their programs around the operational
strengths of their manufacturing unit...[and] divide the market into
segments and select for penetration those segments whose needs [they]
can fill. Finally, [they] must develop a product policy that builds on
the manufacturing unit's ability to service customers in those chosen
segments' (Shapiro, 1977: 113)
To this he adds a call for the adoption of an explicit manufacturing task in exactly the
way that Skinner (1969) proposed and, finally, cites modular design as a method that
'supplies the consumer with apparent variety even though the production output is
based on the concepts of mass production'.
2.4.2 Strategic Reconciliation
The work reviewed in 2.4.1 has been largely concerned with describing the conflicts
between marketing and manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, suggesting means by
which the conflict can be managed and mitigated. In that all these writers consider
the interface as a problem area, it is implicit that the promise of top-down planning,
in which functional strategies and action plans are all derived from the same business
strategy and therefore, presumably, mutually consistent, has not been fulfilled. The
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typologies of conflict do not paint a picture of two functions where the only issues
remaining to be resolved are the detailed translation of orders and forecasts into
production schedules, but of fundamental mismatch. The review will now turn to a
number of frameworks that have been proposed by which the conflict can be
addressed more fundamentally, that is by attempting to align the strategies of the two
functions more directly. These are presented in Figures 2.7 - 2.10 and discussed
below.
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Figure 2.7 Hayes and Wheelwright's Product-Process Matrix (1979a)
Hayes and Wheelwright link marketing and manufacturing via the product-process
life-cycle concept. They do not, apart from this, make a case for any special linkage
between marketing and manufacturing strategy - the two functional strategies are,
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along with other functional strategies, subordinate to the competitive strategy. (Having
said that, nowhere in their 1984 book do they devote such attention to other functional
strategies in the way that they do to marketing.) The key issue here is the linking of
the competitive criterion, to be inferred from the Product Life-Cycle Stage, with the
process type. Hill's framework (Hill, 1980, 1985), shown in Figure 2.8, relates the
same variables to one another but is different in that:
whereas Hayes and Wheelwright's matrix is seen as a supporting tool in the
development of manufacturing strategy, Hill's is seen as the basic framework
and, as such, the marketing-manufacturing interface is of more fundamental
importance for Hill;
it does not purport to represent the product life-cycle in the way that Hayes
and Wheelwright's framework is supposed to.
Furthermore, as discussed elsewhere, Hill's order-winners are different to the
competitive criteria in that they are more marketing-oriented (but they were not
included in the 1981 version). It is doubtful that Hayes and Wheelwright intended the
product life cycle as anything but a 'shorthand' for volume and variety issues. In the
examples they give there is no reason to suspect that, for example, the products made
by a commercial printer are any younger than those made by an automotive
manufacturer: the real point is that a commercial printer makes many different
products in low volumes and a car plant makes fewer products in higher volumes.
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Figure 2.8 Hill's Manufacturing Strategy Framework (Hill, 1985: 41)
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Shapiro links the volume/variety dimensions to product customisation holding that
'The two variables, [production] run length and degree of customization, loom large
because the marketer plays the 'bridge role' in relating customer needs and company
manufacturing capability' and 'Indeed, the degree of customization in a product line
or line of services marketed is beginning to appear to be the most important product
policy variable for industrial goods producers and many other types of companies'
(Shapiro, 1979). Based on this, the framework of four marketing-manufacturing
alignments is proposed. Whilst the prescription is, by Shapiro's admission, 'quite
incomplete', the major contribution made by this is the linking of the volume-variety
dimension, which underlies much of the classic manufacturing strategy theory, with
customisation. Nowhere other than in Shapiro's work (and in that of Blois, below),
until the recent 'discovery' of mass customisation, has customisation been treated as
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anything other than a marginal issue e.g. as just one of many aspects of 'flexibility'
(see above).
Figure 2. 9 Shapiro (1979) "Analyzing What Things Must Be Done Well"
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These basic issues are further combined by Blois (1980a) into the so-called Policy
Interaction Grid. The context of Blois' concerns is the role large customers play in
influencing the areas of activity in which manufacturers become involved. He thus
combines the same basic analysis as Shapiro's with a more explicit focus on the
degree of emphasis on building relationships with large customers. This represents an
early sortie into the territory subsequently explored in depth by the IMP researchers
(indeed, Blois cites a 1975 article by Halcansson). Blois warns against trying to
occupy too many 'boxes' on the grid.
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Figure 2.10 Blois' Policy Interaction Grid (Blois, 1980a)
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In various formats then, these frameworks seek to link together the following
dimensions:
- volume/variety
- product customisation
- competitive criteria or order-winners
- customer account size
and, with their own particular emphases, they all advocate concentration on a limited
combination of these or, at the very least, an acknowledgement of the dangers of
attempting to operate across a range of dimensions. Shapiro's and Blois' analyses
extend the prescription beyond the plant, effectively into 'focused' applications
engineering and sales organisations.
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Blois (1980b) suggests that distinctive competence, until then perceived as an attribute
of one function or another (e.g Snow and Hrebniak, 1980), may be better considered
as obtaining from the very link between the two functions. In this sense, Blois' work
predicts some aspects of both the core competence (e.g. De Leo, 1994) and network
(Biemans, 1995) literatures, as well as being in similar vein to Shapiro (1988).
Blois also identifies some reasons for conflict between the functions, the most
interesting of which is 'disagreement as to whether marketing or manufacturing
activity is the most cost-effective method of producing value'. This is an original and
powerful insight. Blois holds that manufacturing is the 'process of restricting use':
each stage in the process makes the possible uses of its output fewer than those of its
input. Marketing have the role of identifying the value that customers place on the
satisfaction of needs; more specifically they have to understand the extent to which
the customer is willing to pay to have the specific benefit of a more specialised
product, rather than performing the function for itself. A further role of marketing is
to identify new applications for existing products. Whilst this is a fairly standard re-
statement of Ansoff (1965), Blois adds that, insofar as this creates an additional value-
adding opportunity, it is the same as an additional manufacturing process stage and
hence marketing and manufacturing activities are to some extent interchangeable.
The frameworks discussed above are essentially statements of immutable trade-offs.
They provide more sophisticated ways of articulating and conveying the trade-offs,
but accept them nonetheless. Blois' insight, albeit an under-developed one, seems to
offer some promise of moving beyond this: of, to some extent, breaking the stalemate
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1between marketing and manufacturing.
Blois concludes by identifying information requirements that assist the development
of this manufacturing/marketing orientation, including 'cost estimates of supplying
products outside the normal range', which he identifies as likely to happen when
producers attempt to be responsive to large customers, despite loss of focus. The
dominance of marketing and its associated information systems may, he suggests, be
one reason why it is too often the manufacturing value-addition option that is chosen.
A small number of writers have attempted to link together marketing and
manufacturing through a particular juxtaposition of design and manufacturing
activities. Jouffroy and Tarondeau (1992) state that what they call an 'industrial
strategy' should:
'concern value-adding activities.., characteristic of the two main
industry cycles: design cycle and manufacturing cycle' (Jouffroy and
Tarondeau, 1992: 167-168)
These two cycles are illustrated as intersecting, orthogonal processes as shown here
in Figure 2.11.
The same concepts were used by Harrington (1973: 12-23) in the section of his book
on Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) devoted to setting out the basic
manufacturing activities to which he wished to apply computer technology. According
to Harrington's distinction:
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1'The design cycle refers to the events occurring in the development of
a specific product design, while the material cycle refers to the events
occurring in the production of an individual piece of material taken
from raw stock through to finished article.' (Harrington, 1973: 12)
This calls to mind the distinction made by Hákansson (1982), with reference to the
activities undertaken by a firm with respect to its customers, between problem-solving
and transfer abilities (Hdlcansson, 1982: 382). Although the context is broader,
concentrating on the buyer-supplier relationship rather than simply the activities
occurring in the plant, there are strong conceptual parallels. These suggested
conceptual parallels are indicated in Table 2.8.
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Figure 2.11 Design Cycle and Manufacturing Cycle as Orthogonal Processes
(based on Jouffroy and Tarondeau, 1992)
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Table 2.8 Design and Material Cycles: Parallel Concepts
Harrington (1973)	 Design cycle	 Material cycle
Jouffroy and Taroncleau (1992) Design cycle	 Manufacturing cycle
Haikansson (1982)	 Problem solving	 Transfer
liAkansson develops the idea further, associating with each type of ability a general
aspect and an adaptive aspect. For example, the general aspect of the problem-solving
part of a relationship describes how 'difficult, complex or advanced' (Ildkansson,
1982: 383) it is; the adaptive aspect describes the extent to which the problem is
specific to one customer (see Figure 2.12). In this sense there are further parallels
with the frameworks discussed above relating to customisation, notably Blois' Policy
Interaction Grid and Shapiro's framework.
Problem-solvina Transfer
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Customer's
General
Need
Low
High
Customer's
General
Need
Low
Low	 High
Customer's
Specific
Need
Low	 High
Customer's
Specific
Need
Figure 2.12 Problem-Solving and Transfer Abilities: General and Adaptive
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HAkansson's primary concern is to relate these abilities to the degree of mutual
dependence and trust in the relationship. Broadly speaking, where the adaptive aspect
is high, then mutual dependence is high and the relationship between customer and
supplier is very close. Hákansson also uses this analysis of the relationships to
determine the most appropriate emphasis in the supplier's resources and activities. He
comments:
'The connection between, for example, technical resources and the
selling firm's general abilities is well known and widely discussed.
Perhaps less established is the connection between the ability to design
individual solutions and the technical and organisational resources
required by the seller.' (Hákansson, 1982: 389)
Finally, it is possible to make a tentative connection between these two abilities and
the manufacturing strategy competitive criteria as shown in Figure 2.13.
Problem-soMng Transfer
Quality - performance
Service
Cost?
Quality - conformance
Delivery - speed and
reliability
Cost?
Figure 2.13 Problem-Solving, Transfer and Competitive Criteria
(This is a small set of criteria - the view adopted here is that, for example, flexibilities
of various sorts are only means to the ends of achieving the primary objectives.)
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The emphasis in much manufacturing strategy literature is on a variety-volume
continuum e.g. Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a), Hill (1985: 66), Slack (1991: 101-
104). These frameworks often conflate low-volume production with 'specials' and job-
shop processes, and high-volume production with 'standards' and line processes
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 209; Hill, 1985: 70-71). Shapiro's and Blois'
analyses indicate that this is over-simplistic: for example, high-volume production
using a line process may well be used to produce customised products. Finally, the
distinction between design cycle and material cycle offers a way of clarifying the
situation: it is material cycle factors that influence process choice. As such, it is
suggested that the relationship implied in Hill's framework (Hill, 1985: 41) between
standardisation/customisation as part of marketing strategy and process choice as the
basic issue in manufacturing strategy is a spurious connection. Blois (1980a)
tentatively introduces the supplier-customer relationship into the picture and
Hákansson takes this further (with a stronger marketing emphasis). This progression
takes us from a view which sees customised products as a low-volume abberation in
a world dominated by mass-production as the only desirable state of affairs (the
implication of the Hayes and Wheelwright product-process life cycle is that
manufacturing plants should progress inexorably toward low-variety line production
as the product matures) to a very different view which sees close, mutually-dependent
relationships founded on the supply of customised products as a significant component
of trade, particularly in industrial or business-to-business markets.. This points to a
need to revisit manufacturing strategy theory and integrate the customisation and
relationship issues into established approaches.
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2.4.3 Other Research
Hutt and Speh (1984) confirm that the interdisciplinary role of marketing, with
manufacturing and with other functions, is increasingly important in the strategy
formulation and strategy implementation processes. They identify an explicit role for
marketers in influencing the design of logistics and manufacturing systems. Using a
mathematical modelling approach, Kim, Ritzman, Benton and Snyder (1992) show
that linkages between marketing and manufacturing, in this case taking the form of
integrated product-line and process design decisions, improve performance. Although
the modelling approach adopted is highly idealised in its assumptions, this piece of
work is interesting in that it chooses these characteristics to represent the two
functions, as well as being rare in attempting to model product-line rather than
individual product management decisions.
Lim and Reid (1992) offer a largely derivative framework that appears to do nothing
more than suggest that other functions' strategies should be formulated with marketing
strategies in mind so that 'potential synergy effects' can be identified and exploited.
No basis for identifying these is proposed. Konijnendijk (1993) carried out a more
discriminating study, attempting to identify co-ordination problems and approaches in
firms distinguished by logistics structure. The hypothesis he examined was that the
type of coordination problems most prevalent would depend on whether the firm
operated in a make-to-stock, make-to-order or engineer-to-order context. A notable
finding of his was that 'specials' were a recurrent source of coordinating problems in
firms with a make-to-stock logistics structure.
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In their discussion of the relationship between manufacturing strategy and marketing
objectives, Gupta, Lonial and Mangold (1991) stress the marketing pursuit of market
share and note that this is often achieved through expansion of the product line. Their
research instrument adopted the three-dimension characterisation of manufacturing
strategy developed by Kotha and Ome (1989) (see 2.3.9) and sought to identify
relationships between these three dimensions - product line complexity, process
structure complexity and organisational scope - and the firm's marketing objective
distilled down to one of three attitudes to market share. The data were collected by
questionnaire and the results indicate that, as we move from 'minor competitor' to
'dominant market share' (via 'major competitor'), firms have increasing process
structure complexity and organisational scope. Product line complexity does not vary
significantly. These results are of somewhat dubious merit anyway as the dimensions
were assessed using Likert scales on a postal questionnaire and there is no evidence
of any assessment of construct validity. Thus, the purely quantitative assessment of
product line complexity is of doubtful validity; also, both the fact of describing
'marketing objectives' purely in terms of some individual's professed attitude to
market share and the risks involved in defming what the market is anyway render the
independent variable next to meaningless. Finally, it is doubtful that any one person
would be in a position to answer all the questions accurately anyway, despite the fact
that Gupta et al tell us that 37.2% of respondents had Masters degrees and 7.6% had
doctorates. The insights here are of dubious merit then, although the lack of variation
in the product line complexity may indicate that product variety is a problem to the
same extent in many types of firm. Once again though, we have no idea of whether
a product line complexity of 10.643 (yes, three decimal places) is high or low in
98
absolute terms.
In their special issue of the Journal Of Operations Management, Berry, Hill,
Klompmaker and McLaughlin (1991) note the early stage of development of the
marketing-operations literature, and the eclectic and inconsistent literature base used
by the authors writing in that edition. Gupta et al's 1991 article demonstrates a
similarly desperate throwing-together of under-developed constructs in an attempt to
generate some quantitative data, with little apparent interest in understanding
anything. As discussed elsewhere here, Berry et al call for much more plant-based
case-study research. (It is also interesting to note that the pre-eminent US Operations
Management journal only attracted 29 submissions for the edition.)
Draaijer (1992) adopts much of Hill's framework. His study, however, attempts to
link improvement programmes in manufacturing to their effect on marketing,
expressed in terms of the order-winning criteria (Hill, 1995: 42-43). In this way, the
study goes beyond Hill's work, by making connections with programmes and projects.
Draaijer's key findings rather support those of Blois in that he finds that the
manufacturing functions have information systems that do not relate to the order-
winning criteria, but concentrate on costs. As such, the impact of improvement
programmes is not easily assessed. Incidentally, Draaijer's study also found that in
two out of his three groups of firms, customisation was cited as a key order-winning
criterion but, disappointingly, offered no specific insights as to how the improvement
programmes adopted addressed this requirement.
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In summary then, there is considerable agreement that conflict exists between
marketing and manufacturing and that it relates to a number of issues of concern to
both functions. St.John's work in particular elaborates on this, providing some
evidence that, while functions articulate similar aims and objectives, they diverge in
particular over the concrete actions and decisions necessary to bring about those aims
(St John, 1991). Konijnendijk (1993) brings a contingency approach into the picture,
finding that the areas of disagreement vary with the logistics structure of the
operation. Prescriptions for improvement range from accepting the inevitability of
conflict and trying to mitigate its effects by training initiatives (e.g. Clare and
Sandford, 1984), through making the trade-offs more explicit (Shapiro, 1977; Hill,
1980), to re-aligning the manufacturing and marketing strategies to identify which
segments the firm can profitably compete in (Shapiro, 1979) and designing the
manufacturing system accordingly (Shapiro, 1977; Hill, 1985; Hayes and
Wheelwright, 1979a, 1979b). It is notable that the trade-off still informs much of this
work. Blois' theoretical analysis is rare in questioning the rigidity of the trade-off, and
his suggestion that to some extent marketing and manufacturing are interchangeable
as ways of adding value appears potentially useful (Blois, 1980a). Finally, it is
particularly noteworthy that the product, product customisation and product variety
are central to many of these assessments of the marketing-manufacturing interface.
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2.4.4 The Product and Related Issues
As we have seen, Hayes and Wheelwright's (1979a, 1979b) principal linking
mechanism between marketing and manufacturing is the product-process matrix. They
acknowledge Shapiro's interfunctional Problem areas (Shapiro, 1977) but suggest that:
'[d]ealing one-by-one with the problem areas in [Shapiro' paper] is not
by itself likely to lead to a substantial increase in harmony between
marketing and manufacturing. Instead, one needs to understand, in
managerial terms, why that interface can so easily become a fault line
in the firm 	 One approach to developing that kind of understanding
is based on an analysis of how product and process life cycles
interact.' (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 199, 201)
Hill's approach (Hill, 1995) links marketing and manufacturing by means of the
criteria by which products win orders. Although less deterministic than the life-cycle
approach of Hayes and Wheelwright, again it is the product that is the connection.
Crittenden, Gardiner and Stamm (1993) have the product as the only common concern
of the two functions, and New (1992) has 'Product' as the only 'P' common to both
the marketing and the manufacturing mix in the Cranfield Competitive Edge Model.
For this reason the discussion now turns to the product, product-range policy, the
product life-cycle and product customisation.
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2.4.4.1 The Product
The product is popularly conceived as part of the marketing mix - one of the Four Ps
(McCarthy, 1960), along with price, promotion and place. Although it is understood
that the Four Ps is not seriously adopted as a useful guiding framework, particularly
as applied to business markets (IMP, 1990: 8), it still informs a good deal of work
in the area. And whether the Four Ps mnemonic is used or not, the marketing mix is
certainly central to basic marketing theory:
'Marketing strategy is the marketing logic by which the business unit
expects to achieve its marketing objectives. Marketing strategy consists
of making decisions on the business's marketing expenditures,
marketing mix, and marketing allocations in relation to expected
environmental and competitive positions.' (Kotler, 1991)
According to Kotler, 'Marketing mix is one of the key concepts in modern marketing
theory' (Kotler 1994: 98). In expanding the Ps, Kotler proceeds as follows:
Product:	 Quality, features, options, style, brand name, packaging, sizes,
services, warranties, returns.
Price:	 List price, discounts, allowances, payment period, credit terms.
Place:	 Channels, coverage, locations, inventory, transport.
Promotion: Advertising, personal selling, sales promotion, publicity.
It is accepted that the product is a complex idea. Kotler's definition is:
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'A product is anything that can be offered to a market for attention,
acquisition, use, or consumption that might satisfy a want or need. It
includes physical objects, services, persons, places, organisations, and
ideas.' (Kotler, 1991)
As the marketing concept emphasises the satisfaction of consumer wants and needs,
rather than simply the selling of products or services, the core benefit or service is
placed at the centre of this model and (where appropriate) the physical product is only
seen as a vehicle for the satisfaction of the customer's needs. This tangible product
has 'as many as five characteristics: a quality level, features, styling, a brand name,
and packaging.' (Kotler, 1991) At a third level, there is the augmented product, which
includes further services and benefits: installation, delivery and credit, warranty and
after-sales service.
2.4.4.2 Product Range
Cardozo (1979) offers a slightly different view of the marketing mix:
'In most cases, an organisation will offer a line of products or services,
rather than just a single product or service. ..The product line is a
more useful unit of analysis than the single product, because almost all
individual products are managed as members of a product line.'
'A product line is itself a* variable in the marketing mix, like price,
promotion, or distribution, but is the most important.'
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'The objective of a product policy is to establish an optimum portfolio
for an organisation.' (Cardozo, 1979: 1-3)
It is useful at this stage to attempt to define terms. Kotler proposes the following
definition for product-line:
' ..a group of products.. .that are closely related, because they function
in a similar manner, are sold to the same customer groups, are
marketed through the same types of outlets, or fall within given price-
ranges' (Kotler, 1994: 434)
First, it is interesting to observe that some of these parameters by which 'relatedness'
may be assessed are, we have been led to believe, non-product decisions: 'types of
outlets' - place (or promotion?); 'price-ranges' - price. Secondly, relatedness is
subjective. To the manufacturing department, our two identical tangible products with
different credit arrangements are, indeed, identical. To the finance department they
are not. To the customer, they are not. So, we have non-orthogonal variables in the
marketing mix. As Kent (1986) puts it: 'To define product ranges as simply groups
of related products, as is common in the literature, is not really adequate. Not only
does what counts as a "product" vary, but "relatedness" may itself take many forms.'
Here, Kent uses the term product-range rather than product-line and there is indeed
some inconsistency in usage in the literature. In the US, the product-mix, is 'the set
of all product lines and items that a particular seller offers for sale to buyers' (Kotler,
1994: 434) and has four parameters: width, length, depth and consistency, defmed as
follows (Kotler, 1994: 435):
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Width	 the number of different product-lines
Length	 the total number of products offered
Depth	 the number of variants in each product-line
Consistency how closely-related the various product-lines are
Product-mix in UK operations management terms refers, for example in a scheduling
context, to the number of different product being made in a relatively short period of
time and their respective volumes. To keep the distinction clear here, the term
product-range will be used to refer to all the products that a firm makes or offers
(e.g. in a catalogue). Product-line will be used to refer to products explicitly related
in some way (Kent's doubts being acknowledged). These definitional issues aside, it
is contended that 'the fate of companies is determined largely by how they handle
such large numbers of products in their range.' (Kent, 1986). This section will now
examine some of the ways in which product-ranges and product-lines may be
characterised.
As mentioned, Kotler (for example) gives three measures of the product-range which
are all quantitative - they simply tell us how many lines there are, how many separate
items there are, and so on. The fourth, consistency, attempts to express relatedness
and is qualitative. Kent (1986) meanwhile, stresses the need to consider the structure
of the product-range and identifies two key variables. Ranges can be considered
hierarchical, where there is some notion of superiority/inferiority between products
('basic'/'de luxe'), or they may be parallel, where products are not better or worse
than one another, just different (orange juice, tomato juice). The other dimension is
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that of concentration versus diversification, which again attempts to capture how far
apart products are from one another. These are shown in Figure 2.14. Whilst this may
be possible for hierarchical ranges, it is difficult to see how this would apply to
parallel ranges where, by definition, .there is no dimension by which to measure
similarity i.e. how similar is orange juice to tomato juice?
Hierarchical	 Parallel
Figure 2.14 Kent's Types of Product-Range (from Kent, 1986)
Shapiro (1987) develops two dimensions that are similar to those of Kent, although
Shapiro does not attempt to fit them into an orthogonal model. First, there are
universal benefits, which are basic performance benefits that all customers buying a
particular class of product want to some degree: e.g. size, power, insulation. This is
close to Kent's hierarchical variable. The other type of benefit is what Shapiro terms
'diverse specifications': these are features that are either present or absent and,
whereas universal benefits are such that customers all want as much as they can have
of the benefit, in the case of diverse specifications, customers may actively prefer not
to have them. Shapiro models consumers as making trade-offs (a) between universal
benefits (e.g. power and fuel efficiency) as well as between universal benefits and
diverse specifications (e.g. left-hand drive). We will return to the implications of this
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identified by Shapiro.
Fisher, Jain and MacDuffle (1994), in discussing the automotive industry, hold that
product variety in the industry is 'often' classified as fundamental variety or
peripheral variety. Fundamental variety refers to 'platforms', models and body styles,
whereas peripheral variety refers to options. They note that Japanese manufacturers
have 'typically' competed on fundamental variety, whereas US producers have had
less fundamental variety and more peripheral variety (although this seems somewhat
at odds with their gleeful observation that Mazda produce their 323 model in four
shades of black at their Hiroshima plant).
Although less concerned with identifying the structure of product-lines or product-
ranges, Cardozo (1979: 31) identifies seven 'distinct attributes of a product-line'
which may be altered 'individually or jointly':
1. Position
2. Physical characteristics
3. Package
4. Brand
5. Amount and nature of value added
6. Expansion or reduction of the product line
7. Composition of the product line
If, indeed, these can be altered independently, then they ought to offer an exceedingly
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powerful way of defming and structuring product-ranges. However, without dwelling
on the details of the text for too long, it soon becomes apparent that they are distinct
neither in the sense of being clear, nor in the sense of being separate and unconnected
with one another. For example, we are told that changing the position of a line may
involve altering the physical characteristics (one of the other 'distinct' attributes), or
by raising the price (one of the other 'Ps'); and that one way of changing the
composition of the line is to offer optional features (features are part of the physical
characteristics), which appears to be a shift toward customisation. Perhaps our only
conclusion here is that many of the terms used are ill-defined and that the Four Ps,
long since considered inviolable tenets of marketing theory, are not independent levers
that can be pulled at will, but highly interrelated and multi-faceted.
2.4.4.3 Product-Range Breadth
The previous section has concentrated on approaches to dimensioning and structuring
product-ranges. A related but distinct issue is the determination of the most
appropriate breadth of product-range. As with the typologies of marketing-
manufacturing conflict, a number of writers have identified reasons for and against
product variety, and this section of the review begins by drawing these together. Some
writers go further and propose ways of evaluating product-line additions. One article
reviewed (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990) assesses whether firms with broad product
lines have proved successful. The factors militating for and against a broad product
line are summarised in Table 2.9.
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The schemes all tackle the problem in different ways and have slightly varying
emphases. Quelch and Kenny are primarily concerned with the implications of line
extensions on retailer and consumer. The other work is more general.
Shapiro observes that:
...the costs of the [overly] narrow product-line and all of the
measurable (as distinct from actual) costs are in the marketing area.
For the broader than optimum line the situation is reversed - all of the
measurable costs and almost all of the actual costs are in the
manufacturing area.' (Shapiro, 1977)
This marketing-manufacturing interface perspective is particularly relevant to the
present research and will be pursued here. Rather than attempting to consolidate all
these into one comprehensive model of the effects of product-line breadth, there is a
more important observation to make, in addition to that of Shapiro's. The effects of
product-line breadth on marketing are a mixture of qualitative and quantitative; the
effects on manufacturing are almost exclusively quantitative. Table 2.10 shows this,
based on the four articles reviewed. Whilst there is no pretence at exhaustive analysis
of the factors, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that almost all the effects on
manufacturing identified are a result of there being, simply, more products. More
products means smaller batches, more set-ups, more inventory, parts purchased in
smaller lots, more administration and more materials handling - more cost. The
marketing implications include quantitative issues - market share and profit, for
example. But they also include many qualitative issues: whether the products fit
particular customer needs, how much and in what way they differ from other
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products, how clear a role their particular features and attributes play in satisfying
customers. A number of equivalent manufacturing issues could just as easily be
identified. For instance, does it not matter to manufacturing whether Product A is
similar to or entirely different from Product B? Does it not matter whether Product
A is required in batches of 20, and Product B is required in batches of 10 000? Does
it not matter to manufacturing that Product A is positioned as a premium, high-
specification product, and Product B is positioned as a basic low-specification, low-
price model? Does it not matter that Product B falls right in the middle of the size-
range that can be accommodated by the production machine, but Product A is at the
limit of the machine, recently extended by judicious modification to the machine's
tooling? Very little is reflected in the schemes discussed here other than that the
changeover from Product A to Product B will involve stopping the machine and
changing it over (incurring cost), build-ups of WIP and other inventory due to the
stop-start process (incurring cost), administration of the changeover and materials
handling (incurring cost). These issues fall naturally within the ambit of the classical
applied operations research approach to Operations and Production Management, but
do not present a comprehensive picture; indeed they may present a misleading one if
they encourage all products to be treated in the same way.
The other perspectives from which this issue will be reviewed is the extent to which
the treatment given here is systemic, in that it considers not only whether the addition
of one new product variant is desirable, but also what the effect of the whole range
is and, related to that, to what extent an interaction view can be accommodated. Both
of these need further explanation.
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1Table 210 Quantitative and Qualitative Effects of Product Variety on Marketing
And Manufacturing
Marketing Manufacturing
Qualitative Refs Qualitative Ref
Full-line supplier 1 Common parts may mitigate variety
Supplier of particular need 1, 4 problems 2
Differentiation 3
Image complementarity 3 Quantitative
Attribute similarity 3 Set-up/changeover costs 1-4
Confusion of positioning 4 Inventory costs 1,2
Quality control costs 2
Quantitative Purchasing power lost 2
Market share 2 Economies of scale/scope 3
Profit 2
Refs: (1) Shapiro (197); (2) Kekre and Srinivasan (1990); (3) Guiltinan (1993); (4) Quelch
and Kenny (1994)
Notable as systemic issues are the notion of being able to operate as a 'full-line'
supplier (Shapiro) and that of erecting entry barriers (Quelch and Kenney). These
contrast with the more localised issues of whether a manufacturer offers a particular
model or variant that exactly satisfies a customer's particular, immediate needs.
Especially as many industrial purchasers seek to reduce their supplier-base, it is
increasingly an issue that the supplier be able to offer a 'full' range per se. This
makes it (a) more likely that a buyer will enter into a long-term relationship with the
supplier and (b) (which is Quelch and Kenney's point) less likely that a competitor
will easily be able to supplant the supplier in that relationship once it is established.
The connected point about relationships/interaction has already crept into the
discussion above. In the context of the single, isolated purchase decision, the main
point is that the supplier have a product model that offers the benefits that the buyer
seeks. Being a 'full-line' supplier, on the other hand doesn't, of itself, win any one
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isolated order. But it may affect the relationship with actual or potential customers.
This is an observation that calls to mind the earlier comments about flexibility acting
more at the level of relationship than at the level of the individual order or delivery.
Just as flexibility is 'a measure of potential behaviour' (Slack, 1983), so, it is
suggested, is being a 'full-line' supplier. Hill's framework (1985: 41) includes
'product range' as an order-winner in its own right although, based on the foregoing
discussion, this appears logically inconsistent.
Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) proceed, despite the reservations set out above, to test
their hypotheses using PIMS data. They conclude that US manufacturers seem to be
able to produce broad product-ranges 'while managing costs' and:
'The main conclusion from our model is that a broader product-line
leads to a higher market share as well as to increased profitability'
The results, though, are fundamentally weakened in that the PIMS database
assessment of product-line breadth is (a) entirely quantitative (see critique above), (b)
subjective and self-reported via questionnaire. How respondents define 'product',
much less 'product-line breadth' is very dubious.
2.4.4.4 Product Customisation
As discussed above, Shapiro (1979) gives an unusual prominence to customisation as
an issue in marketing strategy. Crittenden et al (1993), Skinner (1969), and Hill
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(1985) are among those who include it as one of a number of trade-off or conflict
areas; Konijnendijk (1993) found 'exceptions/specials' to be the biggest problem
among firms operating in a make-to-stock logistic environment.
Shapiro (1977b: 17-21) identifies three types of industrial product lines:
Proprietary or catalogue products
Custom-build products
Custom-designed products
Shapiro sees the customisation-standardisation variable as one of three that dominate
industrial product policy. The other two are the extent of branding and the
conformance to or deviation from industry standard specifications. It is notable that
'number of products' does not appear in the list.
Konijnendijk (1993) used the categories make-to-stock, make-to-order and engineer-to-
order, which combines material-cycle and design-cycle issues. Sharma (1987) suggests
the following categories:
Standardised products:
with no options
with customer-specified options
modified to customer specification
Customised product prodUced to customer specification
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In their automotive industry work, Fisher, Jain and MacDuffle (1994) discuss
peripheral variety in terms of 'package options' (e.g. all the parts needed to provide
air conditioning) and 'standalone options'. These are subdivisions of the 'custom-
build' class of Shapiro. Surprisingly, Mintzberg (1988) also offers a classification of
customisation approaches: pure, where the product is designed from scratch; tailored,
where a basic product is modified to the customer's specification; and standardised,
which is again custom-build in Shapiro's terms.
A number of writers have, then, attempted to categorise customisation approaches.
Shapiro (1979), in linking customisation per se with some aspects manufacturing
strategy, has identified his four-part typology of marketing tasks (in similar vein,
perhaps, to Skirmerian manufacturing tasks). However, there is little consideration
given elsewhere to the management of customisation.
Again, returning to Shapiro's work, he has elaborated somewhat on the role of
customisation in the evolution of industrial products (Shapiro, 1987). Re-configuring
earlier concerns, he identifies two 'generic approaches to product policy': variety and
value. These are related to the universal benefits and diverse specifications discussed
above. A variety-oriented line can be achieved by custom-designed items or special-
purpose products. The latter appear to be similar to custom-build items (Shapiro,
1977b), but '[i]n some situations, the special purpose units are not custom-built.
Instead, the manufacturer has a broad product-line, designed to meet the needs of
many customers or purchase or usage situations'. Shapiro goes on to describe the
typical pattern of interaction between standardisation and customisation as products
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evolve over time. He terms this the Product Evolution Trajectory (PET). Products
start as customised units which are experimental attempts to 'mate a technology and
a need'. The suggestion is that this variety approach shifts from custom-designed to
special purpose (i.e. custom-built or standard). The next stage involves the arrival of
a dominant design, offering great universal benefits. This may stabilise on a few
models offering clear price-performance trade-off positions (Kent's hierarchical
dimension). The next stage involves differentiation, as customers learn to be more
discriminating, and competitors seek profitable niches.
Shapiro relates this PET to the 'way companies must operate to succeed' at each
stage. This is reminiscent of the Hayes and Wheelwright product-process life-cycle,
and of the more general PLC theory discussed below. The Phases and accompanying
prescription are:
Phase 1 Few custom-designed Selection of profitable market
opportunities; pricing high enough to
make money.
Phase 2
	 Special-purpose units	 Sales and Technical support;
relationships essential.
Phase 3 Dominant design Radical changes; performance-to-price;
cost-sensitive product- and process
engineering, rapid growth, specialisation
Phase 4	 Fragmentation	 Search for new profits in saturating
markets via return to Phase 1
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and so on. The importance of identifying transition points is emphasised. During the
customisation phases:
' ...because each order is a different item, functional integration among
sales, marketing, manufacturing, engineering and applications
engineering is an absolute necessity. In custom producers, the profits
are made at the interfaces of the filmdom, not in any single function.'
(Shapiro, 1987: 17, emphasis added)
2.4.4.5 Mass Customisation and Product Family Management
It is only in the last few years that customisation has become a topic of debate of any
note, via the 'mass customisation' literature, popularised by Pine (1993). Kotha (1995)
recently saw fit to describe Mass Customisation as 'the emerging paradigm for
competitive advantage' and his article begins:
'The nature of competition in many industries .. is being
transformed.... '
and continues:
'Mass customization is generally described as a process by which firms
apply technology and management methods to provide product variety
and customization through flexibility...'
Early in Starr's 1965 Harvard Business Review article:
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'..now change is occurring once again. Many enterprise managers are
aware that something new is creeping into the production sphere...'
and then:
'The change that we are talking about can briefly be described as the
consumer's demand for maximum productive variety (or maximum
choice). To achieve this variety, what I call "modular" or
"combinatorial" productive capacities - that is, capacities to design and
manufacture parts which can be combined in numerous ways - are
required, as well as compatible management abilities.' (Starr, 1965)
According to Starr, '...a new form of effort which will cut across many functional
organizational areas is required'.
The phrase 'mass customisation' has particular rhetorical power due to its oxymoronic
quality, but the 'paradigm' appears, in fact, to differ very little from the 'New
Concept' that Starr described thirty years earlier. The most significant development
has been the emergence of relatively inexpensive and commonplace microprocessor-
controlled production equipment, which has made Starr's vision of 'adaptive
automation' a real possibility (although one that is not always exploited to the full
(Jailcumar, 1986)).
Elsewhere, Kotha is more equivocal about mass customisation, noting that much of
what has been articulated in its name (e.g. Pine, 1993) is nothing new, and that it is
dangerous to assume that all firms must aspire to it: 'mass customization taken to an
extreme can position the firm as trying to be all things to all people' (Kotha, 1994 -
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emphasis in original). Even in his own description of a mass-customising firm, Kotha
notes that a mass-production plant and a mass-customisation plant operated in parallel,
satisfying separate markets (and that the mass customisation plant only produced a
small proportion of the firm's volume). The empirical evidence is limited, but the few
applications that have been documented involve information systems allowing
customers to specify products' configurations from a range of options. The dominant
type of customisation is, then, custom-building based on modular designs. The only
element of custom-designing is the relatively simple translation of customer
dimensions - usually anthropometric dimensions - into parametric variations in the
product e.g. bicycle frame size (Kotha, 1995) or the dimensions of jeans (Pine, 1993).
Most examples are in consumer durables.
A recently-emerging literature contributes to this development and begins to address
some of the concerns of Kent (1986) discussed earlier. The management of product-
families as opposed to individual products is just beginning to attract the attention of
technology management writers. Sanderson and Uzumeri (1995) and Uzumeri and
Sanderson (1995) describe examples from consumer durables industries of different
patterns of model-succession and inter-model competition, and how attention to
different levels in the product hierarchy are particularly important in markets with
rapidly-changing technologies. Ulrich (1995) addresses the concept of product
architecture, which is 'the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated to
physical components'. The architecture of a product design determines the extent to
which a variety of products can be made from common components (by the use of
modules) and how readily products may be up-dated as aspects of their technology
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advance. At this stage in its development however, the literature is struggling to move
far beyond Starr's thirty-year-old prescriptions about the benefits of modular design.
2.4.4.6 The Product Life-Cycle
This is no place for a comprehensive review of the product life cycle (PLC) literature.
However, as it has informed some of the manufacturing strategy literature and is a
relatively well-entrenched part of business strategy thinking, it is important to outline
the concept, assess some of the evidence for its validity, review some of its criticisms
and limitations, and identify ways in which it can inform the present research.
The product life cycle 'portrays distinct stages in the sales history of a product' and
these are usually known as introduction, growth, maturity and decline (Kotler, 1994:
335). These are illustrated in Figure 2.15
Introduction	 Growth
	
Maturity	 Decline
Figure 2.15 The Product Life Cycle
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Hofer (1975) claims that:
'The most fundamental variable in determining an appropriate business
strategy is the stage of the product life cycle'
Thorelli and Bumett's (1981) conclusions based on their study of over a thousand
industrial goods manufacturers are less categorical. They comment that :'[a] question
that still remains is whether the findings have any practical significance for strategic
planning' and 'PLC forces are at work, but they do not appear to be the ultimate
independent variable for strategic decision-making in such [industrial] businesses'.
However, they also acknowledge a number of shortcomings of the research method
used, notably its inability to take into account differences in PLC length (a) with the
passage of time or (b) between different types of product.
Day (1981) comments that PLCs 'summarize the effects of many concurrent changes'
and hence that there is a need 'to incorporate the underlying factors and processes
within the particular market situation into the life cycle model'. Evidently the PLC
concept is a useful 'shorthand' for a range of causal factors, but it is important to look
beyond the summary and identify these causal factors individually for strategic
decision-making purposes. Day (1981) also identifies the problems associated with
what constitutes a 'product' in PLC analysis: as Weitz and Wensley (1988: 157)
comment:
'A problem confronted by all strategy analysis is determining the
appropriate level of aggregation'
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The unit of analysis in PLC theory appears to influence the strength of the evidence
for the PLC per se. Should it be the brand, the product form, the product class, the
market segment or the industry? (Weitz and Wensley, 1988). Dhalla and Yuspeh
(1976) advise us to 'forget the product life cycle concept' because their analysis at the
brand level and the product class level provides no evidence to support the existence
of the PLC; Neidel (1988) accepts the PLC concept based on analysis at the product
form level. Abell (1980: 205-210) again looks beneath the PLC shorthand and
suggests that a new PLC starts when one of his three dimensions for defining the
business - product technology, customer function, or customer group - changes. The
underlying causes are the adoption and diffusion processes in the extension to new
customer groups, 'systematization' in the extension of customer functions, and
technological substitution in the case of product technology. Abell argues that these
must be understood in a disaggregated way rather than being summarised in their
effects via PLC theory which is then itself adopted as an independent variable rather
than as a useful but limited way of summarising the outcomes of a number of complex
and interrelated causal mechanisms. It is instructive to note that Abell's more
discriminating understanding of the relationships - or more convincing commitment
to working at that level and in that qualitative way rather than at the level of purely
quantitative relationships between aggregate variables - resulted from research of an
in-depth case-study nature.
Anderson and Zeithaml (1984) carried out a study to determine (a) how a wide range
of strategic variables changed with PLC stage and (b) what correlations existed
between these variables and company performance, measured in terms of ROI and
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market share. Of particular note is that the study was exclusively of industrial product
firms, making its relevance to the present research rather more than might have been
the case if the data had been collected from consumer goods firms or firms in a
mixture of industries. Also, compared to Thorelli and Burnett's work, the collection
of rather more specific data than is possible by reliance on the PIMS database adds
to the validity of the results. They concluded that, in general, the PLC stage is indeed
one contingency variable that informs strategy formulation, but not the predominant
one, as claimed by Hofer. More specifically, they found that product line breadth
grew in maturity and contracted in decline; ROT was better for firms with low
customisation in the growth and, to a lesser extent, the mature stage; market share
was lower for firms with greater customisation in the decline stage; and market share
was strongly enhanced by greater product line breadth in both growth and maturity
stages. Other relationships were not significant.
Another issue connected with the PLC is organisation structure. This is implicit in the
work of Hayes and Wheelwright in that they include it as one of their infrastructural
variables and link it by implication to the PLC via the process life cycle; Hill makes
this more explicit (Hill, 1985: 70-71) and, to a large extent these ideas were present
in the work of Burns and Stalker (1961) (particularly in relation to new products) and
Woodward (1965) (particularly in relation to process choice). This contingency theory
approach was explicitly related to the PLC by Donaldson (1985), who drew together
various studies into a framework that specifies the structure most appropriate to
different combinations of circumstances associated with the PLC. Interestingly, the
Donaldson framework attempts to prescribe for situations where multiple products at
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different stages in the life-cycle are being produced, and acknowledges a 'trade-off'
between the bias toward innovation on one hand and toward productivity on the other.
However, the prescription is at such a macroscopic level, hinging on whether products
are 'mainly mature' or 'mainly early', and specified in terms of a choice between
functional, product division, matrix or project structures, that it can only be a very
general guide. What is perhaps most notable is that a version of the trade-off is
articulated in this rather different context.
The PLC then, has been adopted as an important informing construct in manufacturing
strategy theory. Examination of some relevant literature in marketing and other areas
indicate that, whilst the PLC is a useful shorthand, it is advisable to understand the
underlying factors that give rise to the phenomenon and to take great care in defining
the unit of analysis. This latter point is particularly relevant where an attempt is being
made to link product strategies to decisions on manufacturing system design. There
are strong parallels between this problem of the level of aggregation to adopt and the
level of aggregation appropriate in manufacturing strategy (see 2.3.7). One study in
particular (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984) has some findings relevant to the concern
of the present research with product variety and customisation: namely that
profitability appears to be better for firms not customising products in the earlier
stages of the PLC and, perhaps not surprisingly, that firms offering product variety
gain market share (but not profitability) early in the PLC. However, the research
design did not enable identification of whether the manufacturing system in each case
was appropriate to the amount of customisation.
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2.5 Implications for the Present Research
The literature review has been wide-ranging, as befits the inter-disciplinary nature of
the research question. This section will draw together the ideas from the three main
sections of the review and set out the key issues for the empirical work to address.
2.5.1 Major Issues From The Literature
2.5.1.1 Scope
Scope was identified in section 2.2.1 as very much the concern of corporate strategy.
However, a great deal of the sections devoted to manufacturing strategy and the
marketing-manufacturing interface indicate that these functions have a not
inconsiderable part to play in determining the scope of their business unit's activities.
Some important dimensions of scope which appear to be very much part of functional
strategies, particularly those of the marketing and manufacturing functions, are:
degree of vertical integration
process type i.e. volume/variety positioning
exact positioning i.e. product-range policy
customisation - extent and nature
-	 problem-solving/transfer abilities
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These are additional to the dimensions proposed in Section 2.2.1 by which we might
'define the business' or, indeed, assess the 'Yes, we can do that ...' claim. Certainly,
there is more to functional strategy than 'the maximisation of resource productivity'
(Hofer and Schendel, 1978: 29); Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 396-403), with their
concept of the 'Stage 4' manufacturing organisation, suggest that the functional
strategies of successful firms must go beyond this.
2.5.1.2 The Product and the Product-Range
The Product is central to marketing strategy. The breadth and structure of the
product-range are less well theorised by marketers but, it appears, determine to a
large extent the most appropriate manufacturing strategy. For example, the need for
various categories of flexibility or the ability to 'focus' manufacturing derive directly
from the product-range policy. And yet, despite the observations of a few writers that
the product is the concrete link between marketing and manufacturing (e.g.
Crittenden et al, 1993: 'manufacturing and marketing converge on product
decisions'), manufacturing strategy theory does not give prominence to product or
product-range policy.
The costs and benefits of making product-lines broader has been analysed by a
number of writers but, whilst the marketing implications are identified in both their
qualitative and quantitative aspects, the manufacturing implications are almost
exclusively seen in quantitative terms. That is, it is the fact of adding another product
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- any product - that incurs costs in manufacturing, and there is little concern for how,
and to what extent, the additional products may vary from the rest of the range.
2.5.1.3 Strategy Process
Much of the manufacturing strategy process literature attempts to develop strategy
formulation techniques that are rather like the business strategy process approaches
of the 1960's and 1970's. There has been no development in the manufacturing
strategy process field, parallel to the work of business strategy process researchers
such as Mintzberg and Pettigrew, in taking a longitudinal and emergent view of the
manufacturing strategy process.
Furthermore, it is notable that many of these strategy formulation processes involve
hiatuses between strategy formation and action programmes: in Mintzberg's terms,
'..where does the strategy stop and the project begin?' (Mintzberg, 1994: 77).
Following from the comments in the previous sub-section, it is contended that The
Product or Product-Range is an important concrete vehicle for the formation of
strategy in manufacturing as well as marketing.
2.5.1.4 Marketing and Manufacturing
Most research into the marketing-manufacturing interface has either identified domains
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of conflict, attempted to measure this conflict in some way, and/or made suggestions
as to how to achieve strategic reconciliation between functions. Despite the
acknowledgement of conflict between these functions, there appears to be no
documented research of a more intensive nature into the details of conflicts, in day-to-
day activities, between the functions. If, as Shapiro (amongst others) notes, success
in manufacturing customised products in particular is achieved at the interfaces
between functions rather than in any one function, then a rich understanding of this
most important interface seems essential.
2.5.1.5 A Theory of Manufacturing Strategy for Industrial Markets?
Those authors who have attempted to set out more detailed procedures for formulating
manufacturing strategy have often advocated taking data from aggregated sales of
products or product families from which to determine competitive criteria (e.g. Hill,
1985). This type of procedure implicitly abstracts individual purchases from the
manufacturer-customer relationships in which they take place, a step that has been
demonstrated to be inappropriate to many industrial marketing situations. Industrial
buyer-supplier relationships are characterised by stability and close involvement over
long periods, rather than fleeting, atomistic transactions in perfect markets.
Among those authors reviewed, Shapiro (1979) and Blois (1980a) have made tentative
connections between basic manufacturing strategy concepts and the issues of customer
relationships and product customisation. Based on these efforts, there is a need to
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develop a theory of manufacturing strategy that takes account of relationships of the
type found in industrial markets, as well as of simplistic ideas of products being sold
in markets.
2.5.1.6 Product Customisation
Product customisation is neglected in much of the manufacturing strategy literature.
Two authors in industrial marketing (Shapiro and Blois) have proposed that it is a
more fundamental issue than has hitherto been recognised. Despite this, much of the
coverage of customisation has consisted of rather facile exhortations to develop
modular designs. This tendency has been increased by the publicity given recently to
'mass customization', a concept which, when subjected to close examination, appears
to have limited novelty or applicability.
Product customisation has the potential to defme fundamentally the nature of the link
between the design cycle and the material cycle or, to place it in the context of the
buyer-supplier relationship, problem-solving and transfer activities. Understanding the
nature of this link is essential to developing consistent manufacturing and marketing
strategies.
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2.5.2 Research Questions
The primary research question for this work is:
How can manufacturing strategy theory be extended and modified
to accommodate product customisation as a central, rather than
peripheral, issue?
Included in this question are such subsidiary questions as:
- how do deliberate and emergent strategy formation processes involving
manufacturing and other functions, notably marketing, determine firms'
success in producing customised products?
- in this context, what are useful dimensions by which to define, and against
which to change, the business?
- to what extent and in what ways are problems of customisation associated with
the conflicting requirements of marketing and manufacturing and, if these are
significant, how might they be addressed?
A supplementary question, which results from an emphasis on industrial markets in
much of the literature that does address customisation is:
does manufacturing strategy theory take account of the distinctive
130
1
characteristics of industrial markets? If not, how could it be modified to do so?
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Chapter 3
Research Design
3.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the rationale for the design of the research. First, intensive and
extensive approaches and criteria for the assessment of research quality are discussed
in general terms. The two approaches are then assessed as to their suitability for the
specific research question in hand. Having identified the case-study approach as
suitable, the more specific issues of case-selection, data-collection and data-analysis
are discussed.
3.2 Extensive and Intensive Approaches
Research approaches can be described as being either extensive or intensive (Sayer,
1992: 242). Extensive approaches take a relatively superficial look at a large number
of instances of some phenomenon. Intensive approaches involve the in-depth
examination of a small number of instances - sometimes only one. This can be
characterised as taking a 'thin, deep slice' and is also called an 'idiographic' or
'concrete' approach (Tsoukas 1989).
Extensive approaches are designed to make possible statistically-based generalisations.
They involve the assumption that the sample of the population investigated is in some
clearly-defined way, and to a quantifiable degree, representative of the whole
population in which one is interested. Typical extensive approaches include large-scale
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surveys, experiments, questionnaires and various combinations of these.
The most widely-used intensive approaches are case-studies, historical studies and
archival research (Yin, 1989: 17). The means of generalising from intensive
approaches is theoretical rather than statistical. A small number of case-studies does
not represent a small 'sample'. Indeed, the alternative term 'idiographic' means
precisely that the instance is unique. Cases, or the bounds of archival studies, are
chosen for explicit theoretical reasons, rather than randomly.
There has been a major debate over the relative strengths and weaknesses of these
approaches. This has often taken the form of a debate between qualitative and
quantitative 'methodology' and has 'generated rather more heat than light' (Crompton
and Jones 1988: 72). These authors go on to state that in organisational research it is
'not a mutually exclusive decision' between the two methodologies and, indeed, that
it is 'very difficult to study organisations without using both...'
One of the problems in such discussions is the conflation of extensive research with
quantitative data and of intensive research with qualitative data, as shown in Figure
3.1. Tsoukas (1989) points out that 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' are simply types of
evidence. Miles and Huberman (1984) make the similarly simple distinction that
quantitative data are in the form of numbers and qualitative data are in the form of
words and images. Whilst it is likely that qualitative data will feature more strongly
in intensive research approaches, many intensive studies also require a good deal of
quantitative data. Indeed, Jick (1979) calls for the creative use of both in intensive
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Qualitative	 Intensive )
Quantitative	 Extensive
Qualitative 
0
Quantitative
Intensive
Extensive
studies.
Data Type	 Research Design Data Type
	
Research Design
$ means 'not equivalent to'
Figure 3.1 Data Types and Research Designs
The debate is about something much more important than simply the form of data
used. Research design depends on an assessment of what constitute valid,
generalisable or reliable results. This is strongly influenced by the nature of the
research question in relation to the extant knowledge in the discipline concerned, as
well as the philosophical predisposition of the researcher. Criteria for the assessment
of research quality are needed, and these are discussed next.
3.3 Assessment of Research Quality
The literature on methodology is inconsistent in its interpretations of parameters
relating to research quality. Terms involving various combinations of 'reliability',
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'validity' and 'generalisability' are used, and used inconsistently. For example
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Low (1991: 41) use validity, reliability and
generalisability as their measures of research quality; Yin (1989: 41) uses construct
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.
Inconsistencies in terminology notwithstanding, some yardsticks for judging the
quality of research design are necessary. The terms used here are more or less those
adopted by Yin (1989: 40-45) as these seem to cover the main concerns as precisely
and comprehensively as any.
Construct validity is a measure of how well the chosen data-sources describe or
measure particular phenomena. This may involve assessment of a priori constructs or,
in theory-building, constructs that are established during data collection. For example,
one may be interested in assessing product variety: there are a number of ways this
might be measured, including the total number of products made, the number of
product-lines, or by some relevant assessment of the differences between products,
say the range of sizes. Each one of these could be posited as a construct for
measuring 'variety'.
A related consideration, especially in theory-building research, is testability. Yin
(1989) does not use this term but Eisenhardt (1989) sees it as important that constructs
that are developed and 'sharpened' during the research should be defined in such a
way as to be readily tested. To be useful, they will also need to be transferable to
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other circumstances. Triangulation, by the use of multiple sources of evidence, is an
important way of improving construct validity (Yin, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Internal validity relates to causality. It is a measure of how compellingly and
convincingly data can be related to one another in terms of one event causing another.
This is discussed at some length later in this chapter.
External validity requires some discussion even at this stage. Tsoukas (1989)
discusses the way intensive approaches are viewed by positivistically-inclined social
science and in so doing uses 'external validity' to mean ' ...generalisability of findings
beyond the cases researched'. Critics of case-study and similar approaches hold that
such approaches can only ever investigate local causality: the problem is thus one of
breadth of generalisability or of low external validity.
Miles and Huberman (1984) see 'external validity' as a measure of 'authenticity and
meaning' and suggest that traditional positivistic methods have low external validity.
Advocates of intensive methods point out that many of the 'laws' produced from the
'rigour' of extensive methods are so facile, so abstract and so far-removed from
reality as to be practically useless: even people who were sampled in a survey may
not recognise the 'general' results of the survey as relating to them or having any
relevance to their lives. This is the sense in which Miles and Huberman use the term
and, relating as it does to depth or relevance of generalisability, it is different to the
sense of Tsoukas' usage.
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Both of these interpretations relate to the way in which generalisation may be made
from the results of a piece of research to instances outside the sample, case, or other
bounded data-source studied. One aspect is the breadth of reasonable generalisation:
to how many other instances can the results be applied? The other aspect is the
relevance and utility of generalisation to a given other instance, which might be
characterised as the "So what?" factor', since this may well be the result when facile,
abstract, 'general' results are reported.
i
Reliability is less contentious than some of the foregoing. It is an assessment of the
likelihood that, were the research to be carried out by another investigator, the same
/
result would be achieved. Reliability is largely a matter of defining and implementing
procedures during data-collection and analysis.
3.4 Discussion of Generic Approaches
Advocates of extensive research methods criticise intensive methods on the grounds
of lack of 'generalisability' (the aspect of external validity relating to breadth of
application of results) (Tsoukas, 1989).
First of all, it has to be said that most 'extensive' studies just aren't very extensive.
A thirty per cent response-rate to a questionnaire would be greeted with considerable
delight by the average (!) extensive researcher. This means that in most such studies,
the majority of the sample are never 'measured'.
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Furthermore, how much notice is it reasonable to take of those replies that at
received? Organisations receive many survey questionnaires from students and from
other organisations. In many, the response is to throw the form away. In others they
may be referred to the personnel department or to the office junior, neither of whom
are likely to be well-placed to give competent responses on operations issues, even
assuming that they take the time and effort to try to give accurate responses and have
the data available in appropriate form. This is a particular problem when concepts are
ill-defined or subject to significant variations in interpretation. In these circumstances
at least then, extensive approaches lack construct validity, because the data collected
are not a good representation of the phenomena in which the researcher is interested.
Whilst the criteria discussed here are valuable for structuring any assessment of
research quality, there is also a need to consider what the objective of the work is.
Leaving aside the subject-specific content for the time being, it is useful to clarify
what kind of knowledge the work is to result in i.e. whether the aim is to describe,
to explain to predict or to test theory (Yin, 1989: 16-17).
The state of knowledge in the field to some extent determines what type of objective
is feasible. In completely unexplored research areas for example, it is unlikely that
precise predictive results can be achieved. But, given the current state of knowledge
in any field, there are still choices to be made about the objectives of research in it.
The aim of this research is not simply to determine what happens and how often in
a sample and hence to 'predict' what will happen and how often somewhere else in
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the population. It is to understand bow and why something happens: to understand the
mechanisms and contingent factors (Tsoukas 1989) of the situations studied. Based on
this understanding of, rather than simple measurement of, what happens juaside the
scope of the study, the researcher can think more informedly about what is likely to
happen outside the study. Where relevant generative mechanisms and contingent
factors exist outside the study, then similar phenomena are likely to be observable.
This concern with causative processes involved in particular cases is closely linked
with internal validity. Adequate understanding of structures and mechanisms implies
internal validity, i.e. that the causal processes are convincingly identified, based on
empirical data.
Yin states that internal validity only applies to 'explanatory' studies (he is referring
particularly to case-studies). To him, it is simply not relevant to studies (usually
intensive studies) whose sole objective is to generate theory. This seems a limited
view. Even where the main reason for a case-study is to generate theory, rather than
to test it, surely there must be a concern with generating good theory? And, using the
concept of internal validity, good theory will be more valid than bad, will better
withstand the line of questioning Yin (1989: 43) proposes for explanatory studies, viz:
• Is the inference correct?
• Have all the rival explanations and possibilities been considered?
• Is the evidence convergent?
• Does it appear to be airtight?
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What 'airtight' means is debatable, but there are some pointers here for improving
internal validity. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that theory generated from case-studies
'is likely to be empirically valid' because of the intimate relation between theory-
development and the evidence, previously noted. In well-executed theory-building
research, 'investigators answer to the data from the beginning of the research'. This
is another way of applying the idea of internal validity to theory-building research.
Following on from the previous comments, Eisenhardt also notes that the theory
developed from case-study work may be 'narrow and idiosyncratic'. In other words,
this is an assessment of external validity. Thus the theory may be relevant only to a
limited field, but it is likely to be very relevant in that field. The implicit contrast with
the results of extensive research is that they will be widely applicable, as far as they
go, but not mirror reality very closely.
The external validity of any approach, it is argued, depends first of all on internal
validity: if no internally valid conclusions about structures and generative mechanisms
are drawn, then there is nothing to generalise external to the cases studied. Given
internal validity, the external validity depends upon other supportive theory and
research design, particularly case selection.
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3.5 The Method for This Research
So far, aspects of validity and reliability have been discussed in relation to intensive
and extensive research approaches in general. It is now time to turn to the specific
research question in hand and to determine an appropriate design and methods, such
that the criteria of validity and reliability may be satisfied.
The primary research question for this work is:
How can manufacturing strategy theory be extended and modified
to accommodate product customisation as a central, rather than
peripheral, issue?
Also included were the subsidiary questions shown in Figure 3.2.
142
How can manufacturing strategy theory be extended and modrfied to accommodate
produzt customisation as a central, rather than peripheral, issue?
How do deliberate and emergent strategy formation processes involving
manufacturing and other functions, notably marketing, determine firms' success
in producing customised products?
In this context, what are useful dimensions by Mich to define, and against Mich
to change, the business?
To what extent and in Mat ways are problems of customisation associated with
the conflicting requirements of marketing and manufacturing and, if these are
significant, how might they be addressed?
Does manufacturing strategy theory take account of the distinctive characteristics
of industrial markets? If not, how could it be modified to do so?
Figure 3.2 The Research Questions
Given this research question and the state of knowledge set out in the literature
review, the chapter will go on to assess extensive and intensive methods in turn.
Extensive, sampling-based approaches have their limitations in the best of
circumstances. Many aspects of the research question are not consistently interpreted,
even by practitioners and academics working directly in the fields concerned. For
example, 'flexibility' has many different meanings; 'product-range', 'product-mix' and
'product-line' are used in various ways and depend for their meaning on the subjective
idea of relatedness of products (and even 'product' is difficult to define); various types
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of customisation have been identified. Chapter 2 discusses a number of other terms
whose usage varies considerably.
As has already been noted, a questionnaire about operations issues is as likely to be
answered by the personnel manager as by anyone directly involved with operations.
For both these reasons it seems unlikely therefore, that data collected in this way
would relate very closely to the phenomena being investigated: i.e. extensive
approaches would lack construct validity. Careful design of a questionnaire can
mitigate these effects to some extent e.g. by clear definition of terminology. However,
this is not an option where the reason for the research is precisely that theory and
/
definitions do not exist. This is particularly true in the specific concerns of this work
with customised products. Lacking construct validity, questionnaire-based studies
cannot have internal or external validity. If there is no consistent way of measuring
or describing the phenomena under investigation, then there is no prospect of
convincingly establishing causality between them. And, to complete the argument,
without internal validity, there can be no external validity.
Single, in-depth interviews might be considered appropriate. These would allow some
discussion about the constructs being used and hence would improve the validity to
a limited extent. This approach though, would founder when addressing the less-well-
defined issues: because of the intrinsic cross-functional nature of the work and its
concentration on the operational level, a single interview in each firm would not
capture the different perspectives that form part of the very object of the research.
Finally, interviews alone, from however many sources, would not provide adequate
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triangulation of the data - alternative sources e.g. written documents, production
records are needed to substantiate opinions.
If construct validity is a prerequisite for internal validity, questionnaire surveys and
in-depth interviews are not satisfactory. One might assume that a few interviews in
each firm would be adequate, regardless of the suggested deficiency in triangulation.
This approach would, however, be almost entirely lacking in internal validity as there
would be little opportunity to establish causality in anything but the most trivial
matters. To develop good new theory - 'good', as suggested previously, in that it has
internal validity - some understanding of the processes of causality must be achieved.
It has already been suggested that this requires a lot of data from multiple sources.
The present research question requires that, more than in better-defined areas, time
be spent teasing out interpretations and opinions to set against documented
organisational transactions. This will necessarily be an iterative, and hence an
involved, process. Finally, it is difficult to imagine how a compelling understanding
of causality in an organisation could be achieved without spending a significant
amount of time in it so as to build a picture of power relationships, and different
groups' priorities. The only means of addressing this particular research question in
a satisfactory manner then, is by a case-study approach.
As extensive approaches have been dismissed for the purposes of this work, it must
be established whether the only remaining contender, the case-study approach, has
external validity. Alternatively, more modest objectives for the research may need to
be set. External validity is dependent on internal validity and on other research design
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factors, especially case-selection. The objective of this work being a combination of
theory-testing and theory-building, there is also a need for careful consideration of the
process by which this is done.
Table 3.1 Some Possible Research Methods Assessed
Construct
validity
Internal
validity
External
validity
Rellity
Bdensive
(a) Poor due to
lack of
definitions in
the area
(b) Reinforce
by imposed
definition of
terms
Quite good.
Can darify
definition/
understanding
of terms
Good. Can
darify and
revisit
definitions and
understanding
of terms.
Not without
construct
validity
Poor in
identifying
causality
Moderate -
single view of
causality
Good. Multiple
respondents
and data
sources -
interviews,
documents,
observation -
allow
exploration of
causality,
Not without
construct and
internal validity
Yes: wide but
likely to be
superficial and
weak on
causality
Some, but
founders on
poor internal
validity
Powerful but
possibly limited
in range of
applicability,
Depends on
theoretical
logic in case
selection,
Strong if
designed
carefully and
piloted
Quite good
with well-
prepared
interview
schedule.
Quite good,
but open-
ended nature
might result in
different
researchers
following
different
'leads',
depending on
prior
understanding.
Questionnaire
survey
Incividual
inteivims
ntensive
Case studies
What follows is a consideration of these research design issues in two dimensions:
cross-sectional, bearing on case-selection; and longitudinal, dealing both with the way
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the cases are conceived to exist in time and with the progress of the design,
fieldwork, analysis and theory-building as the study proceeds. In this extended
discussion it is argued that the proposed approach does have adequate external
validity. This discussion of the suitability of various research methods is summarised
in Table 3.1.
3.5.1 External Validity: Cross-sectional Considerations
The original formulation of the research question was, in effect, based on a personal
multiple case study by participant observation. Of course, this wasn't clear at the
time, the 'studies' were far from rigorous and there was a lot more participation than
observation! Nonetheless, the process of describing multiple instances from personal
experience was the way in which some apparently more widespread concerns began
to emerge. Observation of these phenomena in several firms greatly strengthened the
suspicion that they may be widespread.
This experience led to a feeling that a multiple-site design was best suited to this
project. By studying several firms making different products, the potential for new
insights is much greater than it would be in a study of one firm. Although the
'variables' cannot be explicitly defined, a number of issues were felt to be relevant
at the outset. For example, one such issue might be organisational structure. By
carrying out studies in several firms, it is possible to develop understanding of the
ways in which firms with similar and dissimilar organisation structures make product-
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range decisions involving customised products.
Looking at the cross-sectional aspect of research design less intuitively, it clearly
depends on some initial, if implicit, theorising because cases are selected, as we have
seen, for theoretical reasons. One might select cases to replicate previous studies, to
fill theoretical categories or to provide examples of 'polar types'. The latter are cases
presenting extremes of one or more contextual factors and Pettigrew (1990), noting
that one can usually only study a few cases, advocates the selection of extremes where
possible. Tsoukas (1989) sees this in terms of the contextual levels and identifies three
in organisational studies: contingent characteristics such as technology and economy;
sectoral domains i.e. areas in which the organisation has been operating; and
national/cultural features.
3.5.1.2 Case Selection
Choosing the case-study sites was a combination of the kind of pre-understanding
embodied in the 'participant observation' studies just mentioned; of theory in
manufacturing strategy, marketing and more general organisational studies; and of a
large helping of opportunism and practical concerns. The theoretical propositions
more or less explicit in the choice of cases were as follows.
Company size. Previous experience pointed to a significant organisational and
communications element to the research question. Thus initial contacts were limited
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to companies with over 100 employees as it was felt that companies much smaller
than this may not be sufficiently large to have separate manufacturing and marketing
departments.
Activity. Initial contacts were also limited to manufacturing companies involved in
significant value-adding activities. Thus firms who were involved simply in taking in
goods manufactured elsewhere and either repackaging them, 'badging' them or
undertaking trivial modifications were not considered.
Technology. Efforts were made to include a variety of basic technologies in the cases
studied. This amounted to an explicit proposition that the type of product and/or
process technology, with concomitant supposed product life cycles, rates of change,
capital equipment requirements and potential for profitability, could be significant.
Thus electronics firms were included in the cases as well as, for example, more
traditional engineering manufacturers.
Geography. Again, previous experience had engendered a notion that international
or multi-plant companies were one of Pettigrew's (1990) 'polar types' in respect of
the organisational and functional separation issues. Hence every effort was made to
include such companies in the study. As it turned out, a number of international
companies responded positively and this was achieved easily. Conversely, single-site
firms were also included in the initial contacts and one was included.
Nature of Production Task. As the concern of the research is with the tension
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between more and less customised products, it was necessary to establish whether
firms were indeed in this position. Although it was usually possible to determine this
from a telephone conversation, in a few cases it was not until an initial visit that
unsuitability for this reason became apparent.
Markets. Perhaps it is an indication that customised-product manufacture is a
phenomenon more associated with industrial or 'business' markets, but very few
companies expressing an interest in the work were involved in supplying the retail
market. It was hoped that more of a balance between the two might be achieved but,
-
in the event, nearly all the cases are based in manufacturers supplying industrial
markets.
The theoretical rationale for case selection is closely linked to the number of cases to
be studied. The view that there is a 'correct' number of cases to be used in
comparative studies generally' is rejected. The number of cases depends on the extent
to which variables or issues have been specified in advance, and the number of these
variables, although there is no direct relationship between these factors. Where a
number of factors are tentatively suggested as having a bearing on the research
question, then case-selection should attempt to include cases with clear differences in
terms of these factors.
The number of cases is also determined by the research resource available in
comparison to the desired 'depth' of investigation. A finite number of researcher-
3-The reference for this assertion has unfortunately been lost.
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hours can be spread thinly between many cases, perhaps where the 'factors' are
relatively well-established and the objective is to refine and replicate them as
constructs across as wide a range of circumstances as possible. Alternatively, perhaps
where the factors are only tentatively suggested, the resource is more usefully
employed in fewer, more-deeply investigated cases. Whilst these will be selected in
an attempt to capture 'polar types' (Pettigrew, 1990), as Eisenhardt (1989) comments
'[n]o construct is guaranteed a place in resultant theory'. There is then, little point in
meticulously selecting cases to cover all the possible combinations of factors when the
factors are only tentatively suggested and, a week into the field-work, it may turn out
that other factors are more important and the original selection rationale is more or
less irrelevant.
3.5.1.3 Case Definition
An important consideration of case-study research design is deciding what 'a case' is
a case of (Yin: 1989: 31). The theoretical rationale for the work suggests at least four
possible units - a product, a contract (for a particular individual customised product
between the firm and a customer), a production plant or a firm. Others might include
the relationship between a focal firm and one of its customers (implicitly
encompassing product(s), contract(s) and at least one production plant. In the end, the
choice is a matter of where the emphasis of the research question lies, and at what
level of aggregation we wish to describe or test and develop theory. Yin stresses the
need for clarity about the 'unit of analysis', but also comments that case-study
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research is suited to situations where 'the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident' (Yin, 1989: 23).
The individual contract was initially considered as a very strong contender as the unit
of analysis. But it was easy to foresee an early need to move beyond the contract and
examine aspects of the relationship with the customer, the manufacturing process, the
plant, the industry and, in the end, the context would overshadow the case (Figure
3.3a). It was also not clear at the outset what quality of access to detailed data on
contracts would be possible and, as such, this would be a risky as well as
theoretically-dubious choice of unit of analysis.
(a)
	 (b)
Figure 3.3 Context and Case: (a) the Contract and (b) the Plant as Unit of Analysis
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Subsequently, the plant was adopted as the basic unit. Most of the manufacturing
strategy theory refers to the plant level (e.g. New, 1992) and, as the primary
objective is to contribute to that theory, the plant as unit of analysis is consistent with
that objective. 'Contracts' could still be used as part of the (plant) case-study, as could
products, processes etc (Figure 3.3b). Although it is possible to find arguments in
favour of studying at the firm level, it was felt that this would have resulted in
dissipation of the limited research resources. So, for reasons both of theory and of
practice, each firm was studied essentially at one site - the production plant.
3.5.1.4 Practicalities
All this talk of selecting cases, of course, pre-supposes that one is in a position to
'select'. The scope for selection in practice is constrained to some extent by whether
companies are willing to participate, particularly when a significant commitment of
time is involved, as it is in intensive studies. Thus the firms involved were always
likely to be the sort of firms who:
• have a sympathetic attitude toward working with people from
universities;
• have an awareness, latent or otherwise, that they might benefit from
someone looking at the way they manage the manufacture of
customised products.
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This is another way in which there is no attempt made to suggest that the firms
studied are selected on the basis of some kind of 'sampling logic', to 'represent'
manufacturing industry in toto. They are not.
At the outset, it was essential to take into account that any empirical research
approach requires that access to firms be achieved. The main questions to be
answered were:
• Would any firms grant access?
• How ready would they be to divulge commercially-sensitive data?
• In what form, and when, would they allow such data to be published?
• How much of their employees' time would be made available?
Early communication with potential collaborators revealed that there was interest in
the subject in some firms and that, where this interest was present, there was a
general willingness to devote time to the work. Based on the previously-expressed
preference for an in-depth approach, an estimate of four weeks' contact time with
each company was suggested and none of the firms expressing interest at the outset
were put off by the prospect of this level of commitment. Confidentiality was a
concern, but once fairly general guarantees were made, not an insurmountable
obstacle.
So, the practical concerns discussed here influence the choice of approach. In short,
there was a preference for in-depth case-studies and the apparent willingness of some
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firms to participate in such studies indicated that this was a viable approach. The
resource constraints, principally of time and geography, meant that only a small
number of studies could be carried out. (A total of six to eight firms was used for
planning purposes before detailed research design was carried out.) This was not seen
as an impediment to adopting the preferred approach and, as discussed in the accounts
of the fieldwork, proved to be less and less one as the work proceeded.
3.5.1.5 Cases Selected
The actual cases selected are described in greater detail elsewhere. It is nonetheless
useful at this stage to briefly outline the firms involved and their particular reasons
for interest in the work. The firms are summarised in Table 3.2, described in terms
of the factors previously used for case-selection. Two other firms were involved. One,
a manufacturer of consumable parts for textile machines, acted as a pilot for early
attempts at collecting and analysing data, particularly the quantitative data on product
volumes and variety. The second was investigated in some depth as a fifth full case-
study, but withdrew from the research following a major restructuring resulting from
a company takeover.
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Table 3.2 The Case-Study Firms
Hyster-Yale Honeywell Philips BCS Letts
Company size
(at plant)
450 300 400 250
Activity Finished
product from
steel raw
materials
Components
assembled
plus some
upstream
production
Circuit-board
build and
product
assembly
Complete diary
manufacturing
Product
Technology
Steel
fabrication
design,
hydraulics
Electro-
mechanical
Mcroprocessor
-based circuit
board
assemblies
Paper, glues,
inks
Process
Technology
Machining,
fabrication,
painting, hand
tools
Small tools and
treatment
equipment
Automated
circuit-board
assembly;
testing systems
Desk-top-
publishing,
Printing and
binding
Geography One of three
European sites
of US Parent
One of many
European sites
of US parent
Largely
autonomous
UK site of
European
parent
Only
production
plant, distant
Marketing
group
Nature of
Production
Custom-
designed
products nixed
with custom-
built
Wdely varying
volumes and
degrees of
customisation
in plant
Varying
products in one
plant; rapid
variant
proliferation
Separate
markets for
standard and
bespoke; all
made in one
plant
Markets End-user,
business
OEM, business Large and
small business
end-user
Retailers and
business end-
users
3.5.1.6 Summary of Cross-Sectional Issues
This consideration has shown that decisions about the cross-sectional aspects of
research design have been made for sound theoretical reasons. It also shown that,
despite significant practical constraints, there has been sufficient scope within case-
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selection to provide important elements for comparative study. For these reasons, it
is argued, the potential external validity of the work is enhanced (so far as it can be,
given the impossibility of knowing exactly what theory will emerge from the work).
The cross-sectional aspects are largely determined at the outset. Complementary to
them in enhancing internal and external validity are what have been called here
longitudinal aspects. The following is a consideration of the research design and
execution in these terms.
,
/
3.5.2 External Validity: Longitudinal Considerations
In this kind of work, time can be treated as having past values i.e. a historical
approach, can be treated as constant (synchronic study) or as having real-time values
(diachronic study) (Tsoukas 1989). In the latter approach, often termed a longitudinal
study, the fact that time has elapsed between the collection of two data is a major part
of the comparison. One is looking to identify change, just as one watches motion
pictures for the motion as much as for the picture. A synchronic study does not set
out to explicitly observe change over time: it is a snapshot rather than a motion
picture.
The research question is based in the present - how is it that companies make
decisions about customised products? The case-study approach involves intensive work
with firms now. There is some element of archival analysis e.g. of past sales records,
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but these are treated as recent, other 'nows' taking place in much the same context
as currently exists.
The reality of course, is that data-collection takes a finite amount of time. Filling in
a questionnaire may take ten minutes. Participation in a case-study may take weeks
or months. In this research, the assumption is made that the duration of the data-
collection is insignificant compared to the time taken for significant contextual changes
in the situation under study. At the risk of labouring the analogy, the shutter-speed
is occasionally rather slow, but the snapshot is still not too blurred to be of use.
This section looks at how the inevitable longitudinal aspect of the work is exploited
both in terms of the learning that takes place during the whole research process and
in terms of the creative interaction that can occur between one case and another,
between case and theory and between data-collection and data analysis.
3.5.2.1 Learning New Skills, Learning New Theory
At the start of the data-collection, the pre-understanding and extant theory is embodied
in the data-collection instrument, which is discussed later in the Chapter. For the sake
of clarity and simplicity, a couple of terms to be used throughout this section are now
defined. Yin (1989) uses 'protocol' to mean the document that gives the case
background and defines to the investigator the fieldwork procedures, the topics to be
addressed during data-collection, the analysis plan and the format of reporting. The
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part defining the topics to be addressed is called 'data-collection instrument'.
The investigator goes into the field with the data-collection instrument and whatever
interpersonal and organisational skills he or she may already have and begins
collecting data. As the fieldwork progresses, there is inevitably development of these
skills. This is one of the types of learning which take place during fieldwork and is
to do with the efficiency and effectiveness with which data can be obtained, once the
type of data required is established.
This is to be separated from another type of learning that takes place within and
between cases: that relating to what data to collect. This is the more-or-less explicit
process of theory-building. The research is founded in established theory in the field
of manufacturing strategy and marketing. It has been demonstrated that this theory is
rather weak in taking account of product customisation and the product-range. Thus
the main objective of this work is to build new theory in this more specific area.
In a situation where practically no theory exists, it is legitimate to start with an
unstructured approach to case design, very few prior notions about theories and very
widely-flung data-collection nets. The ideal in theory-building case-study work is 'no
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test' (Eisenhardt 1989) because bias
and limitation in the findings are thus eliminated. However, this ideal is clearly
compromised as soon as the researcher decides to research a particular subject,
however broad. Thus it is accepted that the researcher should
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• formulate a research problem
• possibly specify some potentially important variables
• make some reference to the extant literature
(Eisenhardt 1989).
In the current research, the problem has already been formulated (see section 2.5.2).
It is also possible to specify some potentially-important variables. These can be
derived from relevant aspects of the literature and from the kind of personal pre-
understanding that led to the formulation of the research question in the first place.
Reference to the literature occurs at two levels. First, the existing literature has, in
varying degrees, defined terms and identified relationships between some of them. In
other words, there is a body of literature with a degree of construct validity and some
internal validity, As indicated in the literature review, the ground here is far from
solid, but it does provide some footing for the development of new, related theory.
Second, relevant terms and constructs are tentatively extracted from the literature to
provide initial direction to the theory-building in the more specific territory of the
present research. By using the established constructs as far as possible, the new theory
developed can be related to the extant literature.
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3.5.2.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis
This brings us on to considerations of process. Yin (1989) separates the single-case
data-collection and analysis from cross-case analysis. Furthermore, within the single-
case part of the process, he separates 'conducting' the case-study (apparently used to
mean 'collecting the data') and analysing. This is very much based on a positivistic,
natural-science-based view that one:
• designs the research, THEN
• collects all the data, THEN
• analyses them, THEN
• draws conclusions.
The view held here is that, far from being 'fraught with danger' (Yin, 1989),
analysing-as-you-go-along gives the researcher a 'head-start' in analysis and enables
the exploitation of flexible data-collection (Eisenhardt, 1989). If, as here, theory-
building is an overt objective, the new theories will raise new questions and so the
data-collection has to be flexible. Indeed, this is one of the ways in which the internal
validity of intensive research can be enhanced, because as theory develops it is
immediately put to the test by the next iteration of data-collection and analysis, be that
in the same case or in others.
The logistics of the fieldwork influence the nature of this iterative process. For
various reasons, the data collection phases of the case-studies took place in parallel
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to some extent. This means that, as well as reaction to fmdings within cases, research
on one case feeds from that in other cases that are going on concurrently. There is
also learning and adaptation as a result of work on cases that have gone before. In this
way then, both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal dimensions are involved and
interrelated. (This is more so in situations where one researcher does all the field-
work, as in this instance.)
The way in which data-collection and analysis are related in execution is a slightly
different issue to the way in which the two are related in their design. Even Yin
(1989) notes the need to think about the analysis even at the design stage and suggests
that the protocol should include a section on analysis and that considerations of
analysis should be reflected in what data the data-collection instrument specifies to be
collected. Further consideration of the general strategy of how the data are to be
related to the research question makes it clear that this cannot be left until after the
data-collection 'phase'. Yin suggests that the goals are to:
• treat evidence fairly
• produce compelling analytical conclusions
• rule out alternative interpretations
As the fieldwork progresses, the research question should inform and constrain how
far the investigator diverges from the initial guide, based on pre-understanding, extant
theory and whatever other theory has been built during earlier parts of the fieldwork.
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Yin suggests that the ideal way of analysing the data is to structure the analysis (and
hence, presumably, collection) using the original theoretical propositions, if there
were any. The 'second best' alternative, if there are no theoretical propositions, is to
develop case descriptions. Within either of these approaches, Yin suggests three
'dominant modes' of analysis. First, pattern-matching involves either showing literal
or theoretical replication by patterns of several 'dependent variables' or by trying
different theories against the data of one or more cases. Second, explanation-building
is an iterative process where the analysis of data from one case influences the theory
to be used as the basis for the next case. Finally, time-series analysis is, in essence,
either drawing graphs of constructs over time, or creating chronologies. It is not just
a matter of observing trends but also of constantly addressing the how? and why?
questions. The notion of 'dependent variables' seems to be a misappropriation from
positivistic methodologies. If the idea of the work is to understand 'how?' and 'why?'
- in other words there is a concern with causation - there needs to be more than a
demonstration of the patterns of 'conjunction of atomistic events' as Tsoukas (1989)
has it. The idea of patterns does have some use though, but it is with patterns of
causative mechanisms that we should be concerned rather than with 'independent' and
'dependent' variables.
The reality of the iterative process is messier than Yin's conception of 'explanation-
building'. Case-execution may well be in parallel to some extent. The view presented
here also seems to preclude the possibility of the investigator having ideas during a
particular case study.
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Eisenhardt (1989) identifies two key features of analysis. First, there is within-case
analysis - typically 'writeups for each site'- where the 'overall idea is to become
intimately familiar with each site as a standalone entity'. Second, there is a cross-case
'search for patterns'. The key to this second aspect is, she suggests, 'looking at the
data in many divergent ways'. Some different approaches are suggested, including
categorisation of cases based on theory or the research question, some form of paired
comparison between cases, identifying similarities and differences, and separation of
data by source - interview, shopfloor transaction data etc.
Although Eisenhardt mentions the writing process as a way of becoming 'intuitively
familiar with each case as a standalone entity', her description of the cross-case
analysis is of a search for patterns across the cases. This emphasises the synchronic -
analysis - over the chronological - narrative (Sayer, 1989). This emphasis on writing
prose as a way of documenting and becoming familiar with single cases and on
analysis - by tabulation, extraction of key dimensions and separation of data by source
- as the way to understand multiple cases underplays the value of writing per se as a
way of developing understanding (Sayer, 1989). As Sayer notes, the process of
structuring a narrative and of accommodating non-sequentially experienced phenomena
into a (necessarily) sequential form - i.e. prose - is itself a powerful technique for
building understanding. In the end, prescription is also narrative ('If you plan now,
you will be more competitive later'), so this approach to analysis is reflective of the
intended outcome of a good deal of research. There are problems with narrative
though. Most notably, narrative can 'gloss over the difference between mere temporal
succession and causality' (Sayer, 1989). This risk is enhanced by the (inevitable)
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rhetorical content of prose.
The approach adopted here is intended to exploit the strengths and hopefully militate
against the risks of these approaches by using a variety of methods. The cases
involved triangulation in that multiple respondents were asked about the same things
and, where possible, corroborating documentary and quantitative data were sought
(Jick, 1979). These data are presented in prose, diagrams, graphs and tables.
Particularly in the cross-case analysis chapter (Chapter 8), tabulation serves the dual
purpose of analysis and summary (i.e. the act of creating the table is not merely a
means to the end of communicating to the reader, but often constitutes analysis in
itself). Only narrative though, can move us forward from existing to new theory.
This can finally be related to research design. A relatively recent exchange
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1991) has examined the
relative merits of 'better stories' (from single cases) and 'better constructs' (from
multiple, comparative case-studies). For the purposes of the present research, the
extra value of multiple cases is considered to far outweigh the single, very intensive
case and the process of documenting and analysing the data reflects a combination of
'stories' and comparisons.
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3.5.3 The Data-Collection Instrument
The data-collection instrument is included in Appendix 1. In the spirit of Yin, the
'questions' it contains are not actual forms of words to be used in interviews but are
questions posed to the researcher. The methods of answering the questions will be
many and varied. "The main purpose of these questions is to keep the investigator on
track as data-collection proceeds" (Yin, 1989). The purpose here is to briefly explain
the purpose of the sections of the data-collection instrument.
Section 1 requires that basic descriptive data about the plant and the company be
collected. This is to facilitate subsequent comparison between companies at a broad
level. The intention is not to carry out a complete manufacturing audit but to collect
(a) the relatively mundane quantitative data describing the parameters of activity at
each site and (b) more detailed and complex data relating to the particular concerns
of the research and in which the case takes place.
Although there has not been complete freedom in choosing sites or cases, each
collaboration that has been undertaken has some characteristic felt to be of theoretical
importance. As such, it is necessary to include in the contextual data for all the firms
data on these substantive characteristics and Section 1 is intended to do this.
Sections 2 and 3 deal respectively with the 'Design cycle' and the 'Material cycle'.
This distinction, taken from Harrington (1973), is not intended as the definitive way
to consider a manufacturing operation but is a pragmatic way of breaking down
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activities for data-collection.
Section 4 covers more specific issues relating to customisation and individual contract
chronologies, where these are appropriate.
Whilst the data-collection instrument progresses more or less from the general to the
specific, it is unlikely that the practical data-collection will do the same to such a
degree. The distinction between the case and the background against which it is being
studied is not clear-cut and there is a need to pursue lines of enquiry when the
opportunity presents itself, rather than rigidly following the sequence of the
instrument.
The questions have mostly been written as such i.e. complete sentences and have been
supplemented in some cases by prompts as to likely sources of data as suggested by
Yin (1989). This has enabled a uniform style even though the questions have come
in various forms from various sources.
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Chapter 4
Hyster-Yale
Materials Handling
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Company Background and History
Hyster-Yale is a US-based manufacturer of Fork-lift trucks (FLTS). The project
described here was undertaken between October 1992 and April 1993 and centred on
the Scottish plant, located in Irvine, Ayrshire. It is one of three plants within Hyster-
Yale Europe, the others being located in Holland and N.Ireland. The markets served
directly from Hyster-Yale Europe are Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Products
are also supplied to other Hyster-Yale divisions.
The Irvine site, as well as being the location of one manufacturing facility and its
support functions, is the chosen location for a number of European divisional
activities. These include divisional procurement, some design engineering and Sales
Support and Administration (including application engineering).
Ownership of the firm has changed in recent years, with the current Hyster-Yale
having been formed by the merger of two firms in the FLT business. At the time of
the study, the process of combining and rationalising the resources, activities and
products of the two firms continued. The brands of the two firms retained separate
identities, although they had come to be manufactured in the same plants and often
engineered by the same engineers.
Sales of the FLTs are nearly all carried out through dealers, although a few large
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customers are served directly through key account sales representatives. The dealers
for the two brands remain separate and in some cases (e.g. the main UK dealer) FLTs
are just one of many materials handling and related products sold. Dealerships in
other countries vary according to local circumstances.
4.1.2 Irvine Manufacturing Facility
The Irvine plant manufactures small and medium-sized FLTs incorporating a number
of product-lines and power-sources. At the time of commencing the study, the current
year's turnover was £60m. The site, first established in 1960, occupies 300 000 sq ft
and 450 people were employed, of which 380 were Irvine plant personnel and 70
were Hyster-Yale Europe staff. Shop-floor employees numbered 240. The site had
been extensively refitted in the early 1980s for the production of a then-new range of
products and, at the time of the study, these same products constituted the bulk of the
production from the plant. In years immediately prior to the study, production
volumes had fluctuated between 3500 and 4000 trucks per year.
In outline, the manufacturing processes consist of machining, various forms of
fabrication, painting and assembly. The major refit involved the introduction of CNC
lathes and machining centres, fabrication robots, Automatic Guided Vehicles (AGVs),
a paint system and a reorganisation of assembly lines. As a result, all operations
except assembly are organised on a functional basis e.g. machining for all trucks is
carried out by the same operators on the same machines. Assembly is carried out on
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iflowlines specific to a particular range of models, usually according to size.
4.1.3 Context of the Study
A meeting with the Plant Manager quickly revealed that product customisation and
product variety was a current concern of Hyster-Yale. Recent years had seen the
proportion of trucks designed to customer's own specifications growing. From what
had been an occasional requirement to add customised features, the problem was
quantified at the initial meeting: customised assembly work on special trucks had been
responsible for 11% of the standard hours worked in the plant. Furthermore, this
work was expensive, requiring skilled fitters, and the volume unpredictable, requiring
a large amount of overtime to be worked.
The brief then was a wide one: to look at the process for special products from order
intake to product despatch and to comment critically on it. These custom-designed
trucks were referred to as SPED (Special Products Engineering Department) and
'What to do about SPED' was characterised as the subject, along with company car
policy, that generated most discussion at Hyster-Yale.
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4.1.4 Research Process
Access to Hyster-Yale was, on the whole, excellent. Following the initial interview
with the Plant Manager, a one-day introductory visit was made, during which
meetings with the following personnel took place: Plant Manager,
Sales/Administration Manager, SPED Design Supervisor, Materials Manager, Cost
Accountant, Factory Manager. Following these initial meetings, contact was made
directly with individual personnel and meetings were arranged as necessary. Access
was granted to the SPED files and personal-computer-based order information system
and, especially in the later stages of the study, a good deal of time was spent reading
the documentary evidence and extracting relevant data from the information system.
Access to the Shop floor was also good.
171
4.2 Strategy Statements
4.2.1 Hyster-Yale Europe Mission
The H-Y Europe Mission Statement is made available to all employees. A large
excerpt from it is presented in Figure 4.1.
I.A.b are in the lift truck and warehouse equipment business (induding the afterrnarket)
and supply products to the market through the separate Hyster and Yale marketing and
distribution organisations.
The markets for our products are Europe ,the Kiddie East, Africa and affiliate demand
(USA, Australia, Japan, Asia, Latin America).
Our vision is to be the best supplier of materials handling equipment in our chosen
markets.
To achieve this we must
Be aware of the needs of our internal and external customers, and regularly
measure our performance against those needs.
-	 Meet the required delivery requirements of all our customers at the lowest cost.
Continuously improve our performance by applying the Total Quality Process to
all aspects of our business, and ublise a team approach throughout our
organisation.
Develop and train our people to their fullest potential.
Provide a modem, competitive product-range to the market which delivers the
lowest cost of ownership to the user.
Develop and maintain world class distribution networks.
Maximise business opportunities in the aftermarket.
Ensure the full participation of our employees, dealers, suppliers, and affiliates in
meeting customer expectations.
Figure 4.1 Hyster-Yale Europe Mission Statement
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4.2.2 Worldwide Assembly Strategy
The internal management document called the Worldwide Assembly Strategy is the
closest Hyster Yale come to an explicit manufacturing strategy. It is reproduced in
Figure 4.2.
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Objective:
To provide cost effective product on a timely basis to our worldwide distribution network
Strategies to deliver the objective: 
1 Assign product to factories that capitalizes on commonality and optimizes part number
complexity to achieve product focus and maximize operating efficiencies.
2. Assign product to factories that complements the existing infrastructure of our facilities
to minimize investment and maximize asset utilization.
3. Assign product to factories with a bias toward assembly in market of sale to promote
customer responsiveness, minimize trade issues, and optimize transport cost and
investment.
Lean production measurements to address strategy effectiveness: 
total part numbers in data base
total factory effectivity
projected asset/facility utilization
average order cycle time
Economic Requirements to guide strateay selection.
total factory conversion cost
one-time facility and equipment investment
one-time transfer and start-up investment
in-stock and in stock inventory investment
Note: Only identify those investments and expenses which would be incremental to the
previously accepted strategy requirements for assets and new product tooling.
1Abrldwide Assembly Strateay Development Methodology
Define existing measurements and economics
Define measurements and economics of previously accepted worldwide assembly
strategy
Develop alternatives and assess risk, economic and responsiveness implications: market
focus, facility utilization, lowest product cost
Optimize alternatives
Present recommendation
Implement
Figure 4.2 Hyster-Yale Worldwide Assembly Strategy
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4.2.3 Marketing Communications
Whilst this is no place to carry out a detailed content analysis of the company's
marketing communications, it is useful to give an indication of the themes that
predominate in such documents as sales brochures, dealer newsletters and
advertisements. In summary, these indicate that Hyster (and most of the literature was
about Hyster rather than Hyster-Yale):
are dedicated to the Fork-lift-truck business and have been in it for a long time
offer quality, performance, reliability and value-for-money
- provide an extensive support network and spares service
- have a comprehensive product range (the quick guide to products is called
'The Total Range')
are a technology-based firm.
4.2.4 Development of Irvine Plant Role
The brief plant history provided in interview with the Plant Manager (summarised in
4.1.2) was supplemented by an internal document that has been prepared for new
employees and visitors to the plant. This is reproduced in Figure 4.3.
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IHyster opened its second European manufacturing facility in Scotland at Hillington near Glasgow in
1957 and subsequently moved to its current location in Irvine, Ayrshire in 1960.
During this period, the Irvine facility has seen sustained growth and investment, running parallel with
increasing market share penetration in the FLT industry. Today, the Irvine facility is one of the most
advanced FLT manufacturing entities in the world, embracing the latest manufacturing philosophies
and technologies in this highly competitive industry.
From 1960 to 1972, production in Irvine focused solely on the manufacture of internal combustion
product with a lifting capacity range from 1.25 tons to 12.5 tons, aimed at the UK European and
Middle East/Africa Markets.
A new era for the plant started in 1972 with the introduction of electric product with a lifting capacity
range from 1.25 to 5 tons.
Approaching the end of the 1970s, business continued to grow unabated, resulting in high
employment levels. At this time though, some ominous clouds appeared on the horizon. Initially,
Japanese manufacturers in particular had started penetrating new high volume market for high
quality, low cost product with limited option features. On top of this, the world economy went into
severe recession in the early 80s with a subsequent dramatic downturn in demand for capital goods
in general and FLTs in particular. Consequently, the Irvine plant was downsized in line with market
demand.
In order to counteract the significant threat emanating from Far Eastern FLT producers, Hyster
company formulated a strategy aimed at competing directly in these volume markets - developing
the first of a new generation of low cost, high quality product - the XL series.
Having constructed a purpose-built facility in Craigavon, Northern Ireland, to manufacture this
product range, the unparalleled success of adopting this stratgey helped the company decide that
this philosophy should be expanded across all product ranges and across all locations.
In February 1983, Hyster Company announced a major investment programme in the Irvine facility -
approximately $40m over a three-year period - that would culminate in Irvine being the most
advanced facility of its kind anywhere in the world.
After completing the physical changes to the plant - CNC machining centers installed, welding robots
introduced in the fabrication process, automated guided vehicles to move components through the
manufacturing process and a total re-layout of assembly lines and stores - the new XL product came
on stream through 1986-1987, replacing all product lines previously manufactured. Again, the XL
product was a major success and considerably helped the company's increased market share thrust
at this time.
In 1989, NACCO Industries acquired the former Hyster Company and merged this with their existing
materials handling division - Yale.
A new corporation resulted - Hyster-Yale Materials Handling Inc. - and in the intervening era, the
company has forged ahead with maximising the opportunities afforded by becoming a true global
player on the world stage. From an Irvine perspective, the plant has successfully integrated Yale
product manufacture across the complete electric 3-wheel and 4-wheel range, using this incremental
volume to further absorb fixed costs.
Strategically, Irvine is now ideally fixed to manufacture volume in line with the market share growth
plans of both Hyster and Yale and looks forward to the challenges that competing on a true global
business level will bring.
Figure 4.3 Irvine Plant History -
176
4.3 Hyster Operations at Irvine
4.3.1 Organisation
The Irvine site accommodates both the Irvine plant operations and some H-Y
European functions. A summary of the Irvine plant operations organisation is given
in Figure 4.4. The Plant Manager, reporting to the VP Manufacturing Europe, was
the primary contact for and sponsor of this research. With the recent integration of
Hyster and Yale, all these functions are carried out for both Hyster and Yale
products. The organisation of the other departments particularly important to this
research is less straightforward. These still maintain some divisions between Hyster
and Yale and mostly operate at European rather than domestic level.
Plant
Manager
Manuf. Eng.
Manager
Financial
Controller
Factory
Manager
Materials
Manager Personnel
Manuf. Eng Cost Acct Machine Purchase
Inspection	 Financial	 Fabricate	 Data Process
Acct
Maintenance	 Paint	 Master
Traffic	 Scheduling
Assembly
Materials
SPED
	 Handling
Stores
Figure 4.4 Irvine Plant Organisation
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Administration
Manager
Systems
Analyst
Order
Management
Supervisor
Secretarial
Supervisor
Sales Support
Manager
Sales
Support
SPED
Applications
As most of the sales are through dealers, Hyster does not operate an extensive sales
activity of its own, but provides from Irvine administration and technical support to
the dealers. These remain largely divided along Hyster/Yale lines, in the same way
as the dealer networks remain separate. The same person, who reports to H-Y
European management, manages the Administration (for Hyster and Yale) and Sales
Support (for Hyster only). These functions are detailed on Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
Hyster	 Yale
Figure 4.5 Hyster-Yale Central Administration Organisation
Figure 4.6 Hyster Europe Sales Support Organisation
Within the Hyster Europe Sales Support Centre, there are two groups. The Sales
Support Supervisors offer a wide range of support - everything but the strictly
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VP Corporate
Engineering
MD
Hyster-Yale
Europe
technical - to their respective dealers. Organised along geographical lines, these
Supervisors are often linguists. The other group are SPED Applications Engineering,
who are responsible for specifying custom-designed products. As such, they will
figure very prominently in this research.
The Hyster-Yale Engineering group is also a hybrid in that there are a mixture of
Europe-wide and plant-specific responsibilities (Figure 4.7). Furthermore, the
European Technical director reports to both European and US-parent senior managers.
This structure results from a need to combine corporate-wide standards and economies
in the design of basic products with country-, plant- and product-line-specific local
specialism. Two large components of the Engineering Department are the Special
Products Engineering groups, one in the UK (for Craigavon and Irvine) and one in
Nijmegen. These functions will also come under scrutiny in this research.
Technical
Director
(Europe)
Parts
Manager
Engineering
Manager-UK
Engineer
N.Ireland
Engineer
Irvine
SPED Design
Engineering
Manager - NL
Resident
Engineer
SPED Design
Figure 4.7 Hyster-Yale Engineering Organisation
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4.3.2 Products
There are many variables by which FLTs may be categorised. Hyster and Yale
products are grouped into series according principally to power source and carrying
capacity. The Hyster range is summarised in Figure 4.8. The Challenger Range is
driven by diesel- or LPG-fuelled engine, as are the Space saver trucks. The Electric
range is electrically-powered. All three basic Ranges cover a range of lifting
capacities, with the Challenger Range extending to 48 tonne capacity.
The Irvine plant, as well as manufacturing trucks from scratch, also takes in trucks
manufactured elsewhere - e.g. in US plants - and either modifies them to suit
particular requirements or completes them by adding certain attachments or features.
The volumes of these 'recleared' trucks are small - a few percent in terms of units
and even less in terms of labour hours. These 'recleared' trucks aside then, the main
task of the Irvine plant is the production of the smaller electric trucks - 1.00 - 3.00
tonnes - and of medium-sized engine-powered trucks (3.50 - 7.00 tonnes). Craigavon
produce a limited range of small trucks; Nijmegen produce the larger engine-powered
trucks.
Characterising and quantifying the number of models is not so simple as the diagram
might suggest. Within these broad categorisations, series are identified - e.g. E1.25-
E1.75 and E2.00-E3.00 are treated as two distinct series. Within these series, models
are identified at regular intervals of carrying capacity - e.g. E1.25, E1.50, E1.75. In
terms of the series and model database, Irvine handles 16 Hyster metric series, of
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which six are recleared. These break down into 79 models, of which 20 are recleared.
The
total
range
Quick reference guide
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Figure 4.8 The Hyster Product Range - 'The Total Range'
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Any 'model' as discussed above only constitutes a platform on which the final truck
is configured. All trucks are extensively custom-built from a large but finite range of
options; some (SPED) also have custom-designed options from a theoretically infinite
range of possibilities. Custom-built options range from the fairly fundamental -
selection of diesel or LPG-fuelled engine for example, or specification of lift height -
to the relatively detailed. The estimated number of permutations that are feasible is
20 000. The processes by which custom-built and custom -designed features are
specified, planned and manufactured is discussed at some length later in the case.
4.3.3 Manufacturing Facilities and Processes
The Irvine plant manufacturing facilities are contained in two buildings. The main
works houses the machining, fabrication, paint and assembly operations. The SPED
workshop contains the general purpose machines and parts storage necessary for the
manufacture and/or fitting of practically all the custom-designed features required on
'SPED' trucks. The general layout of the two shops is shown in the diagram Figure
4.9.
In terms of the structural and many drive-train aspects of the product, Hyster are
largely self-sufficient. Basic steel section and plate materials are fabricated - cut and
welded - to produce the chassis, frames and uprights of the trucks. Welding of most
components is carried out using.
 dedicated robots, and AGVs are used to carry
uprights through the process. Frames are built on fixtures dedicated to series; the
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AGVs in conjunction with the upright welding robots are termed a flexible
manufacturing system and can indeed accommodate a range of uprights for various
truck series. (There are some limitations in terms of sequencing flexibility; it is also
very difficult to use the FMS outside the range of sizes or at increments other than
those that are considered standard upright heights.)
SPED
Workshop
Figure 4.9 Irvine Plant Layout - Main Works and SPED Workshop
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Axle, frame and upright components are also machined from bar and similar stock on
the range of CNC lathes and machining centres. Whereas most other aspects of the
process are planned and controlled by a Materials Requirements Planning (MRP)
system, machining of these components, which are common to many series and
largely unaffected by customer-specified options, is carried out on a Just-in-Time
(JIT) basis, using a kanban system.
Other components are bought in with more value added. These include engines, axle
castings, wheels and tyres, mechanical, electrical and hydraulic components and seats.
Many of these are brought to the assembly line where they are fitted as required. A
separate area of the main works is devoted to axle assembly, which involves bringing
together bought-in castings, wheels, bearings and other components machined in the
Machining section. Axle sub-assemblies are then available for installation on the
trucks.
The frame, chassis and upright fabrications are painted and dried in the purpose-built
paint system, being carried through the successive stages on overhead mechanical
handling devices. Frames then proceed to the relevant assembly lines and the
customer-specified options are built on. The upright is fitted as the last major step,
with trucks from all series being worked on in the same area.
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4.3.4 Ordering, Specification and Planning - Standard Procedure
The large majority of trucks are ordered through dealers. For Hyster, a Europe-wide
computer network enables dealers to sit at a terminal and specify individual trucks
from the large range of options. Typically this will proceed according to the following
hierarchy:
Series - frame / power source
Model - carrying capacity
Options by 'option group' e.g. engine details; tread/tyre/wheel etc
As the specification proceeds, the system configuration only permits technically-
feasible combinations to be chosen e.g. choice of i.c. engine power source will
preclude all control system features relating to electric or LPG sources. For custom-
built trucks then, the dealer can completely specify and order a truck without
intervention from Hyster personnel.
At the time of ordering, each truck is given a sales order number. This is allocated
regardless of specification and does not in any way indicate the type of truck. If a
dealer orders more than one truck of the same specification at the same time, it is
likely that they will be allocated consecutive numbers. However, from that point on
for planning, scheduling and cost accounting purposes, they will be treated as separate
orders, just as though they were different trucks for different end customers. No
Hyster information system available to production staff presents a multi-truck order
185
ShipAvailableto shipMRP Run
as one order - the only way this may be evident is if the trucks share particular
features and have the same delivery date. Rarely is the customer identified because,
so far as the plant is concerned, the customer is the Hyster dealer network.
For initial capacity planning purposes, trucks are disaggregated down to the level of
option groups e.g. uprights or axle/wheel/tyre combination. Options are then re-
aggregated for option planning by pulling together requirements for, say, uprights,
from all truck orders so as to determine, for a particular planning period, what the
demands on upright manufacturing will be. At this point, some iteration and
discussion may be necessary if capacity does not permit fulfilment of all dealers'
requested delivery dates. Through this process, an acceptable plan at option level is
established.
Detailed materials and labour requirements are then planned using MAAPICS MRP.
This is run once a week, over the weekend, and plans produced relate to trucks to be
shipped four weeks later, with assembly line work to begin between 12 and 18 days
(elapsed time) after the MRP run, and availability for shipment to be three weeks after
the run, as shown in Figure 4.10
Week 1	 I	 Week 2	 I	 Week 3
	
Week 4
Line start III
Figure 4.10 Plan - Build - Ship Timing
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The MRP run then drives procurement of materials and the 'front end' manufacturing
processes of fabrication and axle assembly. As machining is done on a JIT basis,
detailed workplans for this are not derived from the MRP system. This results in eight
or so working days for assembly and ten for parts manufacture and assembly.
Those components and materials for custom-built (as opposed to custom-designed)
options that are bought in are sourced from suppliers identified by the European
purchasing group. The purchasing of these materials is, then, largely a matter of
vendor scheduling at a local (i.e. plant) level, within some kind of blanket supply
arrangement negotiated by European purchasing staff.
4.3.5 Ordering, Specification and Planning - SPED
The process for specifying, ordering and planning SPED trucks is different to that for
custom-built trucks. At the heart of this is the need for engineering involvement in
specifying and designing SPED options. Within the (large) range of dealer-specifiable
options, the structure of the ordering system is able to avoid the combination of
options that are technically incompatible or downright unsafe. SPED options, on the
other hand, have to be treated on an individual case-to-case basis so that a safe and
appropriate overall specification results. SPED options may be incompatible with the
dealer-specified options chosen (all trucks will have some dealer-specified aspects)
and/or, where more than one custom-designed or SPED option is required, with one
another. Thus, although some SPED options may appear relatively trivial and may be
requested quite often, the specification of every truck requiring SPED options will
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need the involvement of Applications Engineers and possibly SPED design engineers.
The Special Products Applications group, working for the Marketing function ('Sales
Support'), have two basic roles. They advise on the specification of trucks requiring
SPED options and then administer order entry and parts requirements planning for the
SPED options. This is carried out on a Local Area Network entirely separate from
the MRP system used for production planning and 'standard' Bills of Material
(BOMs).
The SPED Applications group are engineers, doing mostly engineering analysis and
design work. They will provide whatever technical support is necessary to the dealer
and customer to arrive at a specification. The extent of this involvement will vary
enormously depending on the extent of customisation required. It could amount to
rubber-stamping a requirement for, say, a non-standard light, or it could involve a
number of site visits and extensive collaborative design work with the SPED Design
group.
Where the SPED Applications group identify a need for a SPED option that hasn't
been used before (some SPED options are requested by many customers), they will
request SPED Design (part of the Engineering function) to carry out the detailed
design work, establish materials requirements and, where necessary, identify suitable
vendors for parts and materials.
So far as the dealer is concerned, when an order is placed for a truck involving SPED
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options, they simply bracket each SPED option by means of an option number. Their
order will not attempt to describe or specify the SPED option in anything more than
an indicative way and it will be the option part number that links the line on the order
(and hence, via the MRP system, to the BOM) to the detailed design established by
SPED Design. This option number could refer to anything from a different light bulb
to a complex custom-designed lifting attachment.
The buying-in of components or materials for SPED options cannot be dealt with by
a simple vendor-scheduling approach, as for the custom-built options. SPED Design
engineers will identify suitable local vendors for anything they need and will negotiate
price and delivery themselves. Very often, fast delivery is very important and price
considerations less so. This may, in some instances, necessitate ordering components
before a firm truck order is placed, in order that overall leadtime is not excessive.
Commercial matters related to such an order are dealt with by the vendor scheduler
but, in view of the involvement of the SPED Designer, the vendor scheduler is
presented with a fait accompli in most respects and will be able to do little more than
hold the vendor to their delivery promise and, in some cases, press for small price
discounts.
As well as materials and parts, SPED options require labour. Most of the SPED work
is carried out in the SPED Workshop and labour requirements are estimated by the
SPED Applications engineers. In some cases, where it is within the capability of the
SPED workshop, machined parts are made on the general purpose machine tools they
have at their disposal. Most of the SPED work though, is fitting.
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Perhaps more than materials requirements, it is SPED labour requirements that cause
great difficulty for the Plant Manager. Although this will be examined in further detail
soon, it is at a macroscopic level that problems become evident. In part, this is related
to the way in which medium-term plans are made. Whilst dealers place firm orders
for the specific trucks they require in the way described above, they are also required
to commit further in advance to selling certain volumes by series. This enables
forecasting of materials and labour requirements for basic trucks and common options.
However, dealers are not committed to taking custom-built vs custom-designed (i.e.
SPED) trucks and, whilst most forecast requirements will be for custom-built trucks,
a large but unpredictable proportion of these will 'turn into' SPED orders once they
are confirmed. Furthermore, orders placed as custom-built may be modified into
SPED. Section 4.6.1 discusses the effect of late specification on delivery performance.
Thus a capacity plan is very difficult to establish, as the forecasts on which anything
but the next month to six weeks is based will underestimate the SPED requirement to
an unpredictable degree overall and in an unpredictable way in respect of which types
of SPED labour will be needed on which series. Thus it is very difficult to determine
the manning level for the SPED workshop. SPED fitters are skilled and relatively
highly-paid: overmanning just in case would be very expensive; undermanning
necessitates high levels of expensive overtime working and the training and occasional
redeployment of fitters from the main works, with all the implications that has for
quality of fitting in SPED and disruption of the main works assembly.
Although inter-series differences will be discussed more later, SPED labour content
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in terms of SPED labour hours as a proportion of standard labour hours for a custom-
built truck ranges from 10 to 50 %. These are not trivial fluctuations, but very
significant ones. The delay between orders being placed and SPED options being
added is often between two and three months which, with typical requested leadtimes
being about 100 days, makes last-minute significant changes in SPED labour
requirements commonplace.
Assembly of all trucks is planned and controlled with the assistance of a document
termed the final assembly schedule (FAS) which gives, for a week at a time, a truck-
by-truck breakdown of the assemblies scheduled to start that week, indicated planned
start and finish dates. For those trucks with SPED work content, an extra week is
allowed as a matter of course (two weeks in exceptional instances) and SPED start
and finish dates are also scheduled on the FAS.
Production Planning negotiate with all parties concerned to try to spread out the SPED
orders - principally in assembly - so that as consistent a mixture of standard and
SPED trucks as possible is maintained. With the proportion of SPED trucks
increasing, this becomes an increasingly difficult task, especially when relatively large
orders of SPED trucks with tight deadlines are required (e.g. a specific order at the
time of the research which was required for the end of the fmancial year). In a more
general sense, 'acute' problems with such orders demand extra attention of
management and other staff with a consequent distraction from the important 'chronic'
concerns of standard production.
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4.3.6 The Shop Floor Reality
An output target or day rate for each assembly line is calculated based on a forecast
aggregated at series level. This is expressed in trucks per day e.g. for the line
assembling H3.50-5.00 XL and H 6.00-7.00 XL it varies between 6.0 and 7.6 during
1993, as seen from November 1992. Thus, each assembly line supervisor has an
output target in the very tangible form of a number of FLTs.
The reality of SPED is that, depending on the exact nature of the special work
required and when in the sequence of operations it is best carried out, trucks are at
some point pulled off the Main Works assembly line and taken to the SPED workshop
ready for the SPED work to be carried out. (The plant employs 25 'movemen' whose
duties include this.) Thus a line supervisor may come into a shift and see, say, eight
truck chassis/frame assemblies waiting for fmal assembly and look forward to
achieving the day rate, only to find that four of them are SPED trucks and will
disappear from the main works without contributing to the 'score for the day'. They
will return sometime in the next week for further fitting and for the completion of
upright assembly, but when that happens is largely a matter of chance, as SPED
assembly operations, being by definition one-off or very infrequent, are rather
unpredictable in duration. Not only does the removal of SPED trucks make detailed
scheduling and loading very difficult for the non-SPED main works assembly then,
but it also leads to a lack of task ownership on anyone's part for the completion of
SPED trucks. Co-ordinating when exactly in the sequence the SPED work should be
carried out also makes demands on SPED and Main Works supervision.
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Further complicating the picture in some instances is the need to send some trucks to
SPED (or to subcontractors) more than once, coupled with the fact that some SPED
work inevitably damages standard work previously carried out (paintwork is the most
common) and this necessitates additional rework. Some trucks may also have SPED
options that are best dealt with prior to assembly e.g. overhead guard modifications.
Thus a truck becomes the subject of significant 'orchestration' of activities between
main works, SPED and, in some cases, subcontractors.
More generally, a number of criticisms of engineering were made by manufacturing
supervision. Notable amongst these was the concern that, because of the demands of
simply keeping up with new SPED designs, the SPED Design group rarely finds time
to do more proactive work such as value-engineering the more commonly-produced
SPED options. At the time of the study, the Manufacturing Manager indicated that
he was carrying out such an exercise, at his own initiative, on a SPED part that was
causing particular problems. There was also the feeling that, because of the often long
delay between the design of an option and its manufacture, engineers 'lose interest'
and are reluctant to become involved if any assistance is required when a new option
is eventually being manufactured.
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4.4 Quantifying the SPED Problem
So far, the description has concentrated on outlining the processes, both business and
manufacturing, by which customer requirements are translated into finished goods.
The evolution of the SPED problem has been briefly mentioned and quantified very
broadly. Here, some further detail will be added to help define the SPED issue more
precisely.
4.4.1 Overall Measures
The following summary measures indicate the scale of the SPED issue:
SPED, in the year to November 1992 accounted for 11% of standard hours
worked at the Irvine plant and capacity was often exceeded: in August 1992,
estimated custom assembly demand was 2400 hours, capacity without overtime
was 1300; in September, the requirement was 3500 and capacity 2000.
-	 The SPED workshop occupies 13% of the plant floor area.
One fifth of all purchased part numbers are SPED parts.
About one third of the vendors used supply nothing but SPED parts.
Revenue from SPED trucks up to October 1992 was £3.5 m: annualised this
represents about 7% of the annual £60m turnover of the plant.
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Clearly this is no minor sideline and in various ways plays a very significant part in
the Irvine plant's activities.
4.4.2 Trends
The three years prior to the time of the study showed two clear trends:
The total volume of trucks shipped from Irvine fell 20% between 1990 and
1992 (see Figure 4.11)
The proportion of trucks having some SPED content rose by about 10% over
the same 2 year period and by nearly 15% over the 89-92 period (see Figure
4.11)
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These results do not consider the SPED work content, categorising trucks as being
either with SPED or without. The content of SPED work is now summarised for the
year 1991 (the last for which data were available at the time). Figure 4.12 indicates
the number of SPED options overall. Out of about a thousand SPED trucks in 1991,
over 400 had only one SPED option. The labour content for individual jobs is
summarised in Figure 4.13. Assembly hours predominate here and most jobs overall
are of ten hours or less. Having said that, about half of the assembly jobs take over
ten hours. Bearing in mind that the standard hours allowed per truck for capacity
planning are as follows:
H 3.50-5.00 XL 45
H 6.00-7.00 XL 58
A 1.00-1.50 XL 33
En 1.25-1.75 XL 30
E 2.00-3.00 XL 37
J 2.00-3.00 XL 36
it is clear that SPED work adds very significantly to the work content of some trucks.
Figure 4.12 SPED Options Per Truck: 1991 Orders
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Figure 4.13 Estimated Labour Hours Per SPED Option
4.4.3 Series-to-Series Variation
These are overall indications in terms of trucks and do not take account of variations
between series. For the purposes of this analysis, the top five series in volume shipped
are used to indicate series-to-series differences. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 indicate the
relative volumes and SPED proportion over four years. From these, further trends are
apparent:
attrition of total volume has been broadly shared between the "top five" Irvine
series, except for the H3.50-5.00 XL, which has declined more, despite
remaining the most popular series;
the proportion of SPED trucks varies significantly from series to series, with
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the lowest being around 10% and the highest being around 60%;
the proportion of SPED trucks is rising in each series, although the increase
is greater in some series than in others.
Figure 4.14 Volume Trends by Series - 1989-1992
Figure 4.15 SPED Proportion Trends by Series - 1989-1992
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Samples were taken over a four-month period in order to determine the SPED
content, in terms of labour hours, for each series. The results of this study are
summarised in Figures 4.16 a-e
(a) A1.00-1.50XL Series (b) E2.00-3.00XL Series
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Figures 4.16 a-e SPED Labour Content for Top Five Irvine Series
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From these it is evident that there is a similar pattern in series-to-series differences
in SPED content as there is in the proportion of SPED trucks (Figure 4.15). Two
series involve very little SPED:H 3.50-5.00 XL and A 1.00-1.50 XL. In all series but
the H6.00-7.00 XL, there is a clear bimodal tendency: there is either a day's SPED
or a week's SPED and very little in between; the 116.00-7.00 XL series trucks are
more evenly spread over the range.
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4.5 Competitive Position
The competitive positioning of Hyster is important in determining how the production
policies have evolved. This study has not incorporated a full industry structural
analysis but has concentrated on how staff within the firm perceive and articulate the
firm's competitive strategy. Whilst the data collection process has centred on
understanding the processes by which customer requirements are translated into
finished goods, an important secondary aspect of this study, like the others, has been
to assess what the important competitive issues are as seen from within the firm, and
how these influence the decisions made.
4.5.1 The Challenger Range
The account of the introduction of the XL series in section 4.2.4 was corroborated
and expanded on by the Sales and Administration Manager. In particular, he
commented that the introduction of this range (slightly less than ten years prior to the
study) was the first time Hyster had attempted to produce a standardised product,
albeit still a custom-built product from a standard range of options. Before that, all
products had been made to customer specifications.
A new product range, incorporating many more features as standard than did the
Challenger, was currently being .designed in the USA. The SPED Applications and
SPED Design supervisors compared what they knew of the new product and
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commented that 'the old Challenger was very basic'. This is somewhat ironic: the
Challenger had been introduced to counter the Japanese ingression into the 'new high
volume market niche for high quality, low cost product with limited option features'
(see Figure 4.3) and now the new product was being designed with many previously
exotic features as standard, directly influenced by the Japanese automotive industry.
The market was described as still 'very competitive' at the time of the study. This was
reflected in the Sales and Administration Manager's attitude to taking possibly difficult
custom-designed work: 'No-one's walking away from business [i.e. sales force or
dealers]' ; hence SPED jobs are sometimes accepted without full quotations having
been done; 'We have to fit it in and maybe the rest of the business suffers'. This kind
of approach was evident from another discussion, this time with the Order
Management Supervisor. For a particular order the records showed that the order had
been promised despite clear indications from manufacturing that the promised delivery
would not be met. The explanation was 'I suppose salesmen have to tell porkies
sometimes'. In a recession like the current one, he further explained, Hyster would
'do anything' and the priority was 'to give the customer what they want'.
The Sales and Administration Manager also discussed a current corporate drive to
reduce delivery leadtimes. Typical quoted leadtime was 13 weeks: the aim was to
reduce this to six weeks' delivery. There was some scepticism on his part about the
need for this, especially in the context of the typical customer purchase process,
which involves several weeks, if not months, of expenditure requests being debated
and approved by relevant managers. Customers 'don't need trucks the next day'.
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Also, bearing in mind that (sometimes considerable) extra time is required for SPED
work, the Sales and Administration manager commented that the five week leadtime
initiative 'will be no good if all the SPED is squeezed out' i.e. that, in moving toward
a five-week delivery as standard, the company has to turn away anything but the most
simple custom-design work or, alternatively, not be able to promise this for all
products.
Many of the competitive pressures are felt by the Plant at one remove - for the most
part there is the intermediary of the dealer obscuring the individual cases. Dealers
hold inventory and carry out, to a greater or lesser extent, modifications on trucks in
that inventory to suit individual customer needs. This serves to distort leadtimes and
order-sizes because customer orders can often, wholly or in part, with or without
modifications, be satisfied from dealer stocks. All that the plant Sales and
Applications staff usually see are orders for individual trucks for particular branches
of the dealer network.
4.5.2 Technical Lead and Custom Design
There is considerable support for the view that Hyster trucks compete on technical
merit. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is the view of the Applications engineers and the
design engineers. The SPED Applications supervisor commented that Hyster 'know
we're not the cheapest' but that competition is first of all on the basis that 'it's a good
product'; SPED trucks win business on performance and product and the views of the
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real end user - the driver - are seen as favouring Hyster: 'we have no worries about
going on trial'. One example from recent work was for Coca-Cola, where competitors
proposed 2.5 and 3 tonne trucks for an application and Hyster proposed a more
expensive 3.5 tonne truck, despite protestations from the salespeople involved. The
need for the larger, more expensive truck was proven and Hyster won the order.
The competitive role of SPED itself is important here. The SPED Design supervisor,
in discussing the costing of his group's work, commented that SPED design hours are
not charged to customers but are treated as a general overhead and that 'SPED is seen
as supporting the business generally'. Again, according to the Plant Manager, the
involvement of the dealer network makes it less straightforward to determine the
extent to which and the ways, if any, in which the 'SPED sells our standard product'
theory applies. One view is that customers who have been satisfied with SPED trucks
will favour Hyster for orders of standard (custom-built) trucks: that is the implication
of the cost accounting approach to SPED design costs, that somehow it is worth the
standard business subsidising the SPED business.
In a lengthy discussion of this with the Plant Manager and the Sales and
Administration Manager, the conclusion was that the process by which SPED
influences demand for standard custom-built trucks is more diffuse and complex than
the simple link postulated above. In some way, they suggest, there is a synergy
between SPED and standard product that means that, in order to maintain a market
presence of any sort in the industry, a 'full' product-range has to be offered, including
custom design when necessary. 'The word gets around' amongst users and they want
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'a Hyster' not 'a fork-lift-truck'. Via the trade press, dealer newsletters and personal
contacts, the firm 'beats its chest' about technical successes i.e. custom designs for
extreme applications. Linked to this is the suggestion from the Sales and
Administration Manager that customers are tending to want more flexibility in their
trucks. Whereas in the past firms might have bought two or three trucks, each with
different custom-built options to deal with different tasks, they increasingly want one
custom-designed truck with a combination of options that enables it to do everything.
4.5.3 Customer Service
The Sales and Administration manager refused to be held to a clear-cut order-winning
issue. He sees the 'support' offered by the dealer network as being an important
factor. The dealers are known for their efficiency, responsiveness to service call-out,
spares availability and SPED capability. More generally, the willingness of Hyster to
invest in production facilities, with all that that says about quality and technological
prowess, is seen as an asset and exploited through the increasingly common vehicle
of plant tours by customers. In an industry where safety is of paramount importance,
Hyster's strict conformance to relevant legislation is also reckoned to be a selling-
point.
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4.5.4 Price
In the straitened economic circumstances prevailing at the time of the study, the
usually relatively high initial purchase price of Hyster products may be an obstacle.
There have been recent instances of 'dumping' from overseas competitors at 'crazy,
crazy prices'. The measures seen as best combatting this purely price-based
competition are customer visits to the plant and the improved dealer and sales support
offered by such steps as recruitment of linguists in the sales support area. This move
to customer service was described as 'the most significant change in attitudes over the
20-odd years I've worked here'. The Sales and Administration Manager commented
that the typical purchase decision on SPED trucks was a complex one, amounting to
'what [i.e. degree of customisation] the customer can get for the money available, in
the time available'.
4.5.5 Delivery
Delivery speed is not stressed by Hyster as an important factor to its customers,
although in some instances it comes to the forefront e.g. at the time of the study, a
particular large order was occupying many people's minds, primarily because it had
to be completed and invoiced by the end of the customer's financial year, a not
uncommon phenomenon when organisations realise they have underspent plant and
equipment budgets and can remedy this by replacing a FLT. Such special cases aside,
comments from the Master Production Scheduler tend to support this: if customers are
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notified of a delay well in advance, there is not usually a great deal of sensitivity; if,
however, customers are only notified of a delay a day or two before the due date,
then they do become upset, even if the delay is only a couple of days.
The Sales and Administration Manager commented that predicting demand had
become more difficult 'since the mid 1980s' (notably, this roughly coincides with the
start of production at the newly-refurbished Irvine plant) and so it was hard for the
dealers to know what sort of inventory to hold. Products from the plant 'used to be
supplied on a first come, first served basis' but now forward supply was guaranteed
to the dealers i.e. dealers are asked to commit to taking certain trucks of certain series
for stock and the plant commits to supplying them.
4.5.6 Dealers
Dealers hold inventory and carry out customisation themselves. When it suits them -
for example if business is relatively slow and their complement of fitters has little
routine service work to do - dealers will satisfy some customer orders for custom-
designed trucks by buying spares and doing it themselves, using either a truck already
in inventory or one ordered for the purpose but to a basic specification. When it
doesn't suit them - when they don't have the particular skills required, when they are
busy or when they know it will cost them too much - they will order a SPED truck
from the plant.
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The dealer involvement then, means that information on who buys what is rather
limited because not only are most orders not identified as being for individual end
users but, for the reasons just outlined, may not reach the end users in the same form
as they leave the plant. In a similar way, it is difficult to determine the "real"
demands for delivery speed or leadtime, as orders may be to replace inventory, or to
provide a basis for further customisation by the dealer (with presumably, in the latter
case, time allowed for the dealer customisation work and the plant delivery date
brought forward accordingly).
Although much of these issues were only discussed in general terms during the course
of the study, a company research exercise which only came to light during the last
visit to the plant provides useful corroboration and quantification in a number of these
areas. Some of the summary points from the study are presented here, first on
customisation:
Changes to the configuration of 579 trucks shipped to customers during
September and October 1992 [the period of the study in the plant]
were reported by our dealers in France, Germany, Holland, Spain, UK
and Belgium. This study showed the following: [excerpted]
- Of the 579 trucks reportea 519 had some form of modification on
them.
- A mean of 4.1 modifications per truck were made, with a mean of 11
hours' work per truck.
- 270 out of 579 shipped were from dealer inventory, with similar
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levels of modification to dealer inventory and plant-supplied trucks.
and secondly on leadtimes:
The...Study (June 1992) ... fouhd that expectation of a quick delivery
was typically 4 to 6 weeks from customer order;
Information supplied by Hyster's Sales Managers indicate that, for
trucks LT to 3 tonnes capacity, the competition is meeting the
expectation of the market place of typically 4 to 6 weeks delivery;
The study of 579 trucks [above] found that only 32% of customer
orders were delivered within 5 weeks of customer order. Of this 32%,
26% was from dealer inventory and 6 % from Hyster shipment. For
Craigavon series, 5 week leadtime performance was 60% for H1.25-
1.75 XL and 33% for the H2.00-3.00 XL. The results indicate that
Hyster is failing to meet the customers' expectation using the current
"supply from dealers' inventory" philosophy and may be at a
competitive disadvantage.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that 'information supplied by Hyster's Sales
Managers', which presumably has in turn been reported by customers or dealers, all
of whom have an interest in exhorting the factory to better performance, should
indicate that the competition is doing better. Nonetheless, it seems that, regardless of
how the competition are doing, Hyster is not doing well enough.
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4.6 Performance Measurement
These data from the Europe-wide study complement plant-level data on delivery
performance, which is available in some detail for individual trucks. The other key
performance measure that is available is cost. This is not routinely produced in
summary form for all trucks, but a number of individual cases are available. These
will be discussed within the context of a broader description of the approach to
costing and, in particular, the approach to identifying variances and dealing with
SPED.
4.6.1 Delivery Performance
Delivery performance data were available from two separate sources, one which
recorded the requested and achieved delivery for all trucks (held by Sales
Administration), and another which related to SPED trucks only (held by SPED
Applications). The database for all trucks did not distinguish between SPED and non-
SPED trucks. The defmitions used were as follows:
Requested Leadtime =	 Date requested - Date registered
Achieved Delivery =	 Ready to ship - Date registered
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Figure 4.17 Requested and Actual Delivery Leadtime Distributions - (a) All Trucks
(b) SPED Only
The first thing analysis of these data reveals is that many trucks are delivered late.
Figure 4.17a shows the profile of delivery dates for all trucks; Figure 4.17b shows
the same thing for a sample of approximately 100 SPED trucks, covering all the main
series. Requested leadtimes in both cases are centred on 100 days; achieved leadtimes
in each case are centred on 120 days. Statistical testing (t-test) of the data indicate that
there is no significant difference between the two distributions i.e. SPED delivery
request and performance is the same as for trucks custom-built from standard options.
These distributions do not indicate how many individual trucks were late to promised
delivery. Figures 4.18a and 4.18b show the distribution of 'earliness/lateness' for all
trucks and SPED trucks only, respectively. (Note that the units are trucks, and that
the sample of SPED trucks was smaller than that of all trucks.) This clearly shows
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that many individual trucks are delivered late in both cases. The curious shape of
Figure 4.18b cannot be explained by anything other than smallness of sample.
Figure 4.18 Earliness/Lateness of Individual Deliveries - (a) All trucks (b) SPED
Only
This could be interpreted in various ways. The simplest interpretation is that different
series and SPED don't make any difference to the demands on the plant. In view of
what has already been discussed, this seems unlikely. Another interpretation is that,
because Materials Management try to plan SPED in as even a manner as possible,
everything is reduced to the lowest common denominator. In that there is no
perception of different order-winning criteria in respect of delivery time between
SPED orders and standard orders, this uniformity may not matter (except that it seems
to be uniformity of failure). But it has serious implications for the expressed desire
to reduce leadthnes generally. SPED trucks take more time, both in design and
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manufacture, and if leadtimes are to be improved, either the whole process has to be
speeded up a great deal, or SPED trucks and standard trucks have to be treated in a
more differentiated manner so that SPED doesn't drag everything down to its level.
4.6.2 Cost and Costing Systems
The principal contact for fmancial information was the plant Cost Accountant, who
reported to the Financial Controller. Whereas order dates and delivery dates are
collected as a matter of course in the process of logging and administering orders,
information relating to costs is generated as a separate issue and as such, no neat
summary table of the cost of each truck produced was available. Indeed, no systems
were in place to collect actual costs.
Because the costing system is linked to the MRP and associated order management
systems, it works, as these other systems do, at the level of option or "MLI" (Master
Line Item). A standard cost exists for each option and, as the dealer builds up the
options required for a truck, so the costs are built up. Costs are intended to reflect
materials, labour and manufacturing (i.e. not general administrative) overheads.
Manufacturing overheads are allocated in proportion to direct labour hours. Pricing,
an area of policy outside the current study, then seeks to secure a contribution to
general overheads as well as a profit.
SPED costing proceeds in a similar fashion. Every truck has some standard options
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and the costs associated with these are built up as they are specified. The SPED
options are given MLI numbers - relating to each "SPED job" - and the costs
associated with these are collected in much the same way. A cost summary for any
SPED truck is thus a list of option codes and their associated standard costs, summed
to give a total cost for the truck. This "Standard Cost Audit Trail" report, generated
on an exception basis by cost accounting staff, does not distinguish in any way
between SPED and standard options.
So far as standard options are concerned, there is a monthly process of 'rolling up'
cost data so that the most recent cost estimate is available: for example, reflecting cost
changes resulting from Engineering Change Notices. The costs used for any truck
order are those in force at the time of manufacture rather than at the time of
invoicing.
SPED option costs comprise two main elements - materials and labour. Material costs
are simply the costs to Hyster of bought-in materials or components that were needed
for a particular option. Labour costs are obtained by applying the relevant labour rate
to the labour hours for the SPED option as estimated by the SPED Application
Engineers. The Cost Accountant was under the impression that actual labour hours
were reported by the SPED Workshop Superintendent and hence that there would be
a check on inaccurate estimating by the engineers. In fact, shop floor observation and
interviews indicate that no such cost reporting is carried out, nor was there any
evidence of any systems existing by which this might take place. These same
interviews indicate that SPED Supervision have grown to know the allowances they
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should make in respect of the estimates of SPED labour content, dependent upon
which engineer was responsible for generating the estimate: some are accurate guides,
others are very optimistic. This absence of any SPED labour cost reporting was
confirmed by the SPED Design and Applications Engineers. The best information they
had was that 'SPED overall is supposed to be paying its way'.
Where the SPED work involves a number of items which are separate for the
purposes of design, but which are intimately inter-related for the purposes of
machining and fitting, the way in which labour is allocated to individual MLIs may
be misleading. The labour allocation has to be made MLI-by MLI, but in practice,
several MLIs may constitute one large modification and hence one large and
indivisible task for the fitter. So labour may be all allocated to one MU, spread
arbitrarily between them, or some attempt may be made to link labour content with
designed option (i.e. individual MLI) insofar as that is possible or makes any sense.
Thus whilst the total (estimated) labour cost will be reflected, the extent to which
particular individual features requested by customers attract a labour cost will not be
known.
As has already been indicated, although the SPED Design hours on each job are
carefully logged, none of the design cost is charged to the individual customer. This
is somewhat at odds with the description of the total cost appearing at the bottom of
a Standard Cost Audit Trail report as 'cost of sales'. An accountant at the firm's
Basingstoke central sales office carries out 'contract reviews' using the audit trail
reports. The aim here is to compare actual and quoted costs, particularly where there
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are large variances. These are supposed, by the Irvine Cost Accountant, to include
analyses of routings to determine whether the processes used and the labour hours
involved were as estimated. As we have seen there is, in fact, no reporting of labour
hours or process stages for SPED work carried out. It was not clear what the usage
or dissemination of these reviews is: the Irvine Cost Accountant's view was that the
firm does not 'learn from its mistakes and apply pressure to improve performance
where costs indicate that this is necessary'. He also commented that, for SPED trucks,
this approach clearly didn't reflect the reality of all the overhead associated
specifically with SPED. Detailed examination of a major contract further that there
were a number of differences between actual cost e.g. of bought-in items and audit
trail costs.
A 'Statement of Income' for SPED trucks is issued to SPED and senior management
once a month. For (a) the current month, (b) the year to date and (c) the prior month
year-to-date, it gives a profit and loss statement for Irvine SPED operations. The
headings under which data are reported are worth examining in more detail.
Net Sales
Cost of Sales
Product cost at standard
Manufacturing Variance
Other manufacturing costs
Total cost of sales
Gross profit
Percent of net sales
Operating expenses
Engineering Irvine
Engineering Yale
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Marketing
After Sales expense
Total Operating Expenses
Operating Income
There are at least two ways in which this report is of interest. First, regardless of
what the costs are, it demonstrates what data are available and reported to whom.
Secondly, it provides some indications as to the cost structure of SPED operations,
given the assumptions upon which it is based
This report enables management to track trends in total SPED sales revenue and to
see what manufacturing costs are incurred in producing the trucks involved. It is
evident from this that, at overall SPED operations level, some attempt is made to
reflect the cost of support activities e.g. Engineering and that it is not treated as an
entirely 'general' overhead. However, a few comments seem relevant at this stage:
a) Manufacturing costs are not broken down into main works costs and SPED
workshop costs;
b) All costs reported are 'standard' costs - as we have seen, SPED costs are
only estimated due to lack of reporting of actual labour hours;
c) It is not clear how the Engineering costs are allocated.
Total engineering costs run at about 7% of total cost of sales plus operating expenses.
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The annual charge for Engineering is f220k, which is presumably intended to cover
all SPED design engineers plus an appropriate proportion of the general engineering
costs. Noting that there are eleven engineers working full-time on SPED and that
there are six other staff plus the Engineering Manager, it seems unlikely that even
salaries are truly reflected in this allocation (even if SPED engineers alone are
counted, f20k per year per engineer is unlikely to cover salaries).
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4.7 Customisation and Variety
Having previously examined the impact of SPED work on the plant, particularly in
terms of labour and disruptions to production planning and manufacture itself, it is
instructive to see in some more detail just what the special requirements of customers
are. This is no place to itemise in any great detail what the technical requirements of
customers are - there are several thousand components in a typical truck and, as
already indicated, once custom-design is involved, the technical scope is theoretically
unlimited. It is of use to consider patterns in customisation though.
For this purpose, data are available from dealers, from SPED Engineering and from
SPED Applications. Before going into more detail though, some useful insights are
available from the more general comments of those working around the SPED area.
4.7.1 Attitudes to SPED
'We used to do anything': thus the first comment of the Applications Engineering
Supervisor on SPED decision-making. Two major constraints were identified as
having altered that: first, the increasingly tight legislation on FLTs that has, from a
technical/safety point of view, limited what was possible; secondly, the ceiling on
design engineering capacity has increasingly limited the number of quotations that
could be worked on. There are also some elements that are so fundamental to the
truck that they are considered non-modifiable outside the basic options e.g. drive axle
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and engine. Hyster have been criticised by customers for a lack of readily-available
options as compared to Japanese suppliers 'who have benefitted from automotive
industry experience and are able to offer a wide range'.
On a related point, the Sales and Administration Manager pointed out that the
legislation has reduced the extent to which users and dealers can modify trucks
themselves. Thus, whilst one effect of the legislation may have been to limit the extent
to which trucks could be modified, it has nonetheless also increased the proportion
of modification that can only be done in the factory.
The general procedure for handling a SPED quotation was outlined as follows by the
SPED Applications Engineering Supervisor:
1) Assume that a feasibility study has been carried out at the end customer's
premises;
2) SPED Applications suggest standard options wherever possible;
3) SPED Applications do an appraisal of whether to carry out work;
4) SPED Applications with SPED Design assess availability of Engineering
design time.
By virtue of the domination of distribution by the dealer network, the bulk of
enquiries are channelled through dealers. However, according to the SPED
Applications Supervisor, the quality of specifications varies greatly. 'Experienced
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salesmen [sic] and dealers give detailed and helpful specs. Other don't. Sometimes we
are at the mercy of secondhand information passed on by the field to desk sales to
SPED Applications.' Enquiries vary greatly in the level of detail, even for similar
degrees of modification. Some customers submit very 'heavy', detailed specifications.
In the period January to October 1992, 2100 enquiries had been received.
4.7.2 The 'SPED Price List'
Being well aware that many of the enquiries that have to be dealt with are trivial in
technical content but nonetheless demand some intervention by SPED engineers, the
SPED Design and Applications groups have compiled a so-called 'SPED Price List'
which attempts to push some of the decision-making out into the field. An existing
document (dated December 1987 i.e very soon after the Irvine facility began
production of the XL range) used for SPED Design reference, gives a list of
commonly-requested SPED options and an indicative 'nett price' and delivery
availability (in weeks). This attempted to provide a 'ready reckoner' for routine SPED
jobs, at least insofar as quoting a price is concerned. At the time of the study, a new
document serving a similar purpose was being compiled and this was to be made
available to dealers. This list was more comprehensive than the 1987 document (i.e.
contained more options) but it was not clear at the time of the study exactly which
parts of the quotation, pricing and specification and design process would be taken out
of the engineers' hands.
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The new list contains 47 main items, most of which are yes/no options, some of
which are choices from a few possibilities, one - the length of forks - which is to be
specified for each case within certain limits. Most options apply to all series, except
where this would be absurd e.g. Battery Discharge Indicator for non-electric trucks.
They range from the relatively fundamental - fork length perhaps - to the very
superficial - e.g. whether or not a toolkit is supplied with the truck.
4.7.3 SPED Option Usage
Clearly, a one-off cost is incurred when an option is designed. If it can then be re-
used for another order, much of the extra work will be avoided. With this in mind,
data were obtained on the usage pattern of SPED Options. A total of 1920 different
options were on record as 'current'. In 1991, a year in which 1050 SPED trucks had
been engineered for Irvine manufacture, 500 SPED options had been used. The
pattern here was for most options to be used very infrequently. Even within the
quarter of the options that were used at all, only 71 made double figures, and only
one (the incorporation of a knob on the steering-wheel) was specified more than a
hundred times.
What is also evident from the list of current SPED options is that many, similar
modifications have had to be engineered anew, at least in part. For example, one
involving changing the inclination of the uprights on which the forks are lifted occurs
several times, in each case being a different part number, with different drawings and
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parts and having necessitated a separate design study. What appears as a single item
in the list with an indicative price for quotation purposes may still signify a number
of possible designs and potentially a new design when it comes down to detailed
engineering. Bearing in mind that the combination of options is often the reason for
SPED trucks to be subject to a full design study (so as to ensure compatibility of
options) it is difficult to see how this requirement can suddenly be eliminated. Thus
the SPED Price List will have a limited impact on the amount of design work
required, although it may speed up the quotation process.
Most of the options, on the list of option usage and on the SPED Price List, refer to
single features e.g. a different fork or a particular light. On both documents though,
there are also entries that bring together a number of modified features under one
option. For example, 'Cold store kit' may be specified, which involves a number of
inter-related features that make the truck suitable for use in cold conditions. The
detailed examination of a number of sales contracts (see 4.8) confirmed that SPED
options are indeed often ordered in groups like this, where a number of features all
relate to a common cause e.g. use in cold conditions. However, because of the
tendency to treat these as separate and unrelated options for administrative purposes
(e.g. BOM structuring), although everyone in design and marketing appreciates that
they are related, it is difficult to identify and quantify this type of grouping of SPED
options. There are similarities between such grouping and the 'option groups' of non-
SPED features, but these application-related groupings can and often do cut across a
number of option-groups e.g. cold-store-related options could affect engine, hydraulics
and tyre option groups.
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The SPED Design Supervisor commented that previous usage of SPED options is
certainly no use for forecasting purposes e.g. for buying in long leadtime materials.
4.7.4 Dealer Modifications
Dealers modify 90% of the trucks they ship to end customers. These include trucks
ordered specially on Hyster plants and trucks held in dealer inventory, and the
proportion of trucks modified is much the same in each case. This means that, despite
the number of trucks being custom-designed for factory manufacture, dealers still find
it necessary to make some modification to 90% of what they are ordering from the
plants. The dealers are spending an average of 11 hours per truck: this is similar to
the number of standard hours SPED per SPED truck produced at Irvine and should
be seen in the context of typical standard hours per non-SPED truck presented earlier
i.e. 30-45 for most series. Modification thus adds 50% more labour to an 'average'
truck.
4.7.5 'Evolving' SPED
As we have seen, truck orders 'turn into' SPED at the level of the MPS. There is also
a good deal of evolution even after trucks are identified as SPED trucks. Of the 1050
SPED trucks engineered in 1991, 257 had alterations made to their specifications after
initial ordering. Many of these had more than one change made, on more than one
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Figure 419 Delivery Performance versus Delay in SPED Notification
This could provide an explanation for the lateness in delivery of some trucks. With
this in mind, the delivery data were analysed further to establish whether trucks that
'turned into' SPED were delivered late (and hence the dealers, to some extent, 'only
had themselves to blame'). These data are plotted on Figure 4.19, where each point
represents an individual truck, the delay between the order being placed and the
SPED requirements being notified is on the x-axis, and the eventual delivery
performance is plotted on the y-axis. Casual observation shows the extent of the
delays in many cases - bearing in mind that requested deliveries were typically 100
days, half the leadtime is used up before notification. There is also bimodality about
the delays - they are either a week or two months, with nothing much in between.
There is no ready explanation for this. A regression analysis was carried out and this
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showed very poor correlation between the two variables i.e. a truck that is specified
as SPED from the outset is just as likely to be delivered late as one that is specified
as SPED well into the leadtirne. But this analysis cannot show whether SPED 'late
developers' jump the queue to the detriment of carefully-planned SPED trucks.
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4.8 Contract Chronologies
This section comprises descriptions of three contracts that were examined in detail.
Notes were taken of every memo and fax in the contract files, and details of costings,
MRP BOMs and similar detailed material were collected. These were complemented
by discussions with engineers, shop-floor supervision, sales and other staff. The first
chronology is by far the most involved.
4.8.1 An Order for Five Trucks for a UK Public Sector Organisation
4.8.1.1 Chronology Outline
On March 6th 1992, an invitation to tender was submitted by the customer. Tenders
were due by 30th March. The tender document consisted of 90 pages. The customer
was a key account and so no dealer was involved. An initial specification was
prepared by March 17th, but several changes were made; the customer refused the
initial submission, Hyster re-specified using a truck from a smaller series and quoted
price and delivery.
On June 3rd, Sales informed the plant that they had taken the order, indicating that
due date for customer inspection was 4th September (13 weeks). The note commented
'You have already indicated that it is unlikely that we can meet this delivery schedule
- could you please check this matter out fully and advise best possible delivery?'.
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Correspondence continued throughout June. In summary, this concerned difficulties
in identifying a special type of ignition-key; a number of special purchase orders for
long lead-time items being made outwith the MRP system; the need for a special
overhead guard resulting from the customer's opting for a high-specification driver's
seat; and some confusion regarding the location of the fire-extinguisher. The
specification was altered three times. The customer was persuaded to have a standard
livery rather than special-coloured paint, but insisted on a yellow canvas cab cover;
agreement was also reached that the keyswitch could be a standard one.
In early July, the customer reverted back to insisting that the keyswitch be special.
The design of this and other special options were completed during July. SPED
assembly took place during the last week of August. Inspection by the customer found
small non-conforming items and requested that one truck, with corrections, be sent
'without delay'; however, they also requested that the rest be held until the end of
September.
Somewhat alarmingly, on September 9th, Sales wrote to the customer asking, amongst
other things, 'what lift height is actually required and what are the types and
dimensions of loads' - evidently the 90-page tender document had omitted these
technical details. Various other details were the subject of correspondence during
early September. On October 8th, a number of points were still not to specification -
these were a result of inconsistency between Hyster policy and customer
specification. On October 12th, the invoice for the first truck was sent.
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In early November, the customer requested that the keyswitch be changed as it was
not to specification. This and other changes were requested for the remaining four
trucks, yet to be shipped. Cabs and beacons were to be fitted (Hyster policy is not to,
because of damage risk during shipment); the exact specification of keyswitch was
required (Hyster's supplier had supplied an 'equivalent' to the one specified). The
invoice for these four trucks was sent on November 17th, but information from the
customer as to original source of keyswitch was sent to Hyster on December 17th.
Communications about the keyswitch continued in February 1993 (when data were
collected) by which time it seemed that the trucks had been delivered.
4.8.1.2 Commentary and Background
The choice of this contract was suggested by the SPED Applications Engineers. The
Financial Controller felt it was 'fairly representative'; the SPED Design Supervisor
felt it was 'a messy one'. SPED Design felt that this was a 'terrible' customer to work
with, especially as they had 'deliberately looked for reasons to delay delivery' because
there was a delay in their own project that had originally initiated the order. The
particular customer purchasing agent who was buying the trucks 'doesn't know about
lift-trucks - he probably buys the biscuits for their buffets as well' and, as a result,
had to work to the letter of documents because he 'didn't know what was important
and what wasn't'.
There were many problems with this contract. One was the canvas cab, although the
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SPED Designers were not aware of any problem 'in this case'. Discussion with the
SPED workshop supervisor revealed that, in fact, it was only at the third attempt that
the subcontract supplier made the cab correctly. SPED Design 'sometimes' do a
drawing of the specific cab or the manufacturer 'sometimes' comes into the plant to
take measurement off the truck (it was non-standard because of the non-standard
seat...). Alternatively, suppliers have a general arrangement drawing and are given
dimensions only. It is considered 'not worth doing a full drawing for £550-worth of
canopy'. A further complication arose due to the special light that the customer
wanted - to fit this, a hole would have to be cut in the cab, letting the rain in! The
position of the light was subsequently altered in negotiations with the customer. The
whole issue was further complicated by the fact that the subcontractor also
subcontracted-on some aspects of the work.
The fire-extinguisher also presented problems because of other non-standard options -
'a bastard' according to SPED Design. The key-switch generated a lot of activity,
with the correct source being identified 9 months after the initial tender, as a result
of extensive detective-work. The customer was charged the material cost of £30 per
switch. A number of costing anomalies were identified, particularly between the
quoted 'Nett price' which is used to build up the quotation, and costs identified by the
'audit trail' e.g. the 1550-worth' of canvas cab appears to have cost £760. The trucks
sell for about f18k.
The estimated SPED labour was 43 hours fitting and 16 hours machining. 14 days of
SPED Design time were recorded.
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4.8.2 Three Trucks for an African Customer
This was a relatively straightforward order for three large trucks. It is notable that the
quotation was requested with the following comments:
'this customer continues to request special modifications...is about to
order four trucks and another one is likely later in the year...'
Then, when the order was placed:
'We have had orders before to this specification..'
'This specification' included eight separate options, common to all the trucks, all of
which were required because of the hot, dry climate.
4.8.3 Six Trucks for a Northern European Customer
This contract is, again, relatively straightforward (despite over 30 hours extra labour
per truck). Most of the work was because the truck was to be used for loading
containers. Most of the problems resulted from peripheral issues such as a particular
type of electrical converter, where there was a delay in the customer's providing
necessary information on operating conditions.
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The whole contract was carried out under considerable urgency. At the end, the
SPED Applications engineers had to write to the SPED Workshop:
'Due to the late change being made, we have no formal design for this
option... [incidentally, one supplied by the same cab subcontractor as
in 4.8.1]...we would be obliged if you would inform [us] when the
work is nearing completion to allow the design group to note the work
done, to enable them to produce a formal design in the future.'
4.8.4 General Conunents
These contracts can yield many insights into many aspects of the firm's operations.
As far as interdepartmental relations are concerned, some issues emerge:
• the formal, documented communications (excluding drawings etc) are largely
between SPED Applications and the relevant sales functions or between SPED
Applications and Materials (especially purchasing)
• documented involvement of manufacturing in any aspects of the tendering and
design stage is negligible;
• a good deal of communication is required to do things 'the system' can't cope
with e.g. pre-ordering, finding out applications details not collected in initial
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customer communications, circumventing normal procedures to speed up
reactions.
It is interesting, if somewhat mischievous, to note that in one contract, the first
written communication to manufacturing was from sales (with copies being sent to all
other departments with even the slightest involvement in the contract) after the
customer had inspected the first finished product and consisted of a list of things with
which the customer had been dissatisfied.
Obviously, it isn't possible to capture the informal communications that went on to
complement those that are documented. However, discussions of these contracts with
manufacturing staff indicate that problems that arose with the manufacture of these
trucks were dealt with in an undocumented way and, certainly in some cases, the
groups or individuals who were the apparent sources of the problems did not know
about them. This could indicate that manufacturing expect to have to 'make do and
mend' to some extent. The frequency with which this happens cannot be established,
but in limited contact with just a few contracts, several design or supplier errors were
apparent. It would also appear that problems that do arise are related to peripheral
options such as lights, keys, canopies and so on, rather than those related to the
fundamental lifting operations. Hyster have established, regularly-used suppliers for
lifting attachments but appear to have difficulties with some less fundamental bought-
in parts. It is also notable that, in two of the three cases, delays on the part of the
customer for various reasons had a significant impact on the timeliness of the
engineering effort.
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4.9 Case Analysis
This section summarises the analysis and recommendations that were made to Hyster
as part of the project feedback, examines the case in the light of relevant aspects of
the existing theory, and begins to develop new insights that arise from this case in
particular.
4.9.1 What To Do About SPED?
Hyster found SPED a really significant problem. As we see from the data, delivery
performance all round (i.e. for SPED and non-SPED trucks) was poor, labour
capacity planning in the SPED area was next to impossible without incurring massive
extra expense, materials procurement for SPED trucks was often very expensive and
difficult, and no-one had much idea of whether the cost of SPED activities was
justified by the revenue it generated. With very severe competition the norm, and a
corporate response in the shape of, amongst other things, a slashing of lead-times in
the offing, the SPED Problem was not going to go away.
4.9.2 Marketing and Manufacturing
The conflicts between the interests of manufacturing and of marketing as characterised
by Shapiro (1977) are certainly present, but in much more subtle and localised ways
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than in his stark picture. To begin with, to speak of "Marketing" as a homogeneous
function is not particularly enlightening. In this case we have Applications Engineers
(Hyster Europe Marketing) working closely and in reasonable accord with SPED
Engineering (Hyster-Yale UK within European Engineering). There is the relatively
passive Sales Administration function, the far from passive Key Accounts direct sales
team and, to speak of marketing in its extended form for the time being, the dealer
network. Also, although the case did not extend to interviewing them, there are the
Basingstoke-based central sales staff.
There is, it could be contended, a more consistent requirement on the part of
manufacturing (Plant Manager, Manufacturing Manager, SPED Superintendent,
Materials Management) for, in essence, a better picture of the future. The current
volatility makes capacity planning, materials procurement and production control
difficult for all the managers mentioned.
Neither is there an archetypical divide between 'marketing' and 'manufacturing' in
conceptions of order-winners (at least as far as they were articulated). Applications
Engineering and SPED Design engineering alike see the technical superiority and in-
service performance of the product as Hyster's strength (perhaps not surprisingly). To
some extent this is supported by the Plant manager's 'we beat our chests' attitude
toward the firm's technical success stories. Clearly the original concept of the Irvine
plant was based strongly on low-cost, low-price competition, but no-one seems to be
making a case for that as a tenable competitive position, certainly for the truck series
that are produced at Irvine. The Sales and Administration Manager is particularly
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concerned with delivery speed and reliability, although there is strong evidence of
some misgivings on his part about the need for and wisdom of the corporate drive for
shorter leadtimes, certainly across all the products. He also emphasised the customer-
service aspects. From the interviews with Plant Manager and Sales Administration
manager (in some cases together), if anyone emerged as the 'them' to their us' it was
the dealer network. It was the dealer network who played off their labour capacity,
skills and costs against those of the plant, the dealer network who changed the
specifications of their orders at the last minute, the dealer network who obscure a
clear picture of the market.
4.9.3 Custom-built and Custom-designed Products
The most obvious conflict in this case - indeed the reason for the study in the first
place - was that between SPED and standard (or custom-designed and custom-built)
product. Table 4.1 may be constructed from the case data in order to summarise the
different demands of SPED and standard products. Most of the criteria are
manufacturing-specific and this approach is derived largely from the product profiling
approach of Hill (1993: 146-152). As will also be clear from the case data, a simple
dichotomy between SPED and non-SPED is too simple a basis for analysis, and some
of the other factors bearing on the extent of conflict will be discussed after the brief
discussion of the extreme cases.
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Standard
	
SPED
Process type
VVIP Ninirrisalion
Emphasis on capital
utilisation
Work content (labour
time)
Work content (type)
Interrelatedness of
featunas
Quality standard
defirtion
Cost precictability
Ownership of tasks
Dominant prtdulion
technology
Materials requirements
Materials puthasing
per
RdMine
Essential
High
Low and predictable
Machine loading and
operation - dearly
defined
Accounted for in design
Complete and explicit
Very high
Main plant
Machine-based
Forecastable, scheduled
supplies
Strong
Jobbing
Desirable
Low
Higher and less
predictable
Skilled fitting, varied and
not fully defined
Possible ambiguity
Some discretion
Lower
Shared/abdicated
Trade skills and
'orchestration'
Unpredictable, unique
or occasional orders
Maker
Table 4.1 Comparison of Tasks - Standard and SPED
That there are differences between the manufacturing requirements of the two extreme
categories of product is unquestionable. What is more important here is to analyse the
reasons for the differences to generate conflict. The starting-point for this is the notion
of the focused factory (Skinner, 1974; Hill, 1993: 156-182; Hill and Duke-Woolley,
1983). So far as manufacturing processes are concerned, Hyster-Yale are attempting
to adopt some focus, primarily by carrying out the custom-designed work in a
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Standard	 SPED
Plamed in-process
leadtime
Quoted leadtime to
customer
Materials
Performance
targetimeasure
Basis for planring
Rough-cut capacity
Planning
Three meks
13 weeks
MRP
Day rate
Opt ons (MLIs)
Labour hours per truck -
series specific
Standard costs for
options plus est. SPED
labour plus SPED
material costs
Four weeks (or five for
'heavy' SPED)
13 weeks
MRP with manual
adjustment and 'pre-
order details' to extend
leattime
Individual truck order
number
Day rate
Options (MLIs)
Overall 'SPED
Allowance' as % of plant
labour requirements
Costing	 Standard costs for
options
Identification	 Individual truck order
number
separate workshop where they adopt a job-shop rather than line approach. Some
manufacturing focus is lost, however, in that trucks are physically abstracted from the
flowlines to be customised in the SPED workshop, then returned to the main works
for upright fitting. Apart from the disruption to scheduling at the time of removal
from the line and return to it, the blurring of ownership is contrary to the focus ideal
of a clear task for each factory-within-a-factory.
Table 4.2 Comparison of Key Infrastructure Issues - Standard and SPED
More apparent is the lack of focus in infrastructural terms. The same costing,
production planning and control, materials procurement and performance measurement
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Stage
	 Standard
	
SPED Parts*
	
Comments
Parts
Technical
Specification
Selection of
Vendor
Negotiating
Price and
Delivery
Terms
Scheduling
Delivery
Controlling
delivery
Hyster-Yale
Eng. U.S. or
European
Hyster-Yale
European
Purchasing
Hyster-Yale
European
Purchasing
MAAPI CS/
Plant
Schedulers
Hyster SPED
Design
Hyster SPED
Design
Rant Schedulers
(usually little
scope for
negotiation.)
SPED Apps via
Pre-Order to Plant
Schedulers
Liaison with SPED
,Apps.
SPED Usually one-off
deal, technically- based,
SPED die is cast price
penalty due to lack of
purchasing power, time
pressure, one vendor.
Messy system. Risk of
withdrawal from order.
approaches are used for SPED and non-SPED trucks. The 'standard' system has to
be by-passed in some cases (e.g. materials for SPED options require a manual
intervention in the MRP system). Table 4.2 is a summary of the modifications that are
made in some key infrastructural areas.
The differences between the processes by which materials and components are
obtained, for SPED on the one hand and for standard products on the other, are also
instructive. For many SPED options, it is common practice for the SPED Applications
engineer to issue Pre-Order Details before the orders for other materials are generated
in the normal way by the MRP run. This is to overcome long leadtimes for some
SPED parts. Thus there are two parallel systems for obtaining materials and
components. For the main stages in the process, these are contrasted in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Materials Procurement - Standard and SPED
Not all require design work; not all have long leadtime
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There are different priorities here. Standard parts are procured within long-term
relationships, from a position of considerable buyer-strength due to the volumes
involved. The planned nature of the procurement means that there is time to benefit
from centralised procurement: i.e. specification and vendor-selection are either largely
separate or conducted together within long-term joint-development relationships.
SPED parts are often purchased from a position of poor buyer-strength: the essentially
technical basis for vendor selection (often indistinguishable from component
specification) combined with the fact that purchasing time is usually short, means that
the scheduler does little more than rubber-stamp a de facto deal already made between
the SPED engineer and the vendor. Once the SPED part is defined, it is common
practice to specify the vendor and part-number on the drawing so that, if the option
is repeated, the same vendor will be used (usually in the same rush). Hyster become
'locked in' to repeating the same deal.
Were the SPED business a minor sideline, the rather crude adjustments made to the
'standard' infrastructure would not be a cause for concern. In view of the real
importance of SPED though, the adjustments won't do.
4.9.4 Inter-Series Comparisons
The proportion of SPED trucks and the degree of modification varies considerably
from series to series and, insofar as SPED and standard trucks cause conflict, so these
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conflicts are apparent between series having different typical levels of customisation.
Thus, for example, the H6.00-7.00 XL series is largely a custom-designed series. In
1992, 321 of these trucks were ordered of which 207 were custom-designed to some
degree. Furthermore, these tend to be heavily customised (in terms of SPED labour
hours). On the other hand, only 111 of the 741 A1.00-1.50 XL trucks produced in
1992 were customised, and most of these only slightly so.
Some data were available for the Nijmegen plant and these showed that the proportion
of SPED units in the (few) series produced there is high - typically over 70%. ( No
data were available as to the labour hours involved.) On this basis, it seems that the
H6.00-7.00 XL series has much more in common with Nijmegen-made series than
with others made at Irvine. Other factors e.g. common components, may weigh more
heavily when it comes to determining the 'break point' for allocating series to plants;
nonetheless the requirements of the H6.00-7.00 XL series does seem to be out of
keeping with the stated low-cost, standard-product philosophy of the Irvine plant from
a manufacturing task (Skinner, 1969) point-of-view. (In the feedback seminar this
suggestion was well received and was apparently already being considered by
European management.)
4.9.5 Technical and Business Decisions
There appears to be no mechanism for making decisions about which SPED orders
to pursue and/or accept, and which to decline. The Sales and Administration
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Manager's view that (in the current economic climate) 'No-one's walking away from
business' is echoed in other comments. Noting also that dealers and sales people are
paid commission on sales revenue leads to the conclusion that the role of SPED trucks
is, for many, the same as that of custom-built trucks i.e. to fill capacity and generate
sales revenue (and sales commission).
The SPED Applications Engineers exhibited something like nostalgia in the comments
made about the days when 'we used to do anything'; it is notable that it was safety
legislation rather than any thoughts of profitability that, at least to some degree,
curtailed the scope of customisation efforts. Clearly, SPED Applications and SPED
Design are aware of the need to limit the amount of custom-designed work but the
only criterion for declining work explicitly mentioned was a shortage of SPED Design
capacity - again, nothing to do with profitability. Also, whilst SPED Applications
claim to dissuade customers from specifying non-standard options, it should be
remembered that their jobs exist only to the extent that custom-designed work is
required. Too much success in deterring customisation may prove damaging to
engineers' employment prospects.
This slightly cynical view of the decision-making process notwithstanding, there
probably isn't much information available that would prove useful to the Engineers
in making decisions on anything other than on a technical or self-serving basis. As we
have seen, the methods for costing SPED can be criticised on a number of grounds;
in addition to that, conversations with engineers about individual contracts revealed
some confused usage of terms like 'cost' and 'price'. The business rationale among
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individual engineers is informed by little more than the vague notion that 'SPED is
supposed to be paying its way overall'. Any connection between an extra effort to
customise a truck and subsequent order from the same customer for profitable
standard business is lost because (a) the dealers obscure the customers to a greater or
lesser extent and (b) because SPED engineers never have anything to do with custom-
built trucks and wouldn't know even if subsequent orders rolled in, in keeping with
the 'loss leader' theory. Overall then, there is little chance of the decision-makers
understanding the business context of their technical decisions as they relate to
particular customers or market segments.
One way forward might be for Hyster to adopt a much more explicit approach to
making business decisions about SPED. This would be based on a cost-driver
analysis, which would identify which aspects of the SPED work cause extra costs and
which don't. This would be linked to a more explicit understanding of the role of
SPED in each instance. At the moment, the apparent role of SPED is to keep the
factory going - to fill capacity. The role of SPED should be to make money - either
directly or indirectly. The most appropriate place to make these decisions would be
at the Sales Quote stage. This would modify the Applications Engineer's task to take
on a more overt business role.
Their technical study would determine what the ideal solution to the application is.
This might be heavily, moderately or slightly customised and various proportions of
existing design. (Identifying 'these parameters somewhat presumes the outcome of a
cost-driver analysis, but it seems likely that these will be key drivers.) Decisions
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1would then need to be made about pricing, prioritising design and manufacture, and
the business risk involved in proposing designs that deviate from the ideal in that they
avoid some or all of the custom-design work, but that satisfy most requirements.
Table 4.4 Decision-making for Design-cycle and Material-cycle SPED
SPED
(value or
labour has)
Lithe or No
New Design
Heavy New Design
Slight Use pricing or promised delivery date
to encourage dealer to do SPED or
ensure option is easy to do on main
assembly. line,
Volumes may play a part - several
trucks to same SPED spec may be
easier than one-off using standard
options
Unlikely combination?
Charging more directly for design
time might be appropriate here.
Moderate Key issue here is SPED capacity.
Encourage early commitment to
SPED design (via pricing?) so that
SPED can be planned in and
materials procured without any
panics.
Attempt to move design toward Semi-
standard line-of-business or territorial
'bundles' i.e. via price differentiation
etc. so that Design requirement is
reduced.
Heavy Large demand on SPED Assy. Again,
strongly encourage early commitment
Volume may help, but likely to be
made on project basis.
Out-and-out SPECIAL. Policy
depends on customer. If isolated
purchase, charge realistically for
design work.
If major engineering feat, document
and publicise to enhance Hyster
technical image.
The different approaches for different situations might include those shown in Table
4.4. Pressure is required either to drive the cost down or the value up. Driving the
cost down means moving either to the left or to the top in the matrix, the respective
emphases on vertical or horizontal movement depending on the cost-driver analysis.
Increasing value involves either securing a higher price for the particular order, or
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using the order as a lever, with the same or different customers, to secure other
profitable orders i.e. ones that fit with the manufacturing strategy.
Such decisions are difficult, requiring a good understanding of the relationship with
each customer, as well as the technical requirement of each application. It could only
work if the sales commission structure were to reward what's best strategically, rather
than simply rewarding sales revenue (as seems to be the case currently).
4.9.6 The Cost of SPED, The Value of SPED
Much of the preceding discussion has highlighted the various ways in which SPED
makes extra or different demands on the plant. This section will attempt to draw some
of these together and provide a framework for constructively considering what the
cost and benefit of doing SPED business is.
The approach used is based on cost-drivers. Cost-drivers are the events that cause
costs to be incurred. In that specifying a truck (any truck, but especially one involving
SPED) is a sequence of options, many of these option-points are cost-drivers. Several
cost-drivers particular to SPED trucks have already been described in the previous
sections on organisation and manufacturing. A fuller, though far from comprehensive,
list of SPED cost-drivers and the activities associated with them is given in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5 Cost-Driver Analysis of SPED Products
Cost Driver Possible Activities
Customer wants SPED truck
evaluated
- Dealer/Sales contacts SPED Apps.
- SPED SQ raised
- SPED application study done
- SPED Design discussion
- SPED customer visit
- Quotes required for bought-in parts.
- Labour estimate required.
Customer Orders SPED truck
- all SPED options exist
- SPED order placed on Applications Eng. system
- Existing SPED MLIs used to order material and bought-in
parts requirements.
- Pre-order details for any long leacttime items
- Truck incorporated into production FAS
Customer orders SPED truck
including some new option(s)
AS ABOVE plus:
- Design job raised for each option.
- Design work carried out.
- Potential vendors identified, quotes received, vendor selected
for bought-in parts.
- Pre-orders raised for long leadtime parts.
- Possible further discussion with SPED 	 Apps.
- Manuf. Eng. involvement with process design.
- SPED Apps estimate
- SPED labour for new option(s).
Specification changes during
design phase
- Repeat relevant parts of above
Manufacturing:
SPED truck with existing
options
- SPED work planned in.
- SPED Supervisor intervenes to arrange for pre-assembly
SPED work.
- Truck removed from main plant to SPED V\brkshop.
- Superv. schedules labour.
- Obtain drawings/ instrucfions.
- Components obtained/made.
- Fitting.
- Truck returned to main plant.
- Reintroduced into flowline.
- Repairs of damaged paintwork etc.
SPED truck with new options AS ABOVE plus
- Make copies of new drawings etc.
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These cost drivers are the most obvious ones and this list assumes, for the most part,
that there is no need for any clarification of design, that materials are available on
time, that no unforeseen problems arise, and that the work carried out is within the
capability of any of the fitters available. It also does not attempt to describe the more
complicated situation where trucks return to the SPED workshop a second time. A full
analysis would need to be conducted with the involvement of those closest to the
processes and decisions.
The main message of this analysis is that material and labour costs are a poor estimate
of what the real costs of SPED are. More specifically, this type of analysis can shed
light on which of the decision-points are most significant in incurring costs. The sort
of questions that might arise out of a discussion structured around cost-drivers are:
• If a customer has to have some SPED, does it really make much
difference whether it is one option or fifteen?
• What costs are avoided (and incurred) when minor SPED work is done
on the main works line?
• What are the economies of scale associated with making several SPED
trucks all to the same design?
The detailed analysis of cost drivers is good as an occasional exercise for enhancing
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Total
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All new
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understanding of the effects of certain decisions. For day-to-day purposes however,
some slightly blunter instrument is needed. Recalling the previous discussions of
SPED products in the context of standard ones in the product-range and of the
processes involved in designing and making trucks, it is suggested that the cost-drivers
can be 'bundled' in some way relevant to these major areas of impact.
From these previous comments it will be recalled that, nominally 'special' trucks vary
both in the degree to which the particular special features they have are 'special' to
an individual customer's requirements and in the number and cost-content of SPED
options. Novel features place demands on design time; multiple options or options
involving a great deal of assembly work place demands on labour. As such it is
suggested that each SPED order might be conceptualised as in Figure 4.19:
Nunter or Labor, Content of Options
Low
	 High
Figure 4.19 A Typology of SPED Orders
A rough typology of the impact of each job on the plant can be used to guide
priorities, especially if combined with the consideration of the role of SPED, which
,
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was discussed earlier.
The suggestion is not that the cost of SPED should always be passed on to the
customer. However, it is suggested that clear understanding of the mechanisms by
which costs are incurred and an explicit quantification of these costs will enable
better-informed business decisions to be made, taking into account the role of SPED
for a particular contract or series.
One rather more immediate observation is that it is not altogether clear that a
consistent use of the cost data that do exist is made within the firm. The SPED pc-
based information system gives something termed the 'NETT PRICE' which, based
on a few comparisons with quotes given for bought-in items, seems to be the cost to
Hyster of the option. The total of these 'NETT PRICES' is then termed the 'TOTAL
VALUE'. Detailed analysis of a few individual contracts indicates that there are also,
on some occasions, significant deviations from vendors' quoted prices for bought-in
items and the cost eventually incurred by Hyster. It is not clear how, and by whom,
the 'SPED Price List' is to be used (simply due to lack of research time rather than
any confusion at Hyster): however, it seems dangerous to compile a list of 'prices'
when the basis of understanding of costs is apparently shaky. The assumption seem
to be either that these me the components of prices to be charged to the customer or
that there is a generally-applicable margin to be added on to this, which is, after all,
usually the price to the dealer.
The overall argument here is that pricing can be used tactically by the factory to
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1refocus its manufacturing strategy. The costing approach adopted will depend on the
strategic value of particular lines of business - SPED/Standard, Dealer/Direct sales
etc - and that such pricing policy can only be implemented with a rather clearer
approach to identifying the costs of supporting these lines of business.
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Chapter 5
Honeywell Control Systems Ltd
5.1 Introduction
Honeywell Control Systems Ltd is a division of the Honeywell Corporation, which
has international interests in industries related to control systems. This case-study was
carried out at the company's UK manufacturing plant at Newhouse, Scotland.
5.1.1 Company Background
-
The firm operates in a large range of business areas, spanning multi-million pound
control systems for chemical works, replacement limit-switches for machine-tool
safety guards and microswitches selling for a few pence to OEMs for incorporation
into domestic appliances. During the 1980s in particular, the firm diversified out of
its original core switching business into computers and other very diverse activities.
With the business climate worsening in the late 1980's, there has been a certain
amount of retrenchment into core businesses e.g. divestment of Honeywell-Bull
computers. Honeywell was described by one of its senior managers as 'a multinational
company trying to become global'. The common theme among the business areas in
which the firm currently operates is control. The slogan on Honeywell's
advertisements of the period was 'Helping you control your world'. Traditionally,
Honeywell has been an engineering-based company, according to one senior manager
at Newhouse, but has tried to temper that with a customer focus. In the USA, this is
manifested organisationally by the following product divisions: Home and Building
Control, Space and Aviation, and Industrial. Each division has its own research,
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Aviation International
I
Industrial
Components
Microswitch
Keyboards
marketing, manufacturing and sales activities. Within the Industrial product division
there is an Industrial Components sub-division, which is of particular relevance to the
present research. The structure of the international organisation is shown in Figure
5.1.
HQ-USA
Home &
Building
Control
Home control
Building
control
US operations
Industrial
I
IndustnaiA 
utomation
& Control Canada
Latin
America
Asia
Pacific
Europe, M.Esst
Africa
European
Business Units
Affiliate
Organisation
Skinner
valve
Figure 5.1 Honeywell International Organisation Structure
In Europe, the organisational response takes a different form. Rather than having
product divisions with responsibility for all activities associated with their respective
products, the research, marketing, engineering and production activities are separated
from sales. The non-sales activities are organised into the same business units as exist
in the US, with the exception that Control Components constitute a separate division
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European
Business
Organisation
Home and
Building Control
Affiliate
Organisation
UK and
Northern Europe
rather than merely a part of the Industrial division. This is shown in Figure 5. 2.
Sales within the territory are carried out by a separate 'Affiliate' organisation which
is organised on geographic lines. There are three sales areas, as shown in Figure 5.2.
Thus, product-based business units .effectively 'sell' products internally to the
geographically-based affiliates.
Europe, CIS,
Middle East
& AFrica
Industrial Automation
and Control
Control Components
Aerospace and Defence
Central and
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Middle East and Africa
Figure 5.2 Honeywell European Organisation
5.1.2 The Newhouse Site
The Newhouse site accommodates three principal business activities. It is the firm's
only UK manufacturing plant. It is also the location of the Centre of Excellence for
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Control Components and the Residential Business Unit (for Home and Building
Controls), each of which comprise marketing and engineering staff for their respective
product-groups. This combination of marketing and engineering with associated
manufacturing is continued throughout Europe and throughout the product divisions.
Twelve locations in six European countries provide foci for different parts of the
business. This is summarised in matrix form in Figure 5.3. From this it will be noted
that three other sites, two in Switzerland and one in France, are involved in the
Control Components Division. The division's headquarters are in Switzerland.
The Newhouse 'mission' was characterised by the General Manager of the
Microswitch Centre of Excellence (C.o.E.) as being centred on electromechanical
devices, with some involvement in solid state products. As Figure 5.3 shows, other
locations within the division specialise according to component technology. The
present research concentrates on particular aspects of the Control Components
business, rather than the Residential Business Unit.
The Newhouse manufacturing operation has contracted a great deal in the past ten
years or so. Much of this contraction was due to a narrowing of the range of activities
i.e. subcontracting of many operations previously undertaken within the plant. Most
control components consist of a switch or switches and such ancillary parts as
housings and actuators. Whereas previously Honeywell manufactured many of the
ancillary parts using extensive machining, die-casting, fabrication and similar
processes, there is now much greater emphasis on manufacture of basic switches and
fmal assembly.
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Figure 5.3 Manufacturing and Technology Activities in Europe
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Incicative ApplicationsGmup
Industrial Machine-tools
Darestic Domestic appliances and automotive applications
Civil and military aircraft, marine and rail transportAavr
The plant has embraced many changes in the way it works alongside this reversion
to core businesses. Notable on the shop-floor is the presence of manufacturing cells
for assembly processes and a growing number of areas demarcated for direct delivery,
to the shopfloor, of components from vendors. The shopfloor is divided into areas for
(a) production of various basic switches and (b) assembly of various control
component types. There is also a small injection-moulding facility where some
ancillary parts for Home Control products are produced.
5.1.3 An Outline of Control Components Products
It is useful at this stage to identify in the very broadest terms the groups of products
that comprise the Control Components range. These are shown in Table 5.1. Products
in the groups use a variety of basic technologies. The oldest basic technology is the
electromechanical limit switch, applied to all three groups. The newer technology that
is being incorporated into components is solid-state.
Table 5.1 Microswitch Product Groups
* Aerospace, Ordnance and Marine -
(later ATOM - Aerospace, Transport, Ordnance and Marine )
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5.1.4 Context of the Study
The project described here began in July 1992. The first point of contact was the
General Manager of the Microswitch. Centre of Excellence, who championed the
project from the outset. His responsibility covered marketing and engineering for
Control Components in the three main product areas. The concern of the research
with product-range and product customisation made a particular group of AOM
products suitable as a subject for study. This served to narrow down the scope of the
research to something manageable and to direct it toward a current concern of the
firm. The group of products, the EN series of limit switches, involved a large amount
of design and development work to support very low-volume customised products. A
diagram of a typical switch is shown in Figure 5.4, and the overall height of such
products is about 50-60mm. Whilst the general perception was that these were
profitable products, there was at the same time a feeling that the degree of
customisation was out of hand. There had also been some recent, high-profile cases
of missed deliveries and quality problems.
Figure 5.4 An EN Limit Switch
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5.1.5 Research Process
The research began with an interview with the General Manager, who set the context
of the work and indicated the key contacts. Thereafter, the work was coordinated
through the Product Marketing Manager and interviews were conducted with the
Product Manager, Manufacturing Manager, Engineering Manager, Design and
Manufacturing Engineers, Production Control & Customer Services Manager,
amongst others. After initial interviews, a good level of access was possible,
particularly for the retrieval of documentary material. To begin with, the scope was
quite broad, taking in AOM and EN products in total. After that, a few individual
sales contracts were examined in detail.
At the time the research began, there was no intent to carry out a study with an
explicitly longitudinal aspect, except insofar as historical trends of product sales,
manufacturing process and organisational changes and the like could be determined
from documentary evidence and interviews and then be used to put the present into
context. However, in the event, the work was undertaken intermittently between July
1992 and late 1994, with the bulk of the work being carried out in the first six
months.
There are a number of reasons for this extended contact with the firm. First of all,
successive prime contacts were either moved or absent for long periods. Secondly, a
programme of redundancies and restructuring took place and at various stages it was
judged politically inappropriate to visit the site. Although in some respects these
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events disrupted the research, they also constitute rich contextual data that add to the
case. Much of the quantitative data that follow in the rest of the chapter relate to mid-
1992 or (in the instance of the historical data), periods of varying lengths leading up
to then. The data relating to the organisational context, however, cover two years
either side of the period of intensive research and, in retrospect, add many insights.
With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes clear that the research was carried out in the
middle of a very turbulent time for the very business being examined.
In the account that follows, the emphasis will be very much on how the business and
people's perceptions of it were in mid 1992. However, where relevant to each section
of the account, longitudinal observations will be introduced.
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5.2 Strategy Statements
In such a diverse business as this, and especially bearing in mind the concern here
with operations, it is necessary to concentrate on strategies of a more local scale. The
Strategy of the Control Components Unit was set out in a short document presented
by the General Manager at the first interview.
5.2.1 Control Components Strategy
/
The overall mission and goals of the Control Components business were:
-	 to be the leading supplier of electromechanical and solid-state sensors in
Europe;
to maintain revenue and profit in electromechanical and to grow in solid-state.
Quantified, the planned growth of revenue overall was:
1292	 1993	 1994
20%	 7.3%	 9.1%
Halfway through 1992, results were such that the actual growth estimated for the year
was 4.3%. The profit objective (based on internal transfer-pricing) was to halve a
1991 loss of f1. 1m, but it was estimated that, by the year end, this would increase
to a loss of £1.8m.
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A summary of the characteristics of the market segments indicates that the markets
for basic electromechanical switches and AOM are 'flat or declining'. High growth
areas are in the automotive, appliance, commercial aerospace and industrial
automation areas. From this, key strategic issues identified were:
increasing price competition
80% of product portfolio in mature/ageing markets
low involvement with SME OEMs in industrial market
- globalisation of OEMs in appliance
- transferable technology: mobile, appliance, aerospace
- broad technology base to be converted into products.
Additional competitive advantages were identified as world class design &
manufacture and the firm's distribution infrastructure. The resultant strategies
identified include market penetration for both appliance and mobile markets, and
'invest to hold and maintain' in both AOM and Industrial.
These broad strategies are translated into implementation approaches, product-group
by product-group. These are mostly expressed in individual product terms, but for
AOM there are statements of intent to forward integrate switches/actuators, cost
reduce the EN switch range and invest in New Product Development.
In contrast to the differentiated nature of the implementation approaches -
differentiated as they are at product-group level - the same broad manufacturing and
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related measures are indicated for all product-groups. These are re-examination of
make-or-buy decisions; the implementation of 'World Class Design', 'World Class
Manufacturing', and Supply Chain Management; and the use of Total Quality
Management, more specifically expressed as waste elimination, time compression and
elimination of barriers to implementation.
A 'Summary of strategic tasks' includes:
- Increase product launch rate
balance investment - e.g. long term growth in industrial vs cost
reduction in AOM
- key account management
strengthen marketing - research and communications; business
development
leverage engineering resource - reduce time-to-market
A 'Product Strategy' is given separate coverage but relates little to the AOM products.
More generally it sees the technology being developed through its use in appliance
products. There is also a general comment that Honeywell will 'provide systems
capability', which presumably means a move toward forward integration.
Finally, Product Marketing is given particular attention (this is to be understood as
relating to the Honeywell department/group of that name as well as (or instead of) a
more general usage of the term). Points to note here are:
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in-depth understanding of vertical markets;
management of the product life-cycle;
focus on service and added value: supply-chain, technology, forward
integration;
provide flexible applications/product specialist support;
assist in implementation of distribution channel.
All these are taken as general emphases for the Product Marketing function across all
three major markets (Commercial, Industrial, AOM).
5.2.2 Marketing Communications
Within this brief review of marketing communications there will be a concentration
on those documentary sources available at the time of the study. These comprise two
basic types: general public relations material such as magazines for dealers and so on;
and catalogues for specific product lines.
In two copies of the Honeywell Business Review (a UK publication), a vast range of
areas of activity are described in advertisements and features: oil refineries, industrial
heating and ventilation, IT cabling, domestic heating, and avionics, to name a few.
Pervasiveness is a key theme.
Simple brochures describing particular product lines begin to develop market-specific
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emphases, but also illustrate more pervasive themes. From a brochure on domestic
appliance switches (directed at appliance OEMs):
'....we at Honeywell MCROSWITCH have set an important mission for
ourselves: to work with you to develop switching and sensing solutions
that help you satist, your customer's expectations.
As the world's leader in electromechanical switches and solid-state
sensors, we can offer you one of the industry's broadest selections for
your applications. In combination with this portfolio, our experience
with your industry has given us a strong understanding of the unique
issues you face. We understand the importance of providing you with
affordable quality, delivered on time throughout the world
Through a long-term partnership, we can help you deliver what your
customer wants and help you remain competitive in the global
marketplace.'
The brochure then outlines various issues of product technology and quality, on a
number of pages whose margins are decorated with pictures of forty or so different
switches and sensors. In what is by no means a catalogue of the range, Honeywell are
nonetheless making a strong visual statement about breadth of product range in this
segment.
From the brochure outlining one of the AOM areas, Marine, more specific and
general themes emerge:
'Honeywell is one of the world's leading manufacturers of control
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components and offers the most comprehensive range of sensors and
actuators to the marine market. For over forty years, Honeywell has
worked with customers to develop products which meet the unique
needs of the industiy.
For example, no other manufacturer can match Honeywell's selection
of electromechanical switches for control and positioning applications.
Whatever your operating or housing requirements, Honeywell can
provide the best solution.
If an off-the-shelf product is not available, Honeywell specialises
in custom designs to meet specific needs.'
Again, the brochure pages are embellished with illustrations of a variety of switches.
Moving on from general introductory brochures, more detailed information is
contained in the product catalogue, which gives full technical information of the type
required by, for example, design engineers wishing to select switches for an
application. There are many catalogues, covering different product lines and
application areas. The variety of products offered in these catalogues, particularly that
of the AOM/EN products, is discussed at some length later on. The introductory notes
will suffice at this stage. From the general limit switch catalogue (industrial):
'Automated production allows the flexibility to meet customer demands,
supplying switches in batches rangingfrom 1 up to 100 000. Honeywell
also specialises in custom manufacture and is constantly working with
customers to find solutions to the most demanding application
problems.'
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From the AOM catalogue general introduction:
'A very important Honeywell service is custom design This can vary
from simple changes in flying lead length to complete product and
purpose designed assemblies.'
And from the same catalogue's section on 'Panels':
'Honeywell has the capability to design develop and manufacture
complete switch panels for a variety of aerospace, ordnance and
marine applications. The panels can be manufactured to customer's
specification or custom-designed for the application by Honeywell.'
This sample of written marketing communication shows the emphasis placed by
Honeywell on the breadth of its involvement in various industries, the breadth of
particular product-ranges, and the company's willingness and ability to make
customised products.
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5.3 The AOM Market
The characteristics of the AOM market are unique and rapidly changing. Products are
principally found on aircraft, both military and non-military, and on other arduous
military and marine applications. There are a very small number of customers and
historically a good deal of the business was with government departments or their
subcontractors. For these products, the firm is thus acting as sub- or sub-sub-
contractor to manufacturers working in a large contract, project management
environment. The overall contract is often of very high value and is frequently subject
to long negotiations before a contract is awarded. Once awarded, time has been of
paramount concern in a very sheltered supplier community, but is now combined with
other concerns e.g. price. This is particularly the case where cost-plus contracts have
been replaced by fixed-price ones.
The UK market has also evolved in a particular way by virtue of having been
technically constrained by British Standards and other non-tariff barriers e.g. of a
political and diplomatic nature, particularly during the Cold War. Overseas
competition has been low and this has strongly influenced the technical direction taken
by designs. Whilst the UK customer base has remained separate from those of other
European countries, Honeywell's UK AOM business has been relatively self-
contained. Meanwhile, Honeywell's US operation has supplied products - often very
similar to those made in the UK - conforming to US MIL-specs to European
contractors. Having moved to a much more Europe-wide perspective, Honeywell in
Europe now finds itself with many practically-duplicated products, one conforming
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to old British Standard and the other to US military-based specifications.
The role of the switch in many of these products also has implications. Usually
forming a small part of a large whole, the switch will exist for a long time as an
outline concept. Contractors' designers concentrate on the bigger design decisions
first, and only design small details like switches later on. (To quote the Product
Manager, 'the switch is the last thing to be designed.') This means that most of the
constraints are imposed in advance and heightens the likelihood of switch
customisation - the switch is designed around the contractor's product rather than vice
versa. Also, this means that there is less time than might have been the case for
Honeywell to detail a design and produce a prototype.
Having said that, whilst there is urgency in some senses and at some stages of the
process - for example, to provide prototypes once the switch design is available -
other aspects of the process are very protracted. Notable here is the usually long
interval between the bid being made, which usually involves working up a detail
design, if not a prototype switch, and the eventual shipment of products. In financial
terms, this sees Honeywell making significant outlays in terms of design engineers'
time and the production of prototypes, only to wait two or three years before any
revenue is forthcoming. Although by Components division standards the unit prices
are very high at over £100 per switch, volumes are minute (a few hundreds of any
one variant in its whole life cycle). Even small reductions in the total volume
required of any one switch can upset a delicate balance between the initial pricing and
the total cost over the life-cycle.
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The delay between bid and shipment is just one aspect of the protracted nature of
contracts in the AOM business. Most projects will have a relatively short build period
of a few years (if that) and then will be in the field, in service for many years. The
nature of the business then shifts from supplying the contractor for a scheduled build
programme to supplying either the contractor or the user with spares, perhaps for
twenty years or more. Although volumes are never high, clearly the pattern of
demand changes. The Product Marketing Manager described the market as very
volatile and unpredictable in this respect, and characterised the firm's idealised
approach as 'to minimise up-front work to achieve requirements' to be achieved by
'explicit training and investment to have "match-fit" engineering capability'. The risks
associated with this are heightened by the move away from cost-plus pricing and the
need for 'good bids' - i.e. ones that lead to profitable business - is increasingly
emphasised.
Although the industries served have often been at the forefront of quality systems and
safety and reliability considerations, recent developments have raised the standards to
a great extent and in a relatively short space of time. Against a general background
of more demanding product liability legislation, the industry is, according to the
Product Marketing Manager, much more concerned about the technical demands on
the product and what that means in respect of the legislation. In various ways, risk
awareness is increasing and the potential supplier - Honeywell for example - will
incur more cost `to qualify technically'. Practical manifestations of this include the
much more detailed written specifications and tender documents and extremely
demanding requirements for product traceability. At the time of the research, a major
270
contractor to whom a bid had been made was applying a great deal of pressure in the
latter area in particular and, by the admission of the Product Manager, the necessary
systems were not in place. As the Product Manager commented: 'That would involve
developing a [traceability] system and a product at the same time, and you can't do
that'.
For the reasons outlined above, many AOM markets are becoming increasingly open
to international competition. The main new competitor has traditionally been strong
in industrial and commercial applications, where lower specifications in terms of
durability and protection against environmental attack, compared to AOM, are
normal. Whilst there are markets where the high degree of protection is essential,
there may well be some AOM segments where specifications (and prices) more in
keeping with those of industrial and commercial markets are perfectly acceptable. In
this way then, some Honeywell AOM products may be over-specified and over-
priced.
The future of the AOM market was seen by the Product Marketing Manager as being
in civil aviation, due to the worldwide reduction in defence spending. The products
based on electromechanical technology will give way to silicon-based sensing,
although the US division have invested relatively recently in production facilities for
the electromechanical products.
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5.4 Honeywell Operations - AOM Products
As discussed, the relationships between the various Honeywell divisions and functions
are very complex. So as to avoid unnecessary confusion then, the emphasis here is
on those functions located at Newhouse and those functions located elsewhere with
a specific bearing on AOM business. After a brief overview of the organisation
structure, a number of key business functions will be described in terms both of their
organisation and of their processes. Where relevant, significant changes that have
taken place during the course of the research will also be described.
5.4.1 Organisation Overview
The Scottish Operations are divided along a combination of product and functional
lines. Marketing and design activities are grouped along product lines: thus there are
separate marketing and design departments for Home Controls and Microswitch
respectively. Production and associated functions for all the products come under one
Director of Operations. Support functions - e.g. HRM and Quality Management - for
the whole plant are then grouped under relevant managers. A chart of Scottish
operations is shown in Figure 5.5 and this represents the structure in mid-1992. Under
the Microswitch COE (Centre of Excellence) General Manager then, most activities
are ostensibly organised along functional lines. There is Production Control for all
products, Design Engineering for all products, and so on. Of particular interest here
are the Product Marketing and Design functions. The CoE structure is shown in
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Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6 Microswitch Centre of Excellence Organisation
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Product Marketing is divided according to the product groups Commercial, Industrial
and AOM, with each of these areas headed by a Product Manager. Within the Design
group, the sections involved in product design are the solid state and electro-
mechanical sections. These specialise according to product technology rather than
market. Also located in the same open-plan office, although reporting to
manufacturing support management, are the Manufacturing Systems Engineers
associated with the COE' s products.
5.4.2 Sales
As shown earlier, the three Sales Affiliate groups are:
UK and Northern Europe,
Central and Eastern Europe,
Western Europe, Middle East and Africa.
The extent of coverage varies across territories and so, consequently, does the degree
of specialisation of sales staff. In the UK for example, there are 18 branch offices and
engineers can specialise in particular product/market areas; in Sweden, there are three
offices and hence engineers are required to cover all the product ranges. The
relatively loose formal link between affiliates and manufacturing means that affiliates
are at liberty to buy components from any Honeywell plant worldwide in those cases
where products are made in more than one plant.
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5.4.3 Marketing and Design
These two functions are discussed together here because, for a number of reasons, the
boundaries between them are rather blurred. They constitute the principal activities
of the CoE. The concerns of this project require a more detailed discussion of how
the Product Management and Design groups are organised, how projects are carried
out, as well as further description of the AOM Product Manager's role. These are the
subjects of the next three sections.
5.4.3.1	 Bringing AOM Products to Market - Design and Product
Management Interaction
The conception and development of an entirely new series is carried out by cross
functional teams using a simultaneous engineering approach, according to the
Engineering Manager. These teams involve not only design and marketing but also
procurement, manufacturing and other functions. This had apparently been the
approach for a recent project in the Commercial product group.
As the present research centred on the AOM product group and EN products in
particular, it is the design process for those products that needs to be understood in
some detail. EN products were described by the CoE General Manager as 'mature',
having existed for over 30 years, according to one estimate given. In the opinion of
the General Manager, one of the firm's great failings was, during the 1980's, to
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neglect new product development with the result that, in the early 1990's, the product
range across all the groups is largely comprised of mature products, with 'little
coming through in the way of "Stars". The current preoccupation then is to 'spin out
the life cycles of mature or declining products whilst rapidly bringing on new
technologies'. This applies to AOM products more than any, and the 'spinning out'
of AOM life-cycles results in customising existing products to suit new applications.
The Engineering Manager described the EN products as 'customised beyond
recognition'.
The design process for AOM products then, is typically one of reactive customisation.
It is carried out in a more sequential way, within a matrix structure whose principal
constituents are the design groups specialising by technology (solid state,
electromechanical etc) and the product managers specialising by product type (AOM
etc). Design Engineers' time is allocated to projects by a process of negotiation
between design section supervisors and the Product Managers.
Design work on EN products is invariably initiated by the customer and the
Honeywell affiliate sales engineer, using a 'Sales Project' request. The term 'SP' is
used throughout the firm to identify these projects but it is interesting to note that the
form used is headed 'Sales Project data sheet: modification request'. The Engineering
Manager, who had had responsibility for this design work only since early 1992 (less
than a year before the research work began), explained that, up until then, there
existed a 'Small Changes Group' (including most of the individuals now involved in
design). The scope of this group's work in theory only extended to engineering
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changes that did not affect 'form, fit or function'. Whether this had ever been the
case is difficult to say but, whether in the guise of the Small Changes Group or as a
section of the Engineering Department, the engineers had clearly been accustomed to
changing form, fit and function, often very significantly, for a long time.
5.4.3.2 A.O.M. Sales Projects
Despite the elegant concept of the matrix structure, in reality all AOM products used
electromechanical technology and so all AOM design was done by the
electromechanical section. Furthermore, one long-serving design draughtsman from
the section did all the AOM work. He designed the switches, visited customers,
chased parts, had prototypes made and tested, and released drawings. At the time the
research began, there was concern that, successful as he was in coming up with a
prototype switch that worked, he was something of a law unto himself and by his own
admission, found the prevailing shift toward heavily detailed written specifications,
traceability and documentation rather difficult.
A recent attempt to define the process more systematically had resulted in a flowchart
of which a simplified version is shown in Figure 5.7. The stages shown in bold boxes
were all identified as the responsibility of the one draughtsman. The process begins
with the submission to the Product Manager of the SP Form. An internal report on
SP activity indicated that SPs usually emerge gradually from discussions between
Sales Engineers and customers and that it is difficult to identify when a 'technical
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enquiry' becomes a Sales Project. Furthermore, and for various reasons, the field
sales engineer may delay submission of an SP even though the requirements have
been established. The SP form requires a good deal of information from the sales
engineer. There is 'Field Input', which comprises basic details of the date, customer,
application and technical requirements of the switch. Included in these are sections
asking 'Product Same as. ', ' 	 Except for.... ' , i.e. the form is designed for
modification of existing products. The second main section of the form comprises
'Sales/Business Data'. Included here are projected volumes for the first three years,
target prices for certain volumes, and details of competition. Finally,
'Action/Response Required' indicates what the affiliate wants from the Product
Manager - prices, samples, drawings - and in each case, when.
I Receive SP
Not OK
Yes
'Pass to Engineering I
I 
IPlan Project	 I
Create Concepts
IBuild Samples	 IOK
I 
IDesign Evaluation I
I 
IDesign Release 1
I 
1	 Pilot Build	 I
I 
I	 Close Out	 I
(Some Feedback loops
omitted for clarity)
Figure 5.7 The AOM Sales Project Process
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Given this information (or a small proportion of it, judging by some SPs seen) the
Product Manager has to decide what to do with the SP and allocate resources
accordingly. This stage is indicated on the flowchart as 'filtering', carried out by the
Product Manager and Design Engineering Supervisor. The AOM Product Manager
saw this process of filtering as testing the SP against the following criteria:
Does it fit the strategy?
Is it a customer we want to deal with?
Is it a market we wish to be in?
Is it derived from the catalogue?
It is also necessary to estimate revenues and 'balance' the engineering costs against
the eventual contribution of the product once sales begin. This was conceptualised by
a number of people in terms of a cashflow curve showing negative cashflow as money
is spent on design followed by subsequent positive cashflow as sales take place
(Figure 5.8) The idea of attempting to quantify the design cost was, according to the
Product Manager, a relatively new one ('This hasn't been done before'). Aside from
these more explicit questions, there is also a role for 'gut feel' as to which business
to take on.
Figure 5.8 AOM Sales Project - Notional Cash-flow
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A small study had been carried out on SP activity in recent years. The number of SPs
was relatively small, as shown in Table 5.2. 'Successful' in this instance means that
an order of some sort was placed, although this could mean only a prototype or pre-
production order i.e. there is no information on whether production volumes, as
projected or otherwise, were ordered.
Table 5.2 AOM Sales Projects - Recent Activity Levels
1988 1989 1990
Natter of SPs 57 52 45
Number successful 23 23 16
.% strcessful 40% 44% 36%
The action required as a result of the SPs varies: it could be only a verbal quotation
or concept drawing or it could be a firm price, design of tooling and supply of
prototypes. The study showed that in 1990, response to SPs - in the form of an initial
drawing - was achieved as follows:
65% within 4 weeks of SP
95% within 6 weeks of SP
Prototypes were 'typically' delivered 6-8 months after the final technical offer.
The Purchasing Agent most involved at this stage of AOM SPs confirmed that a quick
response at the outset was necessary to be able to give a quoted price. He contrasted
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this with subsequent delays - 'The project may then lie dormant for a year or more'.
The AOM Product Manager went further than this, commenting that there are some
big investments before any orders are placed and that the lag (between design and
orders) may be years. Citing a recent example, he recalled how tight the time
pressures had been and that, as a result, risks had been heightened by 'cutting corners
on the estimating'. Summing the situation up, he commented that 'all the risks are at
Newhouse' - by implication suggesting that none of the risks are with the sales
affiliates.
Another source of risk is that the financial 'balance' referred to earlier hinges on the
sales volume over which one-off design and tooling costs may be amortised. In a
business where any one product may sell only a few hundred units ever (and many
of those over ten years into the future), a subsequent adjustment in volumes may make
the difference between profit and loss for the project overall. Having made this
comment however, the AOM Product Manager also pointed out that there is no
information system by which an individual SP and sales subsequently resulting from
it could be linked.
5.4.3.3 The Role of the Product Manager
The AOM Product Manager described himself as a link or 'window' between
Newhouse and European and US Marketing. His principal concerns are, in his own
terms, monitoring the Newhouse AOM business, in terms of volumes, revenues and
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contributions, as well as monitoring revenues resulting from various markets. In doing
this, he noted the fundamental importance of transfer pricing and the high degree to
which this is a matter of internal politics.
The Sales force in the UK included five or six dedicated to AOM sales, all of whom
were from an engineering background. In each of the other European affiliates, one
or two salespeople dealt in AOM products, sometimes exclusively, sometimes in
combination with other product groups. He was keen to emphasise the technical nature
of the products and markets (he himself was formerly a design engineer). Based at
Newhouse, his estimate was that 20% of his time was spent 'on the road' - making
/
affiliate and customer visits. These would be variously associated with development
of target accounts and assisting with sales projects, potential or actual.
Turning to the activities at Newhouse, he described himself as sometimes feeling like
a 'super-expediter'. As first point of contact for customers and sales affiliates for
anything to do with AOM products, enquiries were wide-ranging. As described,
during the course of the research, key design staff were made redundant and, as a
result of this, the Product management role was increasingly drawn into detailed
technical issues. Although some contract design staff were subsequently employed,
these lacked the product knowledge required to work independently and had to seek
technical advice from various sources, principally the Product Manager. Previously,
there had been a weekly AOM Meeting, involving various functions, but this had
lapsed. There was, as the research drew to a close, talk of reinstating these meetings.
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Contrasting his position with that of his opposite number in the USA, he pointed out
that in respect of product variety, whereas in the USA the problem is one of
managing 1200 parts going into 250 end-products, here it is 1300 parts going into 700
end-products.
A recurring theme of discussions was the lack of information systems: 'We need a
forum'; 'There's no summary information at a meaningful level [of detail]' ; 'an
information system is needed whereby all the detail is condensed into a brief
chronology and the main business issues on one sheet of paper'. Then, commenting
on a particularly problematic SP: 'We don't have a forum. There's a ten-minute
meeting where people agree "we must do better" and then everyone goes away and
does it again'. Other systems were also felt to be a weakness, for example procedures
for tracing materials and components back to source. A current example was a project
for a large UK contractor to whom it had been necessary for Honeywell to send their
Sales Director, Engineering Manager and Control Components General Manager in
an attempt to convince the contractor that Honeywell could assure quality. The
Product Manager's reaction to the rapid systems development this implied was 'We
can be 10 or even 20% smarter, but not 300%'.
This kind of pressure to improve systems had come at a time when the design
engineering resource had been removed and so, just when there was a greater need
to step back from day-to-day technical details and work on systems improvement, he
had more detailed demands placed on him. In addition to that, a restructuring in
January 1993 saw the AOM Business become separated from the other components
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businesses at a higher level i.e. rather than reporting to a Components Product
Marketing Manager , the Product Managers for each product group reported to a
business unit manager specific to the product group. The AOM business unit manager
was located in Brussels, leaving the AOM Product Manager in Newhouse with less
assistance from 'below' in the form of technical design assistance, and without (local)
support from 'above' in the form of a Marketing Manager.
At June 1993, the Product Manager summed up his position as 'trying to cover many
markets and many products'. Contract design staff were being brought in, funded by
the customer, but only once the order was placed. As already discussed, there is a
good deal of work to be done before an order is placed, and the original design study
is 'done by scurrying around for whatever staff are available' and, by virtue of being
done under these circumstances, may expose Honeywell to problems later on. There
is also little prospect of continuity between study and final design if different staff are
involved at each stage.
Another notable concern is the respective role of the US and European plants and
organisations. The European and US markets for EN products are broadly the same
as each other in terms of volume and revenue. However, the production volumes at
the US plant are around 150 000 units per annum, or about ten times those of
Newhouse. This results in lower unit costs to the USA and hence, as the Product
manager noted in an internal memo in 'European affiliates tend to direct their "general
sales" EN business straight to [the USA] ' .
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There is a note of envy in the description of the US AOM business, where
Manufacturing, Marketing and Sales all report to one business unit manager and 'the
strategies are all lined up .... it's one big machine'. Salespeople in the US concentrate
on particular lines of business within AOM, compared to the UK where salespeople
cover all of AOM, or in some parts of continental Europe where salespeople try to
cover all product groups - AOM, Industrial and Commercial.
This contrasts with the 'fragmented' organisation in Europe, where affiliates are able
to 'play off' UK and US factories against one another. The affiliates want 'faster
response, lower prices, new products' whilst the factory wants 'more business (of the
business we want), standard products and forecasting'.
5.4.4 Manufacturing and Procurement
This section adds more detail to the description of Newhouse Operations. Beginning
with a brief overview of the organisation, it then places the Newhouse manufacturing
plant into the context of the broader supply network. The Newhouse manufacturing
activities are then described and their performance reviewed.
5.4.4.1 Organisation and Overview
The organisation of Manufacturing at Newhouse is shown in Figure 5.9. The structure
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is quite 'flat', with the managers reporting to the Operations Director and their own
,
immediate subordinates being cell-leaders. Most managers have responsibilities
delineated on a product rather than process basis.
Production Production Production Production
Manager Manager Manager Manager
Industrial AOM Basics& Home Controls
Commercial
Materials	 Faci ities	 Production	 Pro • uction	 Production
Control	 Manager
	 Manager	 Manager	 Nanager
Manager
	 Proximity	 Solid State	 SpecialProjects
Figure 5.9 Newhouse Manufacturing Organisation
Procurement involves two main sections. One deals with strategic procurement, which
involves identifying sources for new components. The buyers here (six at the time)
are allocated particular product groups. The other group takes over once suppliers are
identified and conditions have been agreed and are responsible for scheduling and day-
to-day planning and control of supply. These buyers (nine at the time) specialise
according to commodity type, so whereas one strategic purchasing agent will be
involved in a new product at the outset, the routine supply of materials once the
product is established is divided between a number of buyers.
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5.4.4.2 EN Parts Sourcing
As previously related, there has been a concerted move to sub-contract 'non-primary'
processes - die-casting, plating and many machining processes - and so the role of
procurement has become more significant. This has been carried out under the
'Supply-chain optimisation' initiative. More specifically, EN switches consist of 75%
bought-in parts, according to the AOM strategic procurement agent. Cross-checking
this with a report on orders and inventory current at the time, of the 1149 EN
components listed at the time, 880 were indicated as being 'bought' rather than made -
77 % .
For many classes of products, particularly the 'basics' that form the core of the
control component assembly - the finished EN switch, say - the majority of parts are
bought in, and the majority of these bought from Honeywell in the US. This is
important because Honeywell US are, in effect, custodians of the technology that
gives the switches their functionality, and are also suppliers of the high-price parts to
Newhouse. Parts bought in locally in the UK tend to be lower-value items such as
fasteners and cables. The US plant thus plays at least two roles: one as competitor
with the Newhouse plant when European affiliates are looking for a source for EN
and other AOM products; secondly, as a supplier to Newhouse of a large proportion
of parts for EN switches assembled at Newhouse, as shown in Figure 5.10. In the
first role, the AOM Product Manager has pointed out the significant disadvantage
Newhouse has compared to its US sister plant, both in material cost and assembly
cost. One comparison of costs for production of a well-established EN product has the
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US cost at 53% of the Newhouse cost. Aggregate volumes are very different: 10 000
per year at Newhouse compared to 150 000 per year in the USA.
Figure 5.10 The Newhouse-USA Relationship
Again, emphasising the organisational difference between the USA and Europe, the
AOM Product Manager commented that EN products are 'pushed by the US operation
- they have a coordinated marketing strategy'. He also contrasted the US operation's
relatively limited involvement in highly customised products with the situation in
Europe, where there is high variety due to a 'fragmented' market.
5.4.4.2 Newhouse Manufacturing Processes
Having put the Newhouse EN operation into context relative to the rest of the EN
activity, it is now useful to look in more detail at the manufacturing process, in
particular assembly, relating to EN products. The AOM and, within them, EN
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products are a small part of the range made at Newhouse. Section 5.5 will go into
some detail about the products, but for the time being the key issues are that
AOM/EN products are low-volume, high variety and mostly high value compared to
the rest of the products.
There are two stages in the production of an EN switch, as shown in the simple
process flowchart, Figure 5.11. First, the 'basic' switch is made. This is then
incorporated into a housing and the relevant connectors and other accessories are
added. The first stage is common to other types of switch and is carried out in an area
of the plant dedicated to it.
Basic EN	 Final EN Assembly
Prepare
	 ii• Spot-weld
Figure 5.11 Simplified Process Flowchart - EN Switches
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The Basics area produces about 10 000 basic switches per week, for use in AOM and
industrial final products. It will be clear from this that only a small proportion of
these are eventually used in AOM products (average 200 units per week). Although
they are produced in the same area using similar processes, the basics for AOM are
specific to AOM i.e. one basic is never used for both AOM and industrial switches.
Basics are put into stores and withdrawn for 'kitting' when a batch of final switch
products is to be made. The final assembly of AOM products is carried out in an area
of the plant, and by operators, dedicated to AOM products, and it is these who build
the 'kits' of components from the stores items. A simple factory layout diagram is
shown in Figure 15.12. It shows that the AOM Assembly area is self-contained and
separate from the basics area. Apparently, there had been an initiative to move all
'small-to-medium batch' products to one area of the factory, but AOM was, in the
event, the only one to actually be relocated. During the research, there was a move
toward decentralised stores and the direct delivery by vendors of some parts direct to
the point of use.
The processes are documented by Honeywell in process flow-charts and detailed job
instructions. Confidentiality does not permit the inclusion of these in this account. All
the processes are carried out using hand tools and small bench-size machines e.g.
welding and epoxy sealing equipment. Based on these flowcharts, production of a
typical basic switch involves 26 separate operations; subsequent assembly into an EN
switch involves a further 51 operations.
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Figure 5.12 Newhouse Plant Layout
Figure 5.13 AOM Section Layout
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The AOM area is organised on a product basis: there are distinct areas for EN, SE,
TL/TW and 'AOM Specials' respectively (see Figure 5.13). Within the EN area, for
example, there is a loose process layout, with soldering benches, ovens and
sandblasting equipment grouped together. Switches will pass through a number of
workstations. The process instructions stress the frequent requirement to correctly
orient parts in the assembly, and to use the correct temperature and time for heat-
treatment operations. Although thoroughly documented then, the conformance quality
of these processes depends on the skill and diligence of the operators in their
execution.
The constant novelty of products that arose due to the frequent requirements for
customisation and the long gaps between orders, even for established products, posed
particular problems. According to the AOM Production Manager: 'Most assembly
jobs are being done for the first time, so there isn't the luxury of a trial build'. This
makes demands on manufacturing and design engineers.
Parts shortages presented a major problem. The Production Manager felt that the
biggest problem was with purchased parts rather than those produced at Newhouse.
Other departments supplying AOM Assembly 'know the importance of [delivering on
timer but 'bought-in items take their place in the queue'. This made scheduling and
capacity management difficult: for example, at the time of one visit, only three
operators had been scheduled on the section, but were having to work overtime to
cope with a peak in workload resulting from the sudden arrival of a delayed order of
bought-in components.
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5.4.5 Delivery Performance
The issue above all that had drawn management attention to the AOM products was
poor delivery performance. According to the Production Manager, AOM delivery
overdues were 'off the chart'. Analysis of the current order status indicates delivery
problems among many products, not just the AOM ones. The reports available
quantify delivery performance in a bewildering variety of ways: by number of lines
(products), number of units, sales value and transfer value against requested delivery,
promised delivery and normal leadtime. (The report contains so many different
measures for each of 22 product groups that the Production Control Manager
produces his own report on a simple spreadsheet, summarising trends using one
measure for each group.) Despite the thoroughness of quantification, the performance
is still a problem. At the time of the research, the value of EN overdues to promise
constituted 20% of the total value for all components. From another source of data,
it appeared that 47% of the works orders live at the time (July 1992) were overdue
to customer request.
Requested delivery speeds were very variable, ranging from a few days to over a
year. (The data were extracted from a computer order-status system that covered all
the products in the plant, from one-off ENs to 1 million-off commercial switches, and
the credibility of some data was questionable. However, it was the best available, both
for this research and for plant production control purposes.) Figure 5.14 shows the
profile of requested leadtimes for orders live at July 1992. Most are quite short - up
to three months - but a considerable peak occurs at one year. This is due to the way
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the system is circumvented to indicate blanket 'call-off' arrangements. There are,
however, leadtimes across the range.
Figure 5.14 Requested Leadtime Profile - EN Switches
5.5.5 Products
Turning now to the concern of this research with product-range management and
customisation, this section will describe and quantify the main product groups in the
Control Components business, with particular emphasis being given to the AOM
products. A later section will expand on the issue of customisation.
5.5.5.1 The Three Product Groups: Volumes, Variety and Revenue
The three main product groupings were characterised early on in the research as in
Table 5.3. The CoE General Manager summarised the product range as comprising
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Product Grow	 Typical Price	 Typical Amual Volume
Commercial	 <£1	 millions
Industrial	 E5-£10	 100000+
AOM	 £50-£100	 10 000 - 20 000
around 10 000 unique products in '50 to 80 product "families", depending on who
you ask'. Here, AOM products, will be compared with other products.
Table 5.3 The Product Groups - Prices and Volumes
For AOM products as a whole, the volume trends are as shown in Table 5.4. Data
for EN switches for ten years are in Table 5.5 and, graphically, in Figure 5.16.
Table 5.4 AOM Products - Volume Trends
Product 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
EN 13 912 13 445 15 814 14 441 10 246
SE 93 200 127 800 176 626 147615 83 248
11/TW 82 226 75 775 51 493 42 513 36 481
38AS 39
,
1 338 2 183 1 263 112
AF 610 246 494 473 193
99PB 541
_
1029 621 295 706
Gear Sel 137 226 169 145 135.
Panels 10 94
Table 5.5 EN Switches - Volume Trends
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
EN Vcittne
(1)00s)
8 9 14 12 11 13 14 14 13 16 14 10
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Figure 5.16 EN Switch Volume Trend (Newhouse manufacture)
As at mid 1992, the Newhouse EN production for the previous 12 months was 10 196
units with a sales value of £ 815 000. 212 different products were listed, with 132 of
these having been produced in the year. A profile of annual volumes per product is
shown in Figure 5.17. The year's production for the highest volume item is 586 units.
Figure 5.17 Volume/Variety Profile - EN Switches
296
From these graphs, it is possible to confirm that volumes are declining in practically
all groups, and the annual EN volumes are as previously estimated from other
sources. Although complete comparative data for other product groups were not
collected, the other extreme in terms of volumes is the Commercial group, where
individual products can have annual volumes of 100 000 - 500 000. (e.g. V5 products
- 234 items (same as EN) and unit costs of 20p.)
As at May 1992, orders worth a total of £4m were promised. Some significant
constituents of this are shown in Table 5.6., which again points up the different nature
of the three groups: with the number of lines of similar order, and each making
around 10% contribution to the value of the then-current order-book, the volumes
involved in each case are orders of magnitude different - thousands, tens of thousands
and millions respectively. In terms of units actually shipped during a week, there is
a similar story, told in Table 5.7. These confirm that AOM/EN is a very different
business and also a very important one in terms of revenue.
Table 5.6 Volume, Variety and Value - May 1992 Order-book
Series Product- Unes Urits Value % of
Group (£000) total
value
EN AOM 249
,
3 691 330 8.2
CE Industrial 339 32 000 280 6.9
V5 Commercial 282 2 400 000 466 11.5
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Table 5. 7 Volume, Variety and Value - One Week in May 1992
Series Product-
Group
Unes Units Value
(E)
Units/
line
EN AOM 27 167 11 000 6
CE Industrial 62 2 415 28 000 400
V5 Commercial 11 105 000 28 000 10 000
5.5.2 Product-Range Structure and Reporting
It is instructive, within such a complicated product-range, to look at the ways in
which the various departments and individuals divide up the products, for various
reasons.
The three-way split initially articulated by the CoE management (AOM, Industrial,
Commercial) is reflected in the structure of the marketing group - there were product
managers for each of the groups. This is also reflected in the level at which product
marketing/technology strategy is articulated.
In the plant, production management responsibilities are divided up along a mixture
of product and functional lines (see Figure 5.9 earlier). Although there are production
managers with technology- rather than product-focused briefs (e.g. 'solid state') there
is a production manager for each of the main product-groups.
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Table 5.8 Strategy, Product Management and Production Management Grouping
Strategy Doctrrent Product Management Production Management
AOM AOM AOM
Industrial Industrial Industrial
Commercial Commercial Commercial
Various Technology-based
The information systems divide the products up in a variety of inconsistent ways.
Reporting of delivery performance is done at a higher level of detail in what are
termed 'forecast groups'. There are 22 of these covering the Components business;
AOM finished products are divided into 7 forecast groups. Product management
provided sales data at a similar level of aggregation, but the groupings are not
identical to the 'forecast groups' in every case. The Catalogue for AOM products
breaks products down into series, some of which map directly onto the 'forecast
groups'. The stock status reporting system uses yet another level of and basis for
aggregation. These are all summarised in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9 Grouping of AOM Products for Information Purposes
Delivery
Peiforrnance
Product
Management
Intimation
Catalogue Stock Status Report
7 Forecast Groups
_
9 groups 13 series 4 major groups
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Although the management is reasonably well 'lined-up' behind the product groupings,
the information systems do not enable any consistent trail to be followed through at
more detailed levels.
5.5.3 AOM Product Variety
Within these various aggregated groups exist unique products, and that is the level to
be considered now, within the framework of the product catalogue for AOM. First,
the variety as described by the catalogue will be quantified as far as possible.
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Secondly, the actual variety apparent from recent business will be quantified and
compared with the range given in the catalogue. This is summarised for the series as
set out in the catalogue in Table 5.10, from which it is clear that there is a very
inconsistent relationship between the catalogue listing and the variety in production.
The degree of precision with which the catalogue states the number of options varies
from one extreme to the other: for series 991 it is 'this range of three pushbutton
switches'; for panels it is a general statement of the firm's ability to 'design, develop
and manufacture complete switch panels'; in between there are more or less
exhaustive listings of specification options that can be combined to give a finite
number of switches. In most cases, these finite possibilities are added to by means of
general footnotes such as 'a wide range of standard housings, mountings and
customised designs for specialised applications are available, on request'.
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Table 5.10 AOM Series - Apparent and Actual Variety
Catalogue Series Variety Apparent from
Catalogue
Actual Variety"'
SE 3 switches
6 auxiliary actuators
XE 10 switches
2 auxiliary actuators
38 AS 5 switches
9 EN design your own -
est. 60 000 permutations
35 listed, 17 active in current
year
401 EN 4 models given 4
402 EN 4 models given, with
'alternatives available'
16 documented, 6 active in 2
years
AS 2 models given 27 documented, 9 active in 2
years
TL approx 300 options possible Inventory report has total of
188 TL & TVV lines active
TW approx 350 options possible
901AF/902 AF 3 models given ?
991 'This range of three..' 20 different models active
Gear Selectors Vague 9 different models active
Panels lAb will do anything ?
** Note:Actual variety based on available recent production history, using various documents
5.5.4 Customisation
The previous section has detailed the way in which, via the catalogue at least, the
AOM range is presented to the customer. Customers will request customised products
when what they want is not available as a standard product 'from the catalogue' and
they are willing to pay the higher price of a customised switch. The extent to which
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customers are driven to consider customised products will be determined by the
coverage of the standard range - the greater the coverage, the less need there will be
for customisation.
There are a number of pressures, discussed earlier, that make customers increasingly
likely to ask for customised switches. The basic product is old now, and customers
wishing to achieve extra performance can only do so by moving away from it. Also,
the increasing tendency to design the switch around the product rather than vice versa
often leaves the customer little choice but to specify customised switches. Finally, the
increasing competition amongst switch suppliers has implications in the following
ways:
a) suppliers unwilling to customise products won't get the business
b) suppliers may seek out customised switch business deliberately, on the
assumption that, where heightened competition exists, the entry barrier
will be stronger where customised rather than standard products are
being supplied. (One Honeywell manager claimed this to have been the
rationale for the firm's policy in recent years).
Whether producing customised products because of the irresistible market forces or
as part of a deliberate strategy to keep competition out, it seems essential to know
when and how customisation is taking place.
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However, all attempts to identify categorically which EN (this discussion will be
confined to EN switches for now) switches were 'standard' and which were 'special'
proved unsuccessful. A few could be identified as standard - they were the original
basic products, as produced in volume for many years, some in the USA as well as
the UK.. Some 9EN (European) products were deemed to be standard because they
were built up from the options offered in the catalogue.
This is where another problem arose. Because the product part number of this type
of switch can be analysed to determine the product specification, this enabled
customers to re-source switches easily, both from firms other than Honeywell and
from the USA rather than UK (this is another way in which affiliates may 'shop
around'). Furthermore, there is a growing trade in counterfeit spares for aircraft and
a part number that is essentially shorthand for a product specification is helpful to a
potential counterfeiter. Therefore, for some years there has been a policy of assigning
any new product variants a different type of part number, which an entirely non-
signifying set of alphanumerics. This unfortunately applies to any product, whether
a 'standard' one that hasn't been produced before (not unlikely, bearing in mind that
there are 60 000 possible permutations for the 9EN series) or a heavily-customised
one. From the part-number then, it is no longer possible to determine the degree of
customisation involved and hence not possible to quantify the proportion of customised
versus standard products in aggregate terms. (91 of these were listed, of which 59
were in production in the current year).
The number of live EN projects is very small compared to the possible number of
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permutations of the catalogue options. Even requests for new combinations of these
was treated as considerable novelties. Each project then, had a distinct history and,
as such, it is instructive to examine a few contracts in more detail. The following
section does this.
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5.6 Contract Chronologies
This section gives summary chronologies of three contracts - SPs - that had recently
been designed and had reached various stages of manufacture. These relatively
digestible summaries have been derived from examination of every piece of
documentary evidence available in the file for the SP concerned and from discussions
with engineering, product management, manufacturing and other staff.
There were several reasons for studying these contracts. First of all, studying specific
contracts improves and tests understanding of the general principles and systems used.
Secondly, it helps to determine (to some extent) the patterns of communication, the
timing of and responsibility for various activities and the apparent competitive issues
and basis for decision-making. It may also be possible to identify some ways in which
customisation projects go beyond the capabilities of the firm, where that is the case.
The contracts were chosen in consultation with the AOM Product Manager. Whilst
there had been willingness to discuss general issues very freely, there was much more
reluctance to give access to individual contract details. The reasons for this are not
clear. There may have been a natural reluctance to be subjected to scrutiny,
particularly bearing in mind the prevailing threat of redundancies; there was a (to
some extent justified) concern that specific technical details would hinder the
understanding of the documents; there was also some embarrassment at the state of
the 'filing system' of the by-then-departed design engineer. Nonetheless, once these
had been overcome, free access was given to whatever it was possible to find.
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The contracts chosen were two SPs for ENs that were considered 'fairly typical' and
one SP for AOM control panels that, whilst straying outside the firm's remit for the
project of EN products, had been raised a number of times in conversation as an
example of how customisation had caused great problems.
5.6.1 Two Customised ENs for a North European Sales Affiliate
This contract history, although relatively uncomplicated, nonetheless shows a number
of the features supposed to be typical of the AOM/EN business.
It is protracted. So far as can be established, from an initial request in November
1991 it took 15 months for the first production parts to be shipped, and the OEM
phase is scheduled to go on until the end of 1995.
Projected volumes are small and firm orders placed are even smaller. From initial
projections of 150-200 units in total, orders for the initial build period are for less
than 100 units in total, called off in ten separate lots over a period well in excess of
eighteen months.
It takes place in the context of a relationship involving the sale of other products,
possibly including non-AOM.
Design resources were a very significant constraint. The project stopped dead until
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threats and managerial intervention were used to secure designers' time. Part of the
threat used both by the Sales Engineer against marketing and by the Product Manager
against the Engineering Manager was 'going to Honeywell US'. The US operation
was portrayed as the fast-acting outfit who would do it quicker and cheaper (although
there is presumably some reason other than charity for the sales engineer to tolerate
such delays from Newhouse).
Delivery of drawings, quotes and samples were pushed back, delayed and missed on
a number of occasions. The project limped from crisis to crisis.
Due to various of the above factors, the project absorbed considerable management
time.
The Design Engineer was the usual point of contact for the Sales Engineer.
There is no evidence of any business evaluation of the project to assess whether it is
worth doing either in itself or in the context of the relationship with the customer.
Notably, it is the Design engineer who is obtaining costings from the Accounts
department and who communicates these and the transfer prices to the Sales Engineer.
It is the Product Manager who communicates the 'commercial offer', with Transfer
prices drastically reduced, four months after the Design Engineer's costing and pricing
has been sent. Although an estimate is made of the design costs (£9500), no
assessment is recorded of the overall viability of the project. A rough estimate made
as part of the research of net cash inflow for the firm orders received (disregarding
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time value of money) has estimated design costs at five times the 'profit' based on
transfer prices (U877) i.e. the project loses money overall. Bearing in mind the
extended nature of the delivery pattern, the situation will be considerably worse than
this in that some of the cash in-flows will be several years after the outlays, certainly
for the initial design work and, depending on the approach adopted to producing
requirements of three off at a time, possibly for some of the production.
5.6.2 Contract 2 - An SP for Customised ENs for a UK Sales Affiliate
This contract involved a UK sales affiliate and a customer in the railway rolling-stock
industry.
On July 3rd 1992, the SP was submitted. It was completed fairly comprehensively and
outlined the technical details, describing the switch needed as 'same as.. .except for...'
an existing EN product, the variations including special contacts, leadwires and a
particular operating force. The volume projection was only made for year 1 and was
50 units. Immediate action required was a firm price, a drawing, and a 'statement of
intent to proceed' within 2 weeks. A target price was specified.
On that day, the AOM Product Manager replied to the Sales Affiliate, saying that he
would raise the SP at an imminent meeting but adding
'whether a [specific switch type] is appropriate the projected revenue
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stream (£4k sales per annum) is poor and cannot support the required
engineering. On this basis we must close out [reject] the SP'
A week or so later, the Sales affiliate responded, expressing 'disappointment':
'I thought railways were a market of interest to us and that the product
I needed was a combination of existing parts in a new variation. The
option of using a [switch type] seemed simple and straightforward - a
question of knocking up a drawing and doing a production release...'
Further on he added:
'[Honeywell USA] have agreed to respond to an SP for 50 pieces of
the part I want (a pleasant surprise).'
There is no record of anything else until October 15th, when the sales affiliate tried
again, writing to the Product Manager (and sending copies to senior Sales and Product
management):
'..you mentioned you wouldn't be prepared to do it [the SP] due to the
small revenue resulting from it
	 I need you to support me for the
greater Honeywell cause. To Sales, [customer] is a key major potential
account....I am close to securing a £290k contract with [customer] for
[other products]...I am trying to promote us as a company who can
309
supply all their switch and sensor needs, I don't want competitors
getting any visibility in the account. ....the target price., is also quite
generous, I believe... .Please review this.. .this is an immediate
requirement.'
A flurry of activity ensued in late October and early November. The Design
Draughtsman specialising in AOM asked Honeywell USA to give a price for the basic
switches to go into the finished switch, and Newhouse strategic procurement to give
prices for other necessary bought-in parts. The USA response was that, because of
the unusual operating force, special tooling would be needed, which could not be
justified for 50 units. Newhouse replied, asking what the tooling cost was. The USA
quotation came on November 12th. On November 13th, the Product Manager replied
to the USA, complaining of the large mark-up and asking them 'to advise whether
calcs are correct...we are under considerable pricing pressure and need as much help
from [Honeywell USA] as possible.' On the same day a bill of materials was made
out, and on 16th November, a commercial offer was made by the Product Manager
to the Sales Affiliate - for 50 units in one shipment - and promising drawings by
November 20th.
Nothing else is recorded until 29th March 1993. The switch has been given a new-
style meaningless part-number. The customer is about to order and has made enquiries
of the sales affiliate over changes to the details of the design: '..a response is required
V. URGENTLY.' The Design Engineer agreed to do changes on 8th April. On 20th
April, the products were ordered, and on 30th April, the design was formally
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released. On 4th May, the procurement agent received quotes for parts 'all 8-11
weeks delivery'. The switches were eventually shipped on 12th July, a year after the
SP was first written.
5.6.3 Contract 3 - An SP for Two Customised Control Panels for a UK Sales
Affiliate
The product involved here is not a simple AOM switch, but two panels, each
involving a number of the simplest of the AOM switches. The documentation on this
contract was very extensive, so even a summary of the main events in the chronology
would be excessive. A very broad summary of the contract will be given instead.
The prices of the panels were of the order of £600-£700 each, and the total cost of
the switches contained in each was about £30. Each assembly involved 30-40
components, of which six or seven were the switches. The costings carried out using
the standard costing system generally applied throughout the plant indicated that
labour costs for the manufacture of the switches themselves totalled £4 for the whole
panel. A further labour cost for final assembly was indicated as being approximately
£30 , including overheads.
The project goes back at least as far as November 1989, when the Product Manager
was able to tell the Design Draughtsman that he intended to quote prices for the
panels, for '135 off of each starting September 1990'. During the next few months,
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there appears to have been parts shortages, even for the small quantities required for
prototypes. Again, 'the longest leadtime part is [from] Honeywell USA' ; a great deal
of effort (on the part of the Product Manager) went into identifying sources for new
components - 13 suppliers were identified in the earliest parts listings of March 1990.
The prototypes and early production quantities were built but problems arose in
testing at the customer's premises. The panel was 'put on hold' in April 1990,
although 50 had been made and would require reworking to overcome the test
problem. The customer then added to the problem by making other late design
changes, at the same time applying pressure for prompt delivery.
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Honeywell found that they needed more rigorous in-house testing than anticipated and
so had to sub-contract this supplementary testing, at a cost of several thousand
pounds. Delivery problems then became more high-profile and there was a succession
of meetings over the next few months. Records show that shipments began on 19th
September 1990 and continued in small quantities - usually between two and seven at
a time - right up until the data were collected in March 1993. But over much of that
time, there was a succession of quality problems and ever-increasing test requirements
that saw many of the units being returned, and many design changes. Parts shortages
plagued production and there were repeated attempts by various people to clarify just
how many acceptable units, to the most up-to date specification, had actually been
sent to the customer. In June 1991, further subcontract testing was required, at a cost
of £20 000. A price increase was negotiated in February 1992, followed swiftly by
a change of part-number for one of the now-drastically-revised products .More test
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failures occurred in April 1992 and more late deliveries were evident in May 1992;
20-30 units were reworked to bring them up to the latest specification. In June 1992,
it was found that a batch had been made with one of the switches upside-down. And
so the rework continued and the customer was short of panels to the correct
specification.
The production of the switch had involved a new range of skills in wire harness fitting
and this had presented a challenge to the operators, who spoke with wry smiles about
the jigs and aide-memoires they had made to help them with the assembly. The large
number of parts, from a variety of sources, also presented difficulties. A number of
the test failures were due to misunderstandings about the properties and application
of the bought-in components and the systemic effect of combining them. The
complexity of the build, with a BOM of effectively four or five levels, was something
entirely new to everyone concerned. The Production Planning Manager doubted
whether the BOM was right, even in early 1993! And the Product Manager rued not
having drawn up a 'family tree of which parts go into which panel' right from the
start. In 1992 he described the contract as 'a bad scene.. .We never want to do
anything like this again....It's tin-bashing really'.
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5.7 Case Analysis
This section concentrates on the analysis of those issues that emerge particularly
strongly from this case. Issues relating to more than one case are covered in the
Chapter 8.
5.7.1 Explicit Business Strategy
Honeywell's Control Components business had the most comprehensively documented
strategy of any of the business units examined in this research. However, nowhere
was the term 'manufacturing strategy' used, at least not on paper. The only reference
made was at an early interview with the Microswitch CoE General Manager, who
commented that Honeywell were 'good at World Class Manufacturing, good at
manufacturing strategy, but not so good at linking the two together'.
The written Control Components Strategy is clearly informed by the BCG Growth-
share matrix (Henderson, 1970; 1973), notably in the way it takes a product portfolio
approach to dividing up the business into Industrial, Commercial and AOM
product/market sectors or business units, and in the use, in strategic summaries, of
such language as 'invest to hold and maintain'. These divisions into business units are
also used for the assessment of the firm's market share and position relative to main
competitors.
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Although somewhat inconsistent or opportunistic, the strategy documents do
discriminate between the product groups in respect of marketing and, to some extent,
technology strategies. For example, in the Commercial product group there is an
explicit intent to penetrate the market by 'focusing' on global OEMs; in each product
group, particular switch types or technologies are identified for cost reduction or
development. There is also some attempt to draw linkages between marketing and
technology strategies e.g. the intent to use the appliance market within the
Commercial product group as a vehicle for the development of solid-state technology.
Despite the simple division of the business into three product groups in most
documents and conversations, there is evidence, both from the original Control
Components Strategy document and, increasingly strongly from later developments
(after the research period proper) of tension between business units and strategies
aligned on markets and those aligned on technologies. This was present in the early
characterisation of the Newhouse 'mission' as being based on electromechanical
products, rather than on any of the product market segments such as Industrial or
AOM. Closer to the time of writing, the situation had evolved to the extent that the
Control Components Business had the following 'product sales groups':
Industrial
Optoelectronics
Commercial
AOM (ATOM)
Fluid Controls
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Thus the original three customer-based and largely mutually exclusive product groups
have been supplemented by one based on a particular technology and one on a
particular control situation. This is perhaps a result of the attempt to build the business
by using applications as vehicles to develop technologies, rather than by simply trying
to develop new products in the same product/market groups. (It is of interest to note
that the Strategy document states that '80% of the product portfolio in mature/ageing
markets' (emphasis added) rather than, as might be expected, '80% of the products
are mature'.) This mixture of customer-based and technology-based separation of
activities is also evident in the organisation of manufacturing operations, e.g. one
manager for AOM production (customer basis), another for solid-state (technology
basis).
This arguably represents the emergence to the surface of a way of thinking of the
business that was at work, although less visibly, beneath the neat veneer of 'We have
three product/market businesses'. Honeywell is a technology-based firm, currently
going through a belated effort to rapidly update its products. After years of managing
its 'product portfolio' in a relatively benign business climate it has undertaken a
radical revision of what it does as a firm, as evidenced by the move to subcontract
many of the processes formerly carried out at Newhouse. This, and the newly-
emerging divisions of activities on lines other than product/market, is a response both
appropriate to the situation in which the firm finds itself regarding the maturity of
most of its products (or markets - see above) and in keeping with current trends in
strategic management i.e. the core competence approach (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel,
1990). The establishment of a fluid controls group is in keeping with the core
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competence approach of developing underlying know-how that is applicable to a
number of (possibly ephemeral) product-markets (De Leo, 1994) .
This may be a highly appropriate strategic shift, but Honeywell must be clear that it
is happening and not mix the approaches without caution. A renewed interest in
developing new technologies and competences will accelerate the replacement of an
ageing product range, but should not be allowed to obscure the business differences
between the markets to which products are eventually brought. This has particular
implications for manufacturing strategy, which is discussed further below.
5.7.2 International Organisation Issues
Also relating to the level at which strategy is defined is the involvement of the
Honeywell USA EN operation. Whilst the Newhouse business is ostensibly
autonomous and able to define and implement its strategy for the EN business as it
sees fit, in reality the US operation looms large. Although the account of the USA
operation given by the Newhouse staff may be based on a somewhat rose-tinted view,
it seems uncontentious that it is a high-volume and relatively low variety activity
which operates at much lower unit costs and has much closer control over its sales
and distribution channels. The Product Manager sums this up as follows: 'the
strategies are all lined up.. .it's one big machine' - as compared to the 'fragmented'
European situation, where the situation is closer to market than to hierarchy (Thorelli,
1986). Whereas the US operation seems to have staked out a clear competitive
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position for itself, the Newhouse EN manufacturing operation falls into what Hill
(1993: 61) might term a strategic vacuum, created by the lack of control over sales
and the by comparison much stronger and clearer competitive position of the US
operation, in its roles as both competitor and supplier to Newhouse.
Many of the basic switches that provide the functionality of Newhouse-assembled EN
products are supplied by the USA. With the apparent corporate shift away from a
product/market emphasis toward a renewed interest in technology and product-
technology-based competences, and noting that the US operation is still investing in
its electromechanical switch manufacture, Newhouse's role as local customiser-and-
assembler-to-order looks likely to continue. Furthermore, it seems likely to move
farther away from involvement in upstream manufacture and, arguably, become more
vulnerable as a viable operation.
The other European locations with an involvement in Control Components include one
or more of the newer basic product technologies in their repertoire (see Figure 5.3).
They are also concerned solely with the Components business, unlike Newhouse,
which has both Components and Home and Building Controls activities under its roof.
With basic electromechanical switch manufacture and successor technologies
increasingly centred elsewhere, Newhouse's role is open to debate, especially if its
mission is characterised as being centred on electromechanical devices. It is the
location for the Microswitch Centre of Excellence but, even during the period of the
present research, certain key members of the electromechanical design staff as well
as the market research and communications manager were made redundant and the
318
Product Marketing Manager responsible for AOM and Industrial products moved to
reside in Brussels. It is increasingly difficult, certainly for AOM products, to
determine where within the Centre of Excellence the excellence remains.
5.7.3 Manufacturing Strategy and the Implications of Low Volumes
Despite various combinations of technology and market conditions, and technology
and marketing responses that are differentiated accordingly, the strategy documents
set out the same manufacturing initiatives for all three product groups (see Table
5.11). Under the umbrella 'World-Class', this cluster of manufacturing-related
initiatives is grouped under the headings of Design, Manufacturing, Supply-Chain and
TQM and includes a comprehensive selection of recently in-vogue manufacturing
techniques e.g a focus on primary processes, FMEA, SPC, Cellular manufacturing.
Whilst there are some technology and market factors that are stated as being common
to all product groups - increasing price competition, transferable technology - it has
to be recalled that in manufacturing terms the businesses are very different to one
another. There are many ways in which the manufacturing task (Skinner, 1969) differs
from one group to another. At this stage in the analysis, consideration of volume and
variety can be used to characterise the manufacturing task, and there is extensive
evidence throughout the case that there are orders of magnitude of difference between
the groups on these dimensions. It seems doubtful that identical manufacturing
responses are suitable to each product group.
319
Table 5.11 Business Strategy and Manufacturing Strategy
Business Unit a u. Strategy Inplerrentation 'Cost to Save' Le.
Manufactising
Carrnercial Invest to Grow Various Product-
Specific Initiatives
1/\brld-Class
Everything
Industrial Invest to Hold Various Product-
Specific Initiatives
ACM Invest to Hold Various Product-
Specific Initiatives
The project was explicitly directed at product customisation, and AOM/EN products
were identified as a suitable focus for that subject. In subsequent discussions however,
the Product Marketing Manager referred to the project as the work 'on low volume
product'. Other product groups involve the production of customised products in very
high volumes. For example, the appliance market, within the Commercial product
group, may involve production of hundreds of thousands of one customised switch for
a domestic appliance OEM. Bear in mind also that one Product Manager, when asked
what were 'standard' products, commented (apparently in all seriousness) that
'Standard products are whatever we make the most of. It is useful to consider how
much of the difficulty results from the low volumes per se, and how much from the
fact of the products' being customised. Starting with the production process itself, the
AOM section is well-suited to producing low volumes. General-purpose machines and
multi-skilled operators, a standard production batch of ten units kitted to order: these
are all features that would be expected from a process type (Hill, 1993) chosen on the
basis of low volume and high variety.
320
The most notable infrastructure difficulty was that production planning and control
was carried out on the same system for the whole plant. The confusion of information
systems made it extremely difficult to gain clear visibility of the AOM or EN
production issues. Furthermore, these information systems were singularly useless
when it came to communicating multi-level BOMs. The prospect of defining clearly
a product structure for the switch panel products discussed earlier was clearly a new
departure and, as such, it is perhaps unsurprising that there were difficulties in
communicating between design, materials management and the shop floor.
Furthermore, performance is measured in terms of switches completed. This is seen
on the shopfloor as somewhat meaningless, bearing in mind the length and
complexity of the assembly process.
5.7.4 Marketing - Manufacturing
The literature discusses at considerable length the conflicts between the marketing and
manufacturing functions (e.g. Shapiro, 1977; Crittenden, Gardiner and Stamm, 1993).
The evidence here indicates that this is not the most important boundary. The Product
Manager is nominally part of marketing but speaks of 'we' as including him and the
shop floor against the 'them' of the sales affiliates. Geography is important - 'all the
risks are at Newhouse' rather than 'all the risks are with manufacturing'; apart from
the affiliates, the other target is the Honeywell US operation, which is not surprising
considering the very powerful position the above analysis shows them to hold, both
as competitor and supplier. There was, by comparison, very little discussion of
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Honeywell's competitors.
The Product Manager's characterisation of what sales affiliates want - 'faster
response, lower prices, new products' - is exactly in keeping with the literature on
marketing-manufacturing conflicts, although surprising again in that the comment is
made by someone nominally within marketing. It is also between sales and marketing,
rather than between marketing and manufacturing, that the largest gulf seems to exist
in respect of understanding the implications of customisation - although the apparent
naivety as to the engineering and production consequences may be convenient rather
than genuine.
5.7.5 Product-Range and Customisation
European marketing communications clearly stress high product variety and
customisation at just about every opportunity. There is some evidence that this has
been an explicit strategy, intended to raise entry barriers. There is other evidence that
this has been a gradual drift or, even if originally intentional, has gone too far
('customised beyond recognition'). Interestingly, although the Control Components
Strategy document mentions 'new product development' for all three product groups,
it never mentions product range breadth or customisation. The only reference made
to a related subject is the explicit statement of intent to 'forward integrate' AOM
switches, which will usually involve customised solutions.
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The firm's experiences of becoming involved in forward-integrated customised
products in AOM, notably the control panel type of product, shows some important
inconsistencies. These products are presented, for example in the catalogue, as just
another series in the AOM range. The reality is that a very small number of different
models have ever been made. The very significant example, described above (5.6.3),
of two panels produced for one UK customer is illustrative of the reality of
Honeywell's undertaking this kind of business. This became the most high-profile
example of poor delivery performance in the whole plant, leading to exchanges
between the Directors of the two firms. It was, according to the AOM Product
Manager, 'a bad scene'; 'We wouldn't do this sort of business again - it's tin-bashing
really'. Apart from involving hardly any material-conversion processes that Honeywell
have any particular ability in, the multiple-level BUM in itself was something that
caused a great deal of difficulty. The plant's manufacturing information system
revolved around products of two to three BUM levels at most. The AOM Product
Manager, on reflection, rued never having drawn up 'a simple family tree of which
parts went in which panel' as a basis for communication between engineers,
procurement and the shop floor. Most products were such that everything could be
clearly understood from one assembly drawing: the medium of the structured BUM
had not become a basic communication tool, as it is in many other industries. The
Production Planning Manager commented that he had doubts as to whether the BUM
had ever been correct.
This product drew on very few of the firm's strengths and played on many of its
weaknesses. The Honeywell switches that were incorporated into it were the very
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simple and very old TL/TWs and offered no particular distinctive advantage over
anything a competitor could offer. The rest of the process steps involved were just the
type of thing that the firm had relatively recently gone to considerable lengths to stop
doing. This led to an unusually complicated procurement exercise involving the
purchase of parts, few of which were similar to parts purchased for other products
e.g. the fabricated sheet steel panel housings. The assembly process was of a very
different nature to those in which considerable expertise had been developed, such as
the specialised welding used in EN assembly. One notable difficulty was with
installing the harnesses of cables leading from the individual switches to the external
connectors: this involved a special aide-memoire jig to be developed on the shop floor/
so that the cable routing could be consistently carried out.
Not only in production did the panel product exceed Honeywell's capability. A
number of the panels delivered fairly early on failed tests at the customer. Honeywell
had initially underestimated the testing regime and had to go to sub-contract test-
houses offering the specialised testing facilities required by the customer. The product
also had to be redesigned to enable it to pass these tests, incurring considerable delay
and extra expense.
5.7.6 Sales Project Decisions
The criteria that the AOM Product Manager reckons to apply to SP decision-making
are problematic. In particular, the questions 'Does it [the SP] fit the strategy?' and 'Is
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it derived from the catalogue?' are difficult to answer. Also, there are very big
problems with 'balancing' engineering costs against projected revenues.
It is not clear that there is any strategy, certainly not for customisation and arguably
nothing coherent for EN or AOM products more generally. From the Control
Components Strategy document, we have the 'invest to hold and maintain' policy for
AOM, plus the more specific statements of intent to forward integrate switches, cost
reduce the EN range and invest in New Product Development. It is evident that at
least some of the forays into forward integration have been disastrous - unsurprising
in that many of the capabilities required for forward integration are precisely those
that Honeywell has either never had or of which it is and has been rapidly divesting
itself. A broad programme of cost reduction on EN switches may or may not be
appropriate, but it is difficult to see how this policy can inform any decision about
which SPs to pursue and which to reject. Similarly, intention to invest in New Product
Development does not help any individual SP decisions - nor how that or the 'invest
to hold and maintain' policy is effected through making redundant the engineers who
designed the products.
Determining whether a proposed SP is 'derived from the catalogue' is also difficult.
Firstly, as outlined above, there is no consistency from series to series as to what is
included in the catalogue in the first place. In some instances the catalogue is quite
clear and exhaustive and it would be apparent when a new product represented a
departure from the catalogue and, in some way, how much of a departure. In other
instances the catalogue entry amounts to an invitation to design your own switch and,
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as such, most things imaginable could be construed as being 'derived from the
catalogue'. Secondly, even where what is 'in' the catalogue can be defined with some
certainty, there is no indication as to how far, or in what way, new products are
permitted to be 'derived' from it.
Estimating costs and revenues for the purposes of some kind of business assessment
is problematic. Determining costs entails the following difficulties:
- small changes in volumes affect unit costs significantly, especially
where tooling is required
- the typical delay before the start of production and the long,
intermittent production life make costing, more than usually, a matter
of predicting a distant and probably very different future
- costs often have to be estimated without a trial build
- once production begins, actual labour cost reporting is poor and not
reflective of engineering /management time
_	 there is little or no information on design costs
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Revenues are unpredictable because:
- there is a long life-cycle even for OEM production
- after-market volumes and prices are largely unknown
customers' projects are subject to delays , which has knock-on effects
on the timing of Honeywell's revenue stream.
Furthermore, linking the two together is made very difficult because of the absence
of any information system that explicitly connects an SP, with its associated design
costs and projected volumes and production costs, to the information on actual
volumes and costs of switch or switches that are produced as a result of the SP. This
not only makes it difficult to control individual contracts, but also to learn in any
objective way which types of business are the most rewarding. No wonder then, that
the Product Manager repeatedly bemoans the lack of useful information; also no
wonder that 'gut feel' is still seen as an important tool in deciding which SPs are
attractive.
5.7.7 Design Cycle and Material Cycle
Information concerning costs of the design activities and values and timing of the
revenue stream from production are but one facet of the relationship between design
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of a new AOM product variant and its manufacture. The unusual characteristics of the
business also influence what the important issues are at each stage of a contract, how
this affects relationships with customers, and how design and manufacturing activities
are best managed to achieve success.
A number of respondents indicated that being responsive technically at the design
stage is vital to winning business. This includes the solving of customers' problems
and doing so quickly - in the form of submitting drawings and possibly prototypes.
Delivery of production volumes may not begin until a year or two after this stage and
so a great deal rests on trust in uncertain circumstances. By the time production
proper begins, it may well be very difficult or impossible for the customer to change
supplier and so such factors as delivery speed and delivery reliability can only be
promises about a quite distant future on the part of Honeywell.
In the situation where a relatively small number of customers keep coming back to
Honeywell - through lack of alternative, lack of incentive to seek out any alternative,
or a combination of the two - these customers have the chance to build up experience
of how well Honeywell perform when it does come to delivering production volumes.
Thus there are two indicators of performance in the material cycle (Harrington, 1973)
in any given contract - learning from the material cycles of previous contracts and
indications as to the likely performance from the design cycle. This contrasts with a
very short-cycle ship-from-stock type of business where customers can learn very
quickly and with very little cost how well suppliers perform. As such, it is misleading
to talk in simplistic terms about order-winners (Hill, 1993).
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This view gains more weight from the fact that, in the UK at least, the number of
customers is very small and, far from making atomistic sales to customers making
simple decisions based on price, delivery etc of the current offering, transactions are
carried out in exceedingly complex, enduring and multi-faceted relationships. From
the small number of contracts examined in more detail, it will be clear that the sales
force are (ostensibly) interested in relationships and accounts as much, if not more,
than individual products:
'I am trying to promote us as a company who can supply all their
witch and sensor needs; I don't want competitors getting au visibility
in the account. I need you to do this SP for me even though it isn't very
financially attractive to you.' (from a memo from afield sales engineer
to the AOM Product Manager).
This point will be developed further in Chapter 8.
As is apparent from the shop floor observations in the case, there is 'rarely the luxury
of a trial build'. Even when there was a design engineer intimately involved with all
the SPs, the long wait between prototyping and the start of full production meant that
considerable effort was involved in re-learning what had been established during
prototyping. Also, as prototypes were usually produced in the model shop, rather than
in the production shop, not all that had been learnt would be applicable anyway.
Following the move to ad hoc and temporary design engineers, the amount of
continuity between design and production was even further reduced.
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Although the generic EN switch process was fairly thoroughly documented in process
sheets and subject to FMEA analysis, none of the listing-specific process variations
were formally documented. In view of the large number of unique special products
and the often long intervals between batches, it was often necessary to 're-learn' hard-
won lessons on listing-specific process idiosyncrasies. This approach, referred to by
the management accountant as 'hand-crafting' means that there is perpetual difficulty
in predicting the work content and cost of products, particularly but not exclusively
the first time they are made.
,
/
5.7.8 Summary of Honeywell Case Analysis
Honeywell's Newhouse AOM/EN operation is at something of a crossroads. It has a
very mature basic product technology, newly complex and competitive markets
becoming more European-centred, and a potentially troublesome relationship with its
US sister operation which, through larger scale and more purposeful organisation,
holds a powerful position both as a supplier to the Newhouse plant and as competitor
with it for higher-volume more standard EN products.
Newhouse has either to compete with this (and its newly-active external competitors)
by trying to do the same thing - investing to produce higher volumes of 'standard'
products at lower cost; or it has to find another way to compete. All the indications
are that there is no willingness to pursue the former course of action, viz withdrawal
of Product Management and Engineering resources from the business and the
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subcontracting of many EN-related processes. Even were there a will to invest in
high-volume plant, the more fragmented European market is unlikely to offer any
prospect of this type of business.
Positioned as it is in a much more fragmented and dynamic European market (despite
corporate ambitions for 'global' reach), Newhouse's AOM operation must act
accordingly. It is essential that the plant fills the apparent vacuum in manufacturing
strategy and explicitly positions itself to compete in such markets. In many regards,
this is a matter of manufacturing infrastructure design (Hill, 1993: 212-262; Hayes
and Wheelwright, 1984) rather than investment in process equipment, and will be
relevant well beyond the allegedly-imminent demise of the electromechanical limit
switch as base technology of the AOM products. Put another way, an infrastructure
designed to achieve, say, fast delivery of low volumes of the current products will
also be suitable to provide the same competitive criteria for products based on solid-
state technology and should thus be seen as a long-term development that will provide
sustainable competitive benefit.
The AOM range must be reviewed by Sales, Marketing, Engineering and
Manufacturing, and much more explicit decisions be made about which products are
custom-built and which are custom designed. Conflicts between these are at the heart
of many of the problems experienced; the distinction between 'standard' and 'special'
products is less relevant and less meaningful. It is evident that fast response at the
design stage for custom-designed product is important. This can take the form of
concept design, quotation, detail design, prototype. This is shown schematically in
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Figure 5.16. Newhouse must, through provision of facilities, information and people,
become the best at this for AOM products. Many more of the customers than has
been the case will be new to Honeywell and, whereas a long-established relationship
might have been sufficient with existing customers, the response to initial contacts will
count for a good deal with new customers. Responses such as that to described in the
chronologies above will not engender confidence.
Figure 5.16 Different Pre-Production Activities for Custom-Build and Custom-Design
Project
Type
Key Acfivities in Approdmate Sequence
Custom-
Designed
Design Deliver
drawings
Deliver
Prototypes
Iterate
Design
Issue
Design
Production
Custom-
Built
Engineer
Application
Deliver
Sample
Iterate 	 Production
When it comes to supplying prototypes of custom-designed products, and samples of
custom-built products, procurement and supplier relationships are important. And, if
this is to be a source of competitive advantage, it is unlikely to be realised by having
to 'scurry around' for ad hoc design engineering staff - explicit provision must be
made. (This is one aspect of the suggested way forward that may need to remain
technology-specific i.e. designers may need to specialise in electromechanical or solid-
state technology, although much of the work is nothing to do with the core switch,
but with the housing, connectors and other distinguishing features.)
In short, as well as developing strategies at the levels of products and markets, of
technologies and core products (such as fluid controls) Newhouse must explicitly
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differentiate its AOM manufacturing and procurement strategy to make it highly
responsive regardless of base product technology. It must move on from seeing
manufacturing as a 'cost to serve' markets.
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